In our previous coverage of the Carson matter we discussed what appears to be a pay-for-appeal scandal, arising from the case of Dr. John Carson Sr., M.D. In our initial article we mentioned the fact that several plaintiffs’ firms had filed a motion to intervene in the Carson case. See the documents from the motion to intervene here.

Jim Onder, as well as other major players in the RoundUp litigation will be speaking at the MTN Four Day Mass Tort Immersion Course June 11th – June 14th (register here). Attendees will be provided with up-to-date substantive information on the Roundup settlement negotiations. While newsworthy under the category of “bizarre,” the matter covered herein should not be considered substantive. We are covering a side show. Jim and others will give you a peek inside the “big tent” at our upcoming course.

Since our first article related to the deal Bayer made with plaintiff John Carson Sr., M.D., Bayer has publicly, and in court filings, fired back at the attorneys that filed the motion to intervene, although for the most part, Bayer/Monsanto’s utterances have been without significant, relevant substance, one of Bayer’s contentions seems to conflict with other prior contentions:

1. Bayer/Monsanto has made no secret of the fact that their appeal scheme involving Dr. John Carson Sr. is at least, in part, motivated by the desire to obtain an appellate ruling in the 11th Circuit or on further appeal to SCOTUS, that would benefit them in their defense of the remaining, approximately 125,000 Plaintiff cases.

2. However, when certain attorneys representing the interest of some of the 125,000 plaintiff cases filed a motion to intervene in the Carson appeal, Bayer/Monsanto filed a response asking the court to disregard these third parties’ filings, claiming that they have no interest in the very appeal that was filed with the intent (at least in part) of affecting those interests.

A more reasonable argument would be, the appeal court refusing to consider and hear the pleadings and interests of these third parties, would constitute a denial of the due process rights of these individuals.

Bayer/Monsanto seems to want to have their cake and eat it too:

Having their cake: We want to get appellate rulings that will help us defend against cases brought by Plaintiffs not initially named in the appeal. We want to dispose of the interest those third parties have in their claims against our organization, and this appeal will hopefully help.

Eating it too: Those third party plaintiffs that we hope to deprive of their interest in part via the Carson appeal, lack the necessary interest to intervene and be heard in the very appeal we hope will ultimately extinguish their interests.


Normally, when an appellate court renders an opinion, the matter (case) is remanded back to the lower court, for further adjudication in accordance with the appellate ruling.

In the Carson case, the parties reached a private settlement agreement. Carson amended his complaint to drop the remaining claims that were not found to be preempted. The lower court then entered final judgement in favor of Bayer Monsanto and closed the case on March 30, 2021. (see below)

The settlement agreement, between Bayer and Carson was never filed or entered the docket of the lower Court in any manner. Now Bayer seeks to file a copy of the settlement agreement under seal in the appeals court in support of their argument pushing back against intervenors as well as in support of their arguments that the agreement is relevant to the appeals courts jurisdiction. The first question that must be ask is; How can appellate jurisdiction, in any way, rely or turn on evidence never summitted to nor considered by the lower Court?

Reports of Bayer’s public statements regarding intervenor action:

“Under the settlement, the company agreed to pay Carson $100,000 to drop the surviving design defect claims and to pursue the preemption ruling against him,” Bayer said in the statement. “If he succeeds in the appeal, he gets an additional substantial payment. If Carson drops the appeal, he would simply have to return the $100,000 settlement payment because he would be in breach of its terms. Thus, plaintiffs’ characterization of the $100,000 as a ‘penalty’ in a court filing is completely false, and nothing more than an effort to block this appeal on federal preemption grounds which threatens their interests in this litigation.”

Bayer’s statements are conclusive of the fact that regardless of the outcome of the appeal, there would be nothing for the lower court to adjudicate (reconsider) based on the appeal ruling, as the terms of the settlement agreement governs what occurs after the appeals court rules.

Federal Appellate Court Jurisdiction is limited to the authority to rule on errors in law and abuses of discretion by lower courts. Appellate Courts do not exist for the purpose of playing arbiter of agreements between private parties that are inherently extra judicial, unless and until a breach of said agreement is alleged and an action is filed arising from said breach, over which Federal Jurisdiction would then have to be proven to exist. More simply stated, it is not within the jurisdictional powers of a Federal Appellate Court to hear and rule on matters over which the resulting outcome does nothing more than determine the amount of money that one party pays, or another receives, arising from a private extra judicial agreement.

Stated differently, if no change or reconsideration of a lower court ruling would occur, regardless of the outcome of an appeal, that said appeal is not within the scope and purpose and jurisdiction of Federal Appellate Courts.


