XARELTO INITIAL ROCKET & EINSTEIN CLINICAL TRIALS NOW SEEN AS FLAWED: ADD THE MAY 2018 FAILURE OF TWO LATEST BAYER/JANSSEN STUDIES = BAD SCIENCE

Xarelto Study Red Flags Ignored: Why were medical research professionals ignored when red flags were raised over the viability of the Xarelto Rocket AF and Einstein DVT study results? Now the clinical trials for both are considered flawed, and the two most recent studies, the “Commander HF” and “Mariner,” failed to produce clear evidence that Xarelto is able to reduce the rate of blood clots in certain high-risk patients or after an acute decline in their condition.

By Mark A. York (October 23, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) Xarelto (rivaroxaban) is a prescription blood thinner created by Bayer and Janssen Pharmaceuticals that was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2011. This drug is an anticoagulant for preventing blood from clotting, often used to treat deep vein thrombosis, atrial fibrillation, pulmonary embolism, stroke, and other conditions.

More than one study has shown Xarelto can cause a higher rate of internal bleeding, than other anticoagulant drugs and until very recently, there was no available “antidote” for stopping internal bleeding in patients taking Xarelto. With warfarin, vitamin K has been shown to stop bleeding but there is no vitamin K “parallel” for people taking Xarelto. For Xarelto, it can take 24 hours for a dose to get out of the body. That means that if internal bleeding starts, the patient may simply have to wait it out and hope it stops on its own.

What The Medical Studies Say About Xarelto?

The FDA has received thousands of adverse event reports regarding Xarelto and medical studies have examined the safety of this drug:

  • New England Journal of Medicine (2011): Published the ROCKET-AF study, which compared Xarelto to Warfarin in patients suffering from atrial fibrillation. This was the biggest clinical trial of this medication and it compared the effects of Xarelto to the effects of a similar drug known as Warfarin in over 14,000 patients. The study concluded that “there was not significant between-group difference in the risk of major bleeding.”
  • Archives of Internal Medicine (2012): The study discussed the risk of uncontrollable bleeding outweighing the benefits for several different blood thinners including Xarelto. The researchers in this study found that there was a tripled risk of bleeding among the patients, who were given the drug, and no improvement in overall survival rates.
  • Institute for Safe Medication Practices (2012): Issued a report based on FDA data from the first quarter of 2012. During this period, the FDA received 356 adverse event reports of Xarelto side effects including “serious, disabling, or fatal injury.” Additionally, 158 reports indicated blood clots were the serious side effect.
  • New England Journal of Medicine (2013): Published the results of the MAGELLAN study, which found that Xarelto may carry an increased risk of bleeding.
  • Medscape (2013): Xarelto is associated with a higher risk of bleeding in certain patients. It caused a nearly 3-fold increase of the risk of bleeding in “acutely ill patients” and 4-fold increased risk of major bleeding in patients that had “Acute Coronary Syndrome” (ACS).

Drug Makers Failed To Disclose Faulty Device In Xarelto Trials

 Rivaroxaban and the ROCKET AF trial issue chronicles: A closer look at benefit risk profile of the drug.

  • BMJ2016354 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i5131 (Published 28 September 2016)Cite this as: BMJ 2016;354:i5131
  • Study Analysis: There has been a lot of hue and cry over the recent question raised about the ROCKET AF[1] trial for rivaroxaban which was the only trial used by the company for drug approval from USFDA. This is indeed a very important concern as it directly impacts the well-being of the patients who are at the receiving end of this very highly prescribed anticoagulant drug in 2014.[2] The main concern with this whole confusion surrounding the ROCKET AF trial is that the device used for measuring the INR in trial arm of warfarin patient was faulty and gave lower INR values than it should have, leading to over dosing of warfarin and thereby increasing bleeding problems with the same, compared to the trial arm of rivaroxaban. However, there has been a reanalysis done by the ROCKET AF researchers, which again reinforced the prior result database of the trial and which was accepted by FDA as well[3]. In the reanalysis, the US FDA clearly mentioned that the effect of the faulty device results in causing bleeding episodes, both minor and major, was minimal.[4]
  • However, following this reanalysis, not everyone who raised the question in the first place was convinced and there was a demand that the data of the complete ROCKET AF trial should be made public for everyone to assess and understand the risks. But since the trial was done and results released before the principles on responsible clinical trial data sharing came into effect, the parent pharmaceutical company for rivaroxaban refused to share the patient level details, citing concerns on privacy and transparency policy [5].
  • In spite of everything said and written for and against this issue, a simple question arises, regarding the amount of belief, honesty and hard work that goes without questioning when you bring a new chemical entity to the research stage, get it approved and then bring it to market. For this to happen, there have to be maintained a very fine balance between pharmaceutical companies, drug regulatory authorities and marketing people. In this case, after initial suspicions, the drug regulatory authorities have cleared and supported the approval of rivaroxaban after reanalysis and that should have a say, in case we want to continue trust with this process of drug entry into the market.
  • Rivaroxaban has shown its efficacy and safety both in patients who required adequate anticoagulation e.g. those who had atrial fibrillation and underwent cardioversion. There are few other trials where rivaroxaban has performed better or equally good than warfarin in terms of both efficacy and safety [6]. These results lead us to believe that all was not wrong with the ROCKET AF trial results. All these, combined with personal experiences of those physicians who had been using the drug rivaroxaban for the last couple of years with a hugely favorable result clearly imply that the drug rivaroxaban is holding its side strongly in the midst of all the controversies surrounding its approval and efficacy and it is here to stay. Adding a last word to all this discussion is that rivaroxaban will always hold an upper hand compared to warfarin when prescribed because of its very favorable and easy to use once daily dosing. We cannot discard all the positive reports and positive experiences associated with this drug, based on real time data, only because of the question raised by some, and considering the fact that the question had been satisficatorily answered with a re analysis with no change in the result.

What Did Or Didn’t The FDA Do About Xarelto?

  • In July, 2011, the U.S Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initially approved the medicine for sale on the market for a limited group of people. This included people who had knee or hip replacement surgery because they were considered to be at a higher risk of blood clotting. Read the FDA News Release here.
  • In November, 2011, Xarelto was approved for a larger group of people, including people with an abnormal heart rhythm, and was used to prevent stroke. Read further.
  • In June, 2012, an FDA advisory panel voted against approving this medicine for the treatment of acute coronary syndrome.
  • In November, 2012, Xarelto was later approved for general treatment of deep vein thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE) after a fast track regulatory review by the FDA. Read more.
  • October 22, 2014, the FDA issued a recall for approximately 13,500 bottles of Xarelto after receiving a customer complaint about contamination in a sales sample.
  • January 12, 2015 – An antidote may have been discovered by Portola Pharmaceuticals for Xarelto. A late-stage clinical trial of the intravenous medication, andexanet alfa, met its goal of “immediately and significantly” reversing Xarelto.