Without regard to the intervenors’ motion, the 11th Circuit has an absolute obligation to affirmatively determine whether Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction exists over the Carson appeal. Federal Courts are under a continuing obligation to affirmatively assure themselves of their jurisdiction over matters, even if no party (or third party) raises a jurisdictional challenge. See in general Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 US 83 – Supreme Court 1998, Arbaugh v. y & H Corp., 546 US 500 – Supreme Court 2006, Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 US 574 – Supreme Court 1999, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694 – Supreme Court 1982.

Voluntary dismissal, moreover, may precede any analysis of subject matter jurisdiction because it is self-executing and moots all pending motions, obviating the need for the district court to exercise its jurisdiction. See Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2 of the Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 452 F.2d 794, 797-98 (5th Cir.1971) University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco, 168 F. 3d 405 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1999 Id at 409.

It is, by now, axiomatic that the inferior federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They are “empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,” and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress. Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir.1994).


Federal Jurisdiction over private settlement agreements is an often misunderstood topic. Parties to a case may agree and seek a consent order in which the Federal Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. Otherwise, a settlement agreement is a contract governed by state law, under a given State courts jurisdiction, like any other contract.

For Federal Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement, the settlement agreement must be incorporated into a consent order issued by the lower court. No copy of the Carson/Bayer settlement was filed in the lower court, much less incorporated into a consent order.

“Mere involvement in the settlement, however, is not enough. There must be some official judicial approval of the settlement and some level of continuing judicial oversight. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1835”.

The point that is often missed or misunderstood regarding a Federal Courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement, is contingent on one party alleging breach of the agreement and instituting a new and fresh case and controversy arising from said breach, over which the Federal Court could then (and only then) exercise its retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement.


“Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred and defined by statute. It cannot be created by the consent of the parties, see Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam), nor supplanted by considerations of convenience and efficiency, see, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 929 (2d Cir.1998), Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F. 3d 1255 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2000 Id at 1261.

“More specifically, the Court did not determine whether a plaintiff could achieve a sufficient “alteration in the legal relationship of the parties” through a settlement entered without a separate consent decree. In fact, private settlements were mentioned only in a footnote, which observed that private settlements do not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal. Id. at 604 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. at 1840 n. 7 (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994)). American Disability Ass’n, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F. 3d 1315 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2002 Id at 1319 also see Anago Franchising, Inc. v. SHAZ, LLC, 677 F. 3d 1272 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2012.


In our previous article, we mentioned the fact that a young attorney named John Caron Jr., who appears to the be the son of the plaintiff John Carson Sr. was added to the Certificate of Interest Parties filed by Carson on 04/02/21.

On 04/21/28 as part of the reaction to the intervenors motion, Bayer/Monsanto files a second Certificate of Interested Parties, with no mention of Attorney John Carson Jr.

At minimum, this appearance and sudden disappearance of John Carson Jr. from the appeal record deserves a “Hmmm” or rather a “Hmmmmmmmmmmm!”

John Ray

John Ray has been a leading consultant to the Mass Tort industry for over a decade. His unique skill sets make him well suited to both teaching and consulting in the Mass Tort arena. As a 21-year old graduate of Brenau University in Atlanta, John graduated Magna Cum Laude and started a pharmaceutical and medical device company right out of school, selling it in an eight-figure deal when he was 35. John’s tenure in the pharmaceutical and medical device field allowed him to gain an in-depth understanding of FDA regulatory matters, as well as, a thorough understanding of the science and epidemiology related to gaining FDA approval to market pharmaceuticals and medical devices. John’s inside knowledge of how “Big Pharma” operates gives him a unique perspective and skill sets that are very useful to Mass Tort plaintiff firms. When John brought his “insider knowledge” and business acumen to the Plaintiff Mass Tort Space, one of the first things he recognized was a lack of common terminology and well defined metrics. John realized that firms were expressing the same concepts, but were not using the same terminology. As a result, John set out to define common terms and create methods for formulating important metrics for use by Mass Tort firms when evaluating litigations. The terminology and metrics John Ray developed are now commonly used by major Mass Tort Law firms. John is highly sought after and writes White Papers about both current and emerging torts, which are highly coveted in the industry. The accuracy of John’s analysis of emerging and ongoing litigations is unmatched. The fact that John not an attorney has proven to be an asset. John thinks like a business person, employing creative problem solving and possesses an extensive set of business skills and industry specific knowledge. He assists Mass Tort firms in making sound business decisions before and during any litigation they are involved in or are considering becoming involved in. John is an expert at evaluating cases and looks at each tort as an individual “investment,” which can be quantified resulting in risk mitigation for you and your firm.