The approval history for Xarelto was actually pretty controversial. FDA reviewers originally said that they recommended against approval, then there was an FDA advisory committee (independent group of key opinion leaders) and they voted in favor, so the FDA approved the drug. Their concern was with how the Phase III trials were run and whether Xarelto had really proved its efficacy. The tests compared patients on warfarin to patients on Xarelto, but the patients on the warfarin run had poor TTR. That means the patients weren’t well controlled on warfarin to begin with, which skews the data in favor of Xarelto.

During the approval process, Xarelto actually wanted a superiority label, which would say that the drug was better than warfarin and other blood thinners. Because of the concerns with the Phase III data, the FDA only gave them a non-inferior label, which says they’re essentially the same in terms of effectiveness.

The INRatio device was the subject of two FDA warning letters about inaccurate readings just as the trial was starting in 2005 and 2006. In 2014, the device was recalled. The use of the INRatio device may have skewed the results with inaccurate readings, making Xarelto look better in comparison with warfarin.

In a 2017 annual report issued by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP), it was stated that oral anticoagulant drugs, including Xarelto (rivaroxaban), showed “unacceptably high risks,” according to two government data sources, the FAERS adverse events reports for 2016 and a new systematic study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Overall, the CDC found in its systematic study that the FDA’s FAERS voluntary reporting underestimates anticoagulant drug-related injuries. The CDC discovered that approximately 228,600 emergency department visits occur each year due to the use of blood thinner drugs, including Xarelto, which is 10 times more than the FAERS total number of voluntary reports.

Xarelto Clinical Trial Red Flags

Controversy Surrounding ROCKET-AF: A Call for Transparency, But Should We Be Changing Practice?

Jason D Matos1 and Peter J Zimetbaum1,,2

Arrhythm Electrophysiol Rev. 2016 May; 5(1): 12–13.

doi:  [10.15420/aer.2016.24.2]

Prior to the emergence of novel oral anticoagulants (NOACS), nearly all patients were prescribed vitamin K antagonists for thromboembolic prophylaxis in non-valvular atrial fibrillation (AF). Rivaroxaban (Xarelto, Bayer/Johnson & Johnson), an oral factor Xa inhibitor, is now one of the most frequently prescribed NOACs used for this indication.1,2

ROCKET-AF (Rivaroxaban Once Daily Oral Direct Factor Xa Inhibition Compared with Vitamin K Antagonism for Prevention of Stroke and Embolism Trial in Atrial Fibrillation), published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2011, demonstrated the non-inferiority of rivaroxaban compared with warfarin for the primary prevention of stroke or systemic embolism in patients with AF. This double-blinded randomised trial, which included 14,264 patients across 45 countries, also showed no significant difference in the risk of major bleeding between these two groups.3

Rivaroxaban use in AF has become widespread since the publication of this trial and US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. Two additional Factor Xa inhibitors, apixaban and edoxaban, have also been evaluated in similar randomised trials and have demonstrated non-inferiority to warfarin for stroke or systemic embolism prophylaxis in patients with non-valvular AF with no significant difference in major bleeding.4,5

In recent months, the results of ROCKET-AF have come into question after the FDA issued a recall notice for the device used to obtain International Normalised Ratio (INR) measurements in the warfarin control group. The FDA found that lower INR values were seen with the ‘point-of-care’ INRatio Monitor System (Alere) compared with a plasma-based laboratory in patients with certain medical conditions.2 These conditions included abnormal haemoglobin levels, abnormal bleeding and abnormal fibrinogen levels.6Since the FDA recall of this device, there has been widespread concern that falsely low INR readings in ROCKET-AF may have led to warfarin overdosing. Inappropriately high warfarin dosing could have increased bleeding rates in the control group and therefore made the rivaroxaban arm appear falsely favourable.7 This point-of-care device recall also highlighted a lack of transparency of the specifics of devices used in large clinical trials.

In response, the authors from ROCKET-AF released a correspondence in February 2016, citing the FDA recall. They also provided a post hoc analysis of patients who may have been affected by the recall. They found that major bleeding was greater in patients with conditions affected by the recall, but, reassuringly, the bleeding risk was greater in those who were on rivaroxaban and not warfarin.6

Despite this post hoc analysis, concern has arisen regarding the generalisability of ROCKET-AF given the faulty point-of-care INR readings. There has been a call for complete transparency of the data from this trial and a better explanation of the mechanism of the incorrect INR measurements.7

Once published, the data supporting an FDA-approved treatment should be available for independent analysis. One issue is that rivaroxaban was approved in the US prior to 1 January 2014, before a new transparency policy on clinical trial data sharing was approved by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).2 Drug companies are refusing to share any data on pharmaceuticals approved before 2014.

A device malfunction in a large clinical trial also should raise concern, especially when that trial has altered clinical practice for millions of patients. On review of Patel et al’s correspondence regarding the point-of-care malfunction, there is inadequate explanation of the mechanism of these faulty readings. Why are they only seen only in patients with abnormal haemoglobin and fibrinogen levels? How inaccurate could the readings be – within 0.1 or 1.0 of a gold standard value? Most alarming is the revelation that the manufacturer had evidence of faulty readings in similar models dating back to 2002.2

Despite legitimate concerns regarding the absence of data transparency and the faulty point-of-care device, rivaroxaban need not be removed from clinical practice for AF patients. In ROCKET-AF, the drug demonstrated non-inferiority to warfarin in preventing thromboembolic events. In addition, data has shown that patients potentially affected by the faulty point-of-care device actually bled more on rivaroxaban than warfarin.6 Therefore, the original risk–benefit ratio presented in ROCKET-AF remains true.

There are other, albeit smaller, randomised trials with shorter follow-up times that compare rivaroxaban and warfarin for thromboembolic prophylaxis.8,9 For example, Cappato et al in 2014, randomised 1,504 patients to show that oral rivaroxaban was non-inferior to warfarin in preventing a composite endpoint of stroke, transient ischaemic attack, peripheral embolism, myocardial infarction and cardiovascular death in patients with AF undergoing cardioversion. Major bleeding rates in the rivaroxaban and warfarin arms were similar (0.6 % versus 0.8 % respectively).8

The prospective observational trial XANTUS (Xarelto for Prevention of Stroke in Patients with Atrial Fibrillation) followed 6.784 patients on rivaroxaban for AF during a mean time of 329 days at 311 different hospitals. Major bleeding occurred in 128 patients (2.1 events/100 patient years) and 43 patients (0.7 events/100 patient years) suffered a stroke. These numbers are more reassuring than those seen in ROCKET-AF, though the patient population had a lower risk profile, with an average CHADS2 score of 2.0 compared with 3.5 in ROCKET-AF.10

To further mitigate concern regarding inaccuracies of bleeding rates in the ROCKET-AF control group, it is helpful to compare bleeding rates in the warfarin arms of the other major NOAC trials. The RE-LY (Randomised Evaluation of Long-Term Anticoagulation Therapy) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.4%/year.11 The ARISTOTLE (Apixaban for Reduction in Stroke and Other Thromboembolic Events in Atrial Fibrillation) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.1%/year.4 The ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48 (Effective Anticoagulation with Factor Xa Next Generation in Atrial Fibrillation-Thrombolysis in Myocardial Infarction 48) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.4 %/year.5The warfarin arm of ROCKET-AF had a 3.4 %/year major bleeding rate, comparable to the other studies. Furthermore, the ROCKET-AF patients are known to be at higher risk for stroke and bleeding; their average CHADS2 score was highest among these studies (3.5 compared with 2.1–2.8).3 In addition, ROCKET-AF had a very high percentage of patients with a HAS-BLED score ≥3 (62 %) compared with the other studies (23 % in ARISTOTLE and 51 % in ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48).1214

Several large randomised trials have compared the safety and efficacy of rivaroxaban versus warfarin for venous thromboembolic disease. The warfarin arm of the EINSTEIN-PE trial (Oral Direct Factor Xa Inhibitor Rivaroxaban in Patients with Acute Symptomatic Pulmonary Embolism), which randomised patients with pulmonary embolism to warfarin or rivaroxaban, had a major bleeding rate of 2.2 %. The bleeding rate was lower in the rivaroxaban arm (1.1 %) and notably patients received a higher loading dose of rivaroxaban for the first 3 weeks (15 mg twice daily) compared with the daily 20 mg daily in ROCKET-AF.15

The recent uncertainties surrounding ROCKET-AF demonstrate the need for widespread data transparency for major trials with the capability of so greatly affecting patients’ lives. These are complicated issues both for the companies’ manufacturing products and the clinical trial organisations who carry out these studies and analyse the data. Ultimately the goal of full transparency to allow increased confidence in trial results should be sought. In this instance there is no compelling evidence of imminent danger of excessive bleeding with rivaroxaban. We should take notice of the recent findings, but there is no need to change practice.

What Are Xarelto Side Effects?

The most dangerous Xarelto side effect is uncontrollable bleeding. Blood thinning drugs have also been associated with bleeding complications. Other side effects include:

  • Blood clots
  • Gastrointestinal bleeding
  • Spinal bleeding
  • Intracranial bleeding
  • Epidural bleeding
  • Cerebral bleeding
  • Stroke
  • Difficulty breathing

For Information on Xarelto and other mass torts see:

Michael Brady Lunch will speak on the Xarelto litigation as well as the status of Pradaxa litigation and related issues at the upcoming Mass Tort Nexus “CLE Immersion Course”

November 9 -12, 2018 at The Riverside Hotel in Fort Lauderdale , FL.

For class attendance information please contact Jenny Levine at 954.520.4494 or Jenny@masstortnexus.com.

  • For the most up to date information on all MDL dockets and related mass torts visit  masstortnexus.com and review our mass tort briefcases and professional site MDL briefcases.
  • To obtain our free newsletters that contain real time mass tort updates, visit masstortnexus.com/news and sign up for free access.
  • WWW.MASSTORTNEXUS.COM

REFERNCES CITED IN STUDIES SHOWN ABOVE

 Rivaroxaban and the ROCKET AF trial issue chronicles: A closer look at benefit risk profile of the drug. References:
BMJ 2016354 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i5131 (Published 28 September 2016)Cite this as: BMJ 2016;354:i5131
  1. Patel MR, Mahaffey KW, Garg J, et al. Rivaroxaban versus warfarin in nonvalvular atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med 2011; 365:883-891. Article
    2. Top 50 pharmaceutical products by global sales. PMLiVE, Available here.
    3. FDA analyses conclude that Xarelto clinical trial results were not affected by faulty monitoring device.https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm524678.htm
    4. ROCKET AF Reanalysis Reviews.http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2011/202439Orig1s000Ro…
    5. Joint EFPIA-PhRMA Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing Become Effective.http://www.efpia.eu/mediaroom/132/43/Joint-EFPIA-PhRMA-Principles-for-Re…
    6. Cappato R, Ezekowitz MD, Klein AL, et al. Rivaroxaban vs vitamin K antagonists for cardioversion in atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J 2014; 35:3346-3355.

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Controversy Surrounding ROCKET-AF: A Call for Transparency, But Should We Be Changing Practice? References
Jason D Matos1 and Peter J Zimetbaum1,,2 Arrhythm Electrophysiol Rev. 2016 May; 5(1): 12–13.; doi:  [10.15420/aer.2016.24.2]
  1. Kubitza D, Becka M, Wensing G, et al. Safety, pharmacodynamics, and pharmacokinetics of BAY 59-7939 – an oral, direct Factor Xa inhibitor – after multiple dosing in healthy male subjects. Eur J Clin Pharmacol. 2005;61:873–80. PMID: 16328318. [PubMed]
  2. Cohen D. Rivaroxaban: can we trust the evidence? BMJ. 2016;352:i575. DOI: 10.1136/bmj.i575; PMID: 26843102. [PubMed]
  3. Patel MR, Mahaffey KW, Garg J, et al. Rivaroxaban versus warfarin in nonvalvular atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:883–91. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1009638; PMID: 21830957. [PubMed]
  4. Granger CB, Alexander JH, McMurray JJ, et al. Apixaban versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:981–92. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1107039; PMID: 21870978.[PubMed]
  5. Giugliano RP, Ruff CT, Braunwald E, et al. Edoxaban versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2013;369:2093–104. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1310907; PMID: 24251359. [PubMed]
  6. Patel MR, Hellkamp AS, Fox KA, et al. Point-of-care warfarin monitoring in the ROCKET AF Trial. N Engl J Med. 2016;374:785–8. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc1515842; PMID: 26839968. [PubMed]
  7. Mandrola J. Rivaroxaban: It’s not time to cut the rope, yet. Medscape. 9 February 2016. Available at: www.medscape.com/viewarticle/858648. (accessed 6 May 2016.
  8. Cappato R, Ezekowitz MD, Klein AL, et al. Rivaroxaban vs. vitamin K antagonists for cardioversion in atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J. 2014;35:3346–55. DOI: 10.1093/eurheartj/ehu367; PMID: 25182247.[PubMed]
  9. Cappato R, Marchlinski FE, Hohnloser SH, et al. Uninterrupted rivaroxaban vs. uninterrupted vitamin K antagonists for catheter ablation in non-valvular atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J. 2015;36:1805–11. DOI: 10.1093/eurheartj/ehv177; PMID: 25975659. [PMC free article] [PubMed]
  10. Camm AJ, Amarenco P, Haas S, et al. XANTUS: a real-world, prospective, observational study of patients treated with rivaroxaban for stroke prevention in atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J. 2016;37:1145–53.DOI: 10.1093/eurheartj/ehv466; PMID: 26330425. [PMC free article] [PubMed]
  11. Connolly SJ, Ezekowitz MD, Yusuf S, et al. Dabigatran versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2009;361:1139–51. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa0905561; PMID: 19717844.[PubMed]
  12. Sherwood MW, Nessel CC, Hellkamp AS, et al. Gastrointestinal bleeding in patients with atrial fibrillation treated With rivaroxaban or warfarin: ROCKET AF trial. J Am Coll Cardiol. 2015;66:2271–81.DOI: 10.1016/j.jacc.2015.09.024; PMID: 26610874. [PubMed]
  13. Lopes RD, Al-Khatib SM, Wallentin L, et al. Efficacy and safety of apixaban compared with warfarin according to patient risk of stroke and of bleeding in atrial fibrillation: a secondary analysis of a randomised controlled trial. Lancet. 2012;380:1749–58. DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60986-6; PMID: 23036896. [PubMed]
  14. Eisen A, Giugliano RP, Ruff CT, et al. Edoxaban vs warfarin in patients with nonvalvular atrial fibrillation in the US Food and Drug Administration approval population: An analysis from the Effective Anticoagulation with Factor Xa Next Generation in Atrial Fibrillation-Thrombolysis in Myocardial Infarction 48 (ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48) trial. Am Heart J. 2016;172:144–51. DOI: 10.1016/j.ahj.2015.11.004; PMID: 26856226. [PubMed]
  15. EINSTEIN-PE Investigators, Buller HR, Prins MH, et al. Oral rivaroxaban for the treatment of symptomatic pulmonary embolism. N Engl J Med. 2012;366:1287–97. DOI: 10.1056/ NEJMoa1113572. PMID: 22449293. [PubMed]

 

 

 

 

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Pradaxa Federal Court Trial Win: $1.25 million verdict-with punitives of $1 million in death case

Betty Erelene Knight (Deceased), Claude R. Knight   vs. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  Docket No. 3:15-cv-06424; Judge Robert C. Chambers (United States District Court-Southern District of West Virginia)

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) A federal jury has awarded the family of a deceased West Virginia woman $1.25 million after finding that Boehringer Ingelheim failed to warn of risks associated with its blood thinner Pradaxa, causing her to suffer gastrointestinal bleeding.

The federal trial in Huntington, WV, (US District Court Southern District of West Virginia) awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages to the estate of Betty Erelene Knight and her husband Claude R. Knight, and added $1,000,000 more in punitive damages. The jury added the large punitive award after plaintiff counsel showed that Boehringer Ingelheim engaged in wanton and willful acts in handling of its blockbuster drug Pradaxa, primarily in failing to warn of the risks.

The October 17th plaintiffs’ verdict was the first trial win in the country against Boehringer Ingelheim the German drugmaker, showing that the blockbuster drug is dangerous. The Pradaxa defense team had won three earlier trials for the company, and this verdict on behalf of  the estate of Erelene Knight and her surviving spouse Claude, shows that juries can be convinced of the dangers including fatal risks related to Pradaxa. Mrs. Knight, who was in her 80’s passed away while taking Pradaxa.

She suffered from an irregular heartbeat, a condition that often leads to the development of blood clots, which can travel into the brain and cause a stroke. The plaintiff’s doctor stated that she was at “high risk of stroke.”

Prior to being prescribed Pradaxa, her doctors initially prescribed Coumadin, another prescription blood thinner. Because of the risk of uncontrolled bleeding with this particular drug, the victim required “frequent monitoring” which is what the Pradaxa marketing teams focused on, when meeting with doctors while marketing Pradaxa as a “safer alternative to Coumadin.”  Eventually, the victim grew weary of the inconvenience of such monitoring and learned about Pradaxa, which performs a similar function to Coumadin, from a television commercial.

Her doctor agreed to switch her to Pradaxa, and after about 18 months on the drug, she started to suffer from severe, uncontrolled internal bleeding. At one point she required surgery, which significantly weakened her and set into motion a decline in her health. Within several months of the surgery Erelene Knight passed away. Defense vigorously attempted to point the finger at other health conditions and place blame on anything besides Pradaxa, which failed as the punitive damage award of $1 million showed that the jury clearly saw that Boehringer Ingelheim knew the risks of Pradaxa, yet continued offering the drug without sufficient warnings.

The winning plaintiff trial team consisted of the Childers, Schlueter & Smith Firm and partner  Andy Childers, Neal Moskow of Ury & Moskow, LLC and Yvette Ferrer of Ferrer Poirot & Wansbrough. Congratulations to everyone, as the mass tort world looks forward to additional plaintiff verdicts in the many other Pradaxa cases pending in dockets around the country.

WHAT IS PRADAXA?

·        Pradaxa is an anticoagulant medication used to reduce the risk of stroke and blood clots in patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation (AF), the most common type of heart rhythm abnormality.

·        The safety and efficacy of Pradaxa were studied in a clinical trial comparing Pradaxa with the anticoagulant warfarin. In the trial, patients taking Pradaxa had fewer strokes than those who took warfarin.1

·        From approval in October 2010 through August 2012, a total of approximately 3.7 million Pradaxa prescriptions were dispensed, and approximately 725,000 patients received a dispensed prescription for Pradaxa from U.S. outpatient retail pharmacies.2

Rulings Prior to Trial

The estate’s lawsuit against Boehringer Ingelheim, focused on Pradaxa’s label, asserting claims that the company knew that “certain blood plasma concentrations of Pradaxa increased the risk of a major bleed without contributing any additional stroke prevention benefit.” This risk was actually disclosed on labels for Pradaxa in Europe, but not the United States at the time of the victim’s care. Boehringer also knew that patients should not take Pradaxa if they also use P-gp inhibitor drugs, which Erelene Knight did. And while the company later altered its label to include this information, it did not directly inform doctors of the risk.

Based on all this, the judge presiding over the case ruled the estate presented sufficient evidence to submit the question of liability for “failure to warn” to the jury. Defense protested that at the relevant time, Pradaxa contained a general warning that the drug “can cause serious and, sometimes, fatal bleeding.” But whether or not this was an “adequate” warning given what BI allegedly knew, but failed to disclose on the original U.S. label, will be for the jury to decide.

How the favorable verdict predicts future trial outcomes in not only Pradaxa cases currently pending around the country, but in the more than 25,000 Xarelto blood thinner cases that are filed in the Xarelto MDL 2592 litigation, see Mass Tort Nexus Briefcase XARELTO-(rivaroxaban)-MDL-2592-USDC-ED-Louisiana (Judge Eldon Fallon), and in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, see XARELTO-Case-No-2349-in-Philadephia-Court-of-Common-Pleas–Complex-Litigation-(PA-State-Court). There are several bellwether trials set for the Philadelphia Xarelto cases in 2019, where Laura Feldman and Rosemary Pinto of the Philadelphi firm of Feldman & Pinto, will be co-lead counsel for the trial team.

Michael Brady Lunch will speak on the Pradaxa litigation as well as the status of Xarelto and related issues at the upcoming Mass Tort Nexus “CLE Immersion Course”

November 9 -12, 2018 at The Riverside Hotel in Fort Lauderdale , FL.

For class attendance information please contact Jenny Levine at 954.520.4494 or Jenny@masstortnexus.com.

For the most up to date information on all MDL dockets and related mass torts visit  www.masstortnexus.com and review our mass tort briefcases and professional site MDL briefcases.

To obtain our free newsletters that contain real time mass tort updates, visit www.masstortnexus.com/news and sign up for free access.

WWW.MASSTORTNEXUS.COM

 

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The Week In Mass Torts By Mass Tort Nexus for December 18, 2017

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By Mark York, Mass Tort Nexus Media

(December 21, 2017)

New Jersey Supreme Court Review Reinstatement Of Accutane Experts

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently granted petitions and cross-petitions to appeal a state appellate court’s reversal of expert exclusions in the state’s Accutane multicounty litigation and the reinstatement of 2,076 dismissed cases (In Re:  Accutane Litigation, C-388 September Term 2017, C-329 September Term 2017 and C-390 September Term 2017, N.J. Sup.) See Mass Tort Nexus Accutane Briefcase Accutane New Jersey State Court Litigation.

New Trial Denied in 3rd Xarelto MDL Bellwether Case After Defense Verdict

Judge Eldon Fallon, overseeing the Xarelto multidistrict litigation, recently denied a motion for a new trial by the plaintiff in the third bellwether trial, where Bayer was found not liable in the Dora Mingo trial that took place in a Mississippi federal court in front of Judge Fallon. He ruled that plaintiff was unsuccessful in presenting new findings, among other things, that the plaintiff’s “newly discovered evidence” is actually cumulative of previously known and admitted evidence (In Re:  Xarelto [Rivaroxaban] Products Liability Litigation, MDL Docket No. 2592, E.D. La., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205422). See Mass Tort Xarelto Briefcase for the entire Mingo trial transcripts as well as full transcripts of the Orr and Boudreaux trials, XARELTO MDL 2592 US District Court ED Louisiana Including Trial Transcripts.

 With Last 2 Cases Gone, Pradaxa MDL Judge Again Recommends Termination

With the final two pending cases now closed, the Illinois federal judge overseeing the Pradaxa multidistrict litigation on Dec. 11 again recommended that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPMDL) terminate the MDL (In Re:  Pradaxa [Dabigatran Etexilate]Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2385, No. 12-md-2385, S.D. Ill.).  After a global settlement was reached in 2014 with defendant Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals Inc., the JPMDL suspended the transfer of tag-along actions into the MDL, and now the judge has moved for termination of the Pradaxa MDL. However, there remains over 700 Pradaxa cases pending in the State Court of Connecticut, Complex Litigation Docket, known as “Connecticut Pradaxa Actions”, see Mass Tort Nexus Pradaxa Case Briefcase,  Connecticut Consolidated Pradaxa Litigation.

Boehringer To Pay $13.5M To End Off-Label Marketing Claims

Drugmaker Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals Inc. has agreed to distribute $13.5 million among all 50 states and the District of Columbia to end allegations that it marketed four of its prescription drugs for off-label uses, attorneys general announced Wednesday.
The settlement would resolve allegations that Boehringer marketed its prescription drugs Micardis, Aggrenox, Atrovent and Combivent for uses that weren’t approved by their labels or backed by scientific evidence. (Getty) The settlement, of which New York will receive about $490,000, would resolve allegations that the drugmaker marketed it products for off-label use, which often leads to unknown or studied adverse events and medical complications for patients taking these drugs for unapproved purposes.

 J&J Fined $30 Million Over French Opioid Drug Smear Campaign In Efforts To Sell Fentanyl Patch

France’s antitrust enforcer fined Johnson & Johnson and its Janssen-Cilag unit €25 million ($29.7 million) on Wednesday for hindering the marketing and sale of a generic version of the company’s Durogesic pain patch.The French Competition Authority found that Janssen and J&J had not only successfully delayed a generic competitor for the powerful opioid for several months, but had also done lasting damage by discrediting rival versions of the drug with doctors and pharmacists in a country where medical professionals still remain reluctant to opt for prescribing opioids.  The J&J conduct reflects the same claims being asserted against opioid drug makers in the US, where lawsuits have been consolidate into Opiate Prescription Litigation MDL No. 2804, in the US District Court of Ohio, see Mass Tort Nexus Opioid Crisis Briefcase, OPIOID CRISIS MATERIALS INCLUDING: MDL 2804 OPIATE PRESCRIPTION LITIGATION.

11th Circuit Affirms Pelvic Mesh Group Trial, Exclusion Of 510(k) Status

(October 24, 2017, 1:25 PM EDT) -The 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals on Oct. 19 said multidistrict litigation court judge did not err in consolidating four pelvic mesh cases for a bellwether trial and in excluding the so-called 510(k) defense raised by defendant Boston Scientific Corp. (BSC) (Amal Eghnayem, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corporation, No. 16-11818, 11th Cir., 2017)   See Mass Tort Nexus Mesh Case Briefcase, All Pelvic Mesh Litigation Case Files.

Preemption Summary Judgment Reversed By 9th Circuit In Incretin Mimetic MDL Appeal

The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals on Dec. 6 unsealed its Nov. 28 opinion reversing summary judgment in the incretin mimetic multidistrict litigation, saying the MDL judge misapplied a U.S. Supreme Court precedent, improperly blocked discovery, misinterpreted what constituted new evidence and improperly disqualified a plaintiff expert (In Re:  Incretin-Based Therapies Products Liability Litigation, Jean Adams, et al. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., et al., No. 15-56997, 9th Cir., 2017 )

Pennsylvania Appeals Court Affirms $29.6M Remitted Zimmer Knee Judgment

A Pennsylvania appeals court panel on Dec. 15 said a trial judge did not err when remitting a Zimmer Inc. knee verdict to $29.6 million and said it declined to substitute its judgment in place of the jury’s (Margo Polett, et al. v. Public Communications, Inc., et al., No. 80 EDA 2017, Pa. Super., 2017 Pa. Superior Court)

Risperdal Gynecomastia Cases Barred By Michigan Shield Law, Pennsylvania Panel Says

A Pennsylvania state appeals panel on Nov. 28 affirmed the dismissal of 13 Risperdal gynecomastia cases, agreeing with a trial judge that the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by Michigan’s drug shield law and that the plaintiffs could not prove that the fraud exception

applied to their claims (In Re:  Risperdal Litigation versus Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., No. 55 EDA 2015, et al., Pennsylvania Court of Appeals, 2017.

U.S. Supreme Court Asks Solicitor General To Weigh In On Fosamax Preemption

The U.S. Supreme Court on has invited the U.S. solicitor general to express the views of the United States on whether there is “clear and convincing evidence” that the Food and Drug Administration would have rejected a stronger warning about femur fractures from the osteoporosis drug Fosamax (Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Doris Albrecht, et al., No. 17-290, U.S. Supreme Court)  This is a unique turn when the Supreme Court is seeking input from an outside agency in what is now a common legal issue placed in front of the court, where dug makers are using the FDA regulatory process as a shield in defending thousands of claims where warnings of drug dangers are not clear or not provided. See Mass Tort Nexus Fosamax Case Briefcase, FOSAMAX MDL 2243 (FEMUR FRACTURE CLAIMS).

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Attorneys Mistakenly Turn Down Xarelto Cases When Death Certificate Omits Internal Bleeding

John Ray has been a leading consultant to the Mass Tort industry for over a decade. His unique skill sets make him well suited to both teaching and consulting in the Mass Tort arena.
John Ray has been a leading consultant to the Mass Tort industry for over a decade. His unique skill sets make him well suited to both teaching and consulting in the Mass Tort arena.

By John Ray.

Even as Xarelto litigation grows ahead of the first bellwether trial in federal court MDL No. 2592, some plaintiff attorneys are mistakenly turning down cases if the death certificate does not specifically mention internal bleeding or ischemic stroke.

In our consulting practice at Mass Tort Nexus we are often asked if the cause of death listed on a death certificate does not mention bleeding or ischemic stroke deal — is that a fatal obstacle to filing a wrongful death case related to Xarelto, Pradaxa or Eliquis?

The simple answer is, possibly but often not.

Many mass tort lawyers see the upcoming bellwether trials on April 24 and May 30 as an opportune time to start or expand a Xarelto product liability practice. So far 15,611 cases lawsuits have been filed before US District Judge Eldon E. Fallon in Louisiana, up from 10,769 cases in September 2016. 

The federal lawsuits stem from allegations that the anticoagulant Xarelto could cause uncontrollable bleeding and hemorrhagic strokes. They accuse the drug’s manufacturers — Bayer Healthcare and Johnson & Johnson subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceuticals — of failing to warn about Xarelto’s potential risks. 

In parallel state court litigation in Pennsylvania, Judge Arnold L. New in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas amended the master and short form complaint to allow for Ischemic Stroke Claims to be made in that court.

What a death certificate is — and isn’t

A  death certificate is document that serves primarily as a public record of an individual’s death. These records are often used in a variety of statistical analysis.

The cause of death (COD) noted on a death certificate is not intended to be an expansive diagnostic review of all medical events that led to the death. In some cases, the person who issued the death certificate may not even be a medical practitioner.

In reviewing blood-thinners Xarelto, Pradaxa and Eliquis cases, the COD listed on the death certificate may not mention bleeding or any other condition known to directly occur as a result of using these drugs however,  this does not necessarily mean that it cannot be determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the given anticoagulant did not cause or contribute to the death.

Example: The cause of death on a death certificate may list heart attack, myocardial infarction or cardiac insult as well as other terms that fall under the more general term “heart attack.”

Should one automatically assume that the death, under this circumstance, cannot be attributed to the use of Xarelto, Pradaxa or Eliquis?  No!

Bleeding can cause heart attack

Do not allow the cause of death listed on a death certificate be the final determining factor in whether you continue to pursue a wrongful death action.

There is ample evidence in the medical literature “heart attacks” can be secondary to bleeding events. Heart attacks can be caused by sudden significant increases and decreases in blood pressure as well as the heart being deprived of oxygen, delivered by adequate blood flow.

If the death certificate lists any form of “heart attack” as the cause of death, further investigation is warranted to determine whether the use of any of the aforementioned drugs could have reasonably caused or contributed to the heart attack.

  • A significant bleed within two or three weeks before the heart attack resulting in death will have more likely than not caused or contributed to the heart attack.
  • A significant bleed can lead to permanent heart damage and can cause or contribute to a heart attack months or even years after the bleeding event. Obviously, the less time there is between the bleeding event and the heart attack makes for a less difficult argument.

It should be noted that in cases where the patient had a history of heart attacks or conditions which are known to lead to heart attacks such as late stage diabetes, for example, may make it more difficult to prevail in your argument.

When analyzing whether the bleeding event may have caused or contributed to the cause of death listed on the death certificate, it is important to understand a basic fact:

Bleeding is never the actual cause of death — events secondary to bleeding are the actual cause of death.

This statement can be difficult to wrap one’s head around as the term “bled to death” is so commonly used and is not inaccurate in the broadest sense. However, from a physiological perspective the true cause of death is always secondary to loss of blood. If insufficient blood volume exists vital organs that are highly dependent on oxygen and fluid volume can quickly fail resulting in death.

The takeaway from this article is: Do not allow the cause of death listed on a death certificate be the determining factor in whether you continue to pursue a wrongful death action.

Once you have a death certificate in hand, review the cause of death listed on the death certificate. After ascertaining the COD listed on the death certificate, as a first step simply Google “Can Bleeding Result in (insert cause of death listed).”

If the cause of death listed a condition that can be attributed to bleeding, then further review of the patient’s pre-death medical records is warranted to determine if there is a strong argument that the bleeding event caused or contributed to the condition listed on the death certificate.

Two Cautions

Late-stage cancers, particularly pancreatic and liver cancer, often result in bleeding regardless of whether the patient is receiving anticoagulant therapy or not. If the cause of death listed is a type of cancer that has a high mortality rate in late stages, then is would be far more difficult to argue that it was more likely than not that the anticoagulant caused the death versus the cancer.

In some cases, the cause of death may be listed as “natural causes” or even “old age.” Although no one dies of natural causes or old age, if such terms are listed as the COD, it may be more difficult, although not impossible, to show that the death was caused by the use of the anticoagulant. To demonstrate that the anticoagulant more likely than not caused or contributed to the death, medical records demonstrating a circumstance that would almost certainly lead to death would be needed.

This article is not intended to be medical or legal advice. Our goal is to provide issues to consider when evaluating Xarelto, Pradaxa and Eliquis cases as well as other cases in which the content of this article may apply.

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Considerations for Plaintiff Attorneys when Starting a Successful Mass Tort Practice

John Ray
John Ray

Mass Tort Litigation has emerged as the only effective check on pharmaceutical and medical device companies that make dangerous products injuring thousands of Americans. Mass tort attorneys have filed 140,000 lawsuits in 250 federal multidistrict litigation dockets as of September 2016.

Many attorneys are expanding their personal injury practices to include mass torts because the US Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has organized the litigation so effectively against the multi-billion-dollar drug and medical device industry.

“The FDA is not a check or a balance on the pharmaceutical industry,” said Mass Tort Nexus Consultant John Ray, recently teaching a four-day course about mass torts in Fort Lauderdale, FL. “Plaintiff attorneys are the only check on the pharmaceutical industry.”

In recent years mass tort lawyers have recovered $10 billion in settlements for injured Americans: $4.8 billion for Vioxx, $1.8 billion for Yaz, $1.3 billion for the Stryker hip and $2.5 billion for the DePuy hip.

“The drug companies bake these cases into their business model,” Ray said. “Defendants call it a win when they don’t put a warning on their labels, don’t get sued and don’t have to pay a judgment at all. This means they got away with it. That happens a lot.”

When a federal MDL is created, the supervising judge will approve a standard short-form or long-form complaint, plus a plaintiffs’ fact sheet which replaces interrogatories. The consolidation of cases means that a mass tort lawyer can file a notice of appearance and file cases regardless of the jurisdiction of the plaintiff, defendant company or the location of the plaintiff’s attorney.

Criteria for a viable case

Cases that are attracting many mass tort attorneys now involve Xarelto, IVC filters and Pradaxa. Among the many factors determining the viability of a mass tort are:

  • Preemption. Congress has expressly preempted certain claims. Further, courts have ruled that generic manufacturers cannot be sued.
  • Statute of limitations: State laws govern when the statute of limitations starts to run, but in most federal litigation, the date that the FDA issues a “black box warning” for a drug marks the date when the time limit begins to run.
  • Legal viability. In many cases, research will show a connection between a drug and injuries among patients, but specific causation must be proved in a trial. Experts must be found who will survive a Daubert motion to disqualify.
  • Financial viability of the defendant. While Johnson & Johnson had $46.8 billion in annual income in 2015, some small makers of IVC filters went out of business before they could sell one.
  • Average case value. The average Pradaxa case settled for $160,000 in 2014, with some settlements valued up to $500,000, according to a grid created by US District Judge David R. Herndon.
  • Plaintiff numerosity. Cases in the Syngenta Corn Market Crash Litigation involve every corn producer in America, and IVC Filters have been implanted in millions of patients over the last 40 years.
  • Cost per client acquired. Costs can add up with Facebook advertising, website marketing, and lead generation companies. For example, The Sentinal Group will advertise for clients for a fee of $100,000 to obtain 250 calls for Xarelto plaintiffs, with 1 out of 5 calls leading to a signed client.
  • Case duration. Mass torts are litigation for the long haul, with the average case lasting 5 years and 4 months before settlement, according to Ray, with 7 years being a good benchmark for the duration of a case.
  • Case value. An example of a good outcome is with Pradaxa. The average settlement is $162,000. Calculating 40% in gross contingent fees would equal $64,800. Another 7% is deducted ($4,536) for the common benefit to pay the steering committee. Of the remaining fee of $60,204, a 40% referral fee of $24,015 is deducted for the co-counsel that handled the litigation. This leaves a net fee of $36,189 for the attorney who originated the case.
  • Financial resources. Costs to fund a case can be in the tens of thousands of dollars, with costs reaching hundreds of thousands for members of the plaintiffs steering committee.
  • Personnel resources. A law firm will have to train a small army of intake specialists to answer incoming calls when advertising is running. Additional personnel will be needed to obtain and review medical records.

Perfect timing

There are three phases of mass tort litigation, and perfect timing will be needed to enter a particular case.

Emerging Phase Cases. In this early phase, the cost to acquire a client is the least expensive, but there many issues of case viability. For example, the courts are still considering motions to consolidate cases involving Abilify and Roundup. With Abilify the FDA has issued a safety warning but not a black box warning. With Roundup the EPA has not classified the herbicide as a carcinogen, but foreign governments have.

Litigation Phase Cases. It is considered an ideal time to enter into a mass tort when the JPML has created a multi-litigation docket (MDL). Some 250 MDLs include mature litigation involving Benicar, Lipitor, Viagra, Xarelto and Zofran, and many legal issues have been settled. The supervising judge will schedule bellwether or test cases for trial.

Settlement Phase Cases. This is the very safest time to enter litigation because all an attorney must do is find qualified plaintiffs. Example cases involve transvaginal mesh, Levaquin and Pradaxa. However at this late phase the cost to acquire a client is at its highest.

“Whatever you do, maintain your single-event plaintiff’s practice,” Ray advised. “You will have to keep paying the costs of a mass tort case until it settles, and you will need a huge cash supply or credit line.”

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700 New Pradaxa Cases Filed in Connecticut State Court

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

So far there are 700 cases and climbing in the litigation consolidated in Connecticut, according to mass tort expert John Ray of  Mass Tort Nexus in Fort Lauderdale, and plantiffs can file there regardless of the state or original jurisdiction.

Before the first case was tried in the federal MDL, German drug maker Boehringer Ingelheim settled 4,590 cases involving Pradaxa (Dabigatran) for a total of $650 million in May 2014. Patients and their families claimed that Boehringer failed to properly warn them that the drug, which is used to prevent blood clots, caused serious and sometimes fatal bleeding that could not easily be reversed.

The average case settled for $160,000 in 2014, with some settlements valued up to $500,000, according to a grid created by US District Judge David R. Herndon.

Shortly after its release to market in 2011, Pradaxa was surrounded by more than 3,500 reports of serious adverse events. More than 750 of these reports involved the death of a Pradaxa patient. The federal MDL was created in August 2012 and the settlement came only 18 months later. The litigation produced 80 million pages of documents and the deposition of 48 defense corporate witnesses.

Qualifications to file

According to Ray, who spoke in a National Trial Lawyers webinar, following are the criteria to file in the state court:

  • The action cannot be filed previously in the federal MDL.
  • The client was not represented (signed) prior to 05/28/2014.
  • Applicable law for a Pradaxa injury without a death:  Connecticut (with a 3-year statute of limitations).
  • Applicable law for a wrongful death case: state of original jurisdiction.
  • Filing deadline: 07/27/2017 for non-death cases. This date is set by the statute of limitations, and no case filed after this date will be viable in the Connecticut litigation.

Click to read more facts about the Connecticut Judicial Branch Complex Litigation Docket

 

 

 

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New Study to Investigate Long-Term Xarelto and Pradaxa Use

xarelto bleedingA patient-centered research institute is conducting two studies that will compare the effectiveness of Pradaxa, Xarelto and other oral blood thinners to determine what the long-term effects are.

The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) announced the $6.5 million studies to scrutinize anticoagulants including:

  • Warfarin
  • Dabigatran (Pradaxa, made by Boehringer Ingelheim)
  • Rivaroxaban (Xarelto, made by Janssen)
  • Apixaban (Eliquis, made by Bristol-Myers Squibb)
  • Edoxaban (Savaysa, made by Daiichi Sankyo)

The drugs are used to to treat clots and are often used for longer than the standard 3-month treatment period to prevent formation of additional clots, but the comparative safety and effectiveness of extended use is unclear, according PCORI.

Federal Xarelto Litigation is consolidated before US District Judge Eldon Fallon in MDL 2592 and the state litigation is consolidated in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas before Judge Arnold New. In the state MDL  Judge New has elected to allow “Efficacy Claims” to be filed in that MDL in addition to claims related to uncontrolled bleeding. Judge Fallon has yet to follow suit and may not.

Uncertainty about medications

Venous thromboembolism (VTE) causes more than half 500,000 hospitalizations and more than 100,000 deaths each year in the United States. VTE is typically treated with at least three months of an anticoagulant, or “blood-thinning,” medication. Afterward, patients are often given the option to extend anticoagulant treatment for a longer period to prevent VTE recurrence. Remaining on anticoagulants, however, can lead to serious bleeding complications and can be expensive and inconvenient for patients.

At present, there is much uncertainty about which medication is the best choice for extended VTE treatment, according to PCORI. Choosing the best anticoagulant strategy is particularly difficult when treating people of older age, people who have kidney disease, or people who have high bleeding risk, due to the scant evidence available on the relative benefits and harms in these populations.

The long-term goal of the project is to compare the benefits and harms of different anticoagulant options for the extended treatment of VTE, information that will be critical in helping clinicians and patients personalize their treatment decisions. The study focuses on people who have completed at least three months of anticoagulant treatment for VTE and compares the outcomes of 1) people who stay on anticoagulants with those who stop anticoagulants, and 2) those who are treated with extended warfarin compared with NOAC treatment. PCORI will also examine whether the benefits and harms of treatment differ by age, kidney function, or bleeding risk.

The study will be based in Kaiser Permanente Northern California and Kaiser Permanente Southern California, two large, integrated healthcare delivery systems that provide comprehensive medical care for more than 7.7 million patients in California. PCORI will identify in these health systems all adults treated for VTE from years 2010 to 2015 and collect information from electronic health records on their health history, anticoagulant treatment choices, and clinical outcomes. Next, PCORI will survey patients with VTE treated in more recent years (2014–2016) and measure their self-reported health, well-being, and satisfaction with treatment.

The main outcome of the study is the net benefit of one treatment strategy compared with another, measured in terms of the number of VTE events prevented and the number of bleeding complications induced. Because the study is an observational study of actual clinical care, PCORI will then apply advanced statistical techniques to maximize the validity of the results.

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Alere Recalls Inaccurate INRatio Blood Monitor for Patients Taking Pradaxa or Xarelto

Alere INRatio2 PT/INR Monitor System
Alere INRatio2 PT/INR Monitor System

Diagnostics company Alere Inc. announced  a voluntary withdrawal of the Alere INRatio and INRatio2 PT/INR blood Monitoring Systems.

Patients taking blood thinners like Coumadin, Jantoven, Warfilone (warfarin), Pradaxa (dabigatran), Xarelto (rivaoxaban), or Lovenox (enoxaparin), can to monitor their blood levels at home instead of at a lab, by using the Alere INRatio, INRatio2 PT/INR Monitor System, or INRatio Test Strips (collectively the Alere INRatio Monitoring System) to monitor their international normalized ratio (INR) while undergoing anticoagulation therapy.


For more, read our story Xarelto MDL 2592 Important Developments.


The monitor is supposed to perform a simple blood test, letting a patient and doctor doctor know if the medication is working properly or if a dose adjustment is needed.

Over the course of the past two years, Alere invested in the research and development of software enhancements to address the potential, in certain cases, of the system to deliver a result that differs from that of another measurement method.

FDA: Not effective

The FDA notified the company that it believes the company’s studies do not adequately demonstrate the effectiveness of the software modification and advised Alere to submit a proposed plan to voluntarily remove the INRatio device from the market.

Alere seeks an orderly transition for patients requiring anti-coagulation monitoring and will provide a timeline to discontinue the product line. Alere will provide further information on patient transition to patients and healthcare providers. The FDA suggest that patients speak with their healthcare providers prior to making any changes to their current PT/INR monitoring practices.

In other news, Alere Inc. was hit with a securities fraud lawsuit on April 22, accusing it of artificially inflating its share prices ahead of the Feb. 1 announcement of its proposed $5.8 billion acquisition by Abbott Laboratories Inc.

The shareholder lawsuit, filed in federal court in Boston, accused Alere of misleading investors by stating that its financial reporting followed generally accepted accounting principles. The plaintiffs, a group of individual investors, cited a federal probe into the company’s accounting for overseas sales in arguing that Alere had not adhered to those principles.

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First of 15,000 Xarelto Lawsuits Heading for Trial

XARELTOWith the first of 15,000 lawsuits heading to trial on March 13 against the makers of blood-thinner Xarelto, Judge Eldon E. Fallon set a briefing schedule for dispositive motions and Daubert motions for the first two bellwether trials.

In pretrial order No. 2C filed on Dec. 20, the following briefing schedule is set for Xarelto MDL 2592 Federal Litigation:

For dispositive motions regarding the first two bellwether trials:

  • Motions and Briefs: December 30, 2016
  • Response in Opposition Briefs: January 26, 2017
  • Reply Briefs: February 3, 2017
  • Hearing and Argument (if necessary): February 10, 2017

For Daubert motions regarding the first two bellwether trials for experts whose depositions are concluded on or before December 15, 2016:

  • Motions and Briefs: December 30, 2016
  • Response in Opposition Briefs: January 23, 2017
  • Reply Briefs: February 3, 2017
  • Hearing and Argument (if necessary): February 10, 2017

For Daubert motions regarding the first two bellwether trials for experts whose depositions are concluded after December 15, 2016:

  • Motions and Briefs: February 3, 2017
  • Response in Opposition Briefs: February 24, 2017
  • Reply Briefs: March 3, 2017
  • Hearing and Argument (if necessary): March 8, 2017

14,465 actions have been filed in the federal MDL in Louisiana (up from 10,769 cases in October). Meanwhile, approximately 1,100 claims have been docketed in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and the number of claims before Judge Arnold New is increasing. The Philadelphia court has set 10 Xarelto cases for bellwether trials for next fall.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys are encouraged by actions taken with another new-generation blood thinner called Pradaxa that shares many similarities with the drug Xarelto. Rather than go to trial, Pradaxa’s maker opted to settle all the lawsuits with a $650 million settlement in Dec. 2014, with individual settlements ranging up to $500,000. It is the hope of many of the plaintiffs in the Xarelto cases that they will also be the beneficiaries of a settlement by the makers of Xarelto.

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