Bard Seeks Summary Judgment in IVC Filter MDL with Novel Preemption Argument

Bard IVC filter
IVC filters cause injuries from migration downward and upward. The IVC Filters can also tilt or shift, making them almost impossible to remove.

In a gambit to dismiss 1,700 lawsuits against its IVC filter, CR Bard is pressing a novel argument that the FDA’s quickie 510(k) approval process has become more rigorous, thus entitling it to a ruling that the plaintiffs’ state-law claims are preempted by federal law.

The argument is a stretch because courts have often declined to hold claims preempted where medical devices were cleared under the shortcut 510(k) process, as opposed to the more rigorous premarket approval (PMA) process.

All of Bard’s IVC filters involved in MDL 2641 – the Recovery, G2, G2, Express, G2 X, EclipseTM, Meridian, and Denali Filters — got approval via the lenient 510(k) process. The case is IN RE: Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, Case No. 2:15-MD-02641-DGC before US District Judge David G. Campbell in Arizona.

Changed greatly?

Bard argues in its summary judgment motion that the plaintiff’s master long and short form complaints, asserting state-law claims, are expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law.

FDA approval through Sec. 510(k) of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 merely requires that a new device is “substantially equivalent” to a predicate device — but not a review of its safety or efficacy as would happen in a premarket approval application (PMA).

“The 510(k) program has changed greatly since Lohr (Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996),” Bard argues. “In 1990, Congress dramatically altered the 510(k) process in section 12 of the SMDA (Safe Medical Devices Act). The language expressly linked FDA substantial findings to “safety” and “efficacy”/”effectiveness”:

[T]he term “substantially equivalent” or “substantial equivalence” means . . . that the device . . . (ii)(1) has different technological characteristics and the information submitted . . . contains information, including clinical data if deemed necessary by the Secretary, that demonstrates that the device is as safe and effective as a legally marketed device, and (II) does not raise different questions of safety and efficacy than the predicate device.

Bard says that in its 510(k) approvals:

  • The FDA required compliance with special controls.
  • FDA required Bard to conduct clinical studies of its filters.
  • FDA required additional testing, labeling, and other information during its review.

“These device-specific guidances are intended to address specific risks or issues related to specific devices or device types, and where, as here, FDA has required manufacturers to follow them, they become device-specific federal requirements entitled to preemptive effect,” Bard asserts.

Bard quotes an FDA  2010 Working Report, saying that “the 510(k) program has changed significantly since its inception…. Through various statutory and regulatory modifications over time, it has become a multifaceted premarket review process that is expected to assure that cleared devices, subject to general and applicable special controls, provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness, and to facilitate innovation in the medical device industry.”

Similar argument failed

A similar argument failed in a motion for summary judgment by Janssen in IN RE: Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Products Liability Litigation. In that case, US District Judge Eldon Fallon ruled:

“The Court in Levine [Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)] held that a state failure to warn claim against a brand-name drug manufacturer was not preempted by federal law, finding that Congress had clearly intended the judicial branch to work in concert with the FDA to protect against unnecessary risk,” the court held.

The judge added, “The court in Guidry [Guidry v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 15-4591, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115447, at *48 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2016)], relying on Wyeth, found that Plaintiff’s pre-market defective design claims under the LPLA [Louisiana Products Liability Act] were not preempted. “Federal law does not prevent a drug manufacturer from complying with this state-imposed duty before seeking FDA approval. Far from impossible, the two are complimentary, preferable, and perhaps necessary to protect the public health and assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs.”

Plaintiffs argue that IVC filters cause injuries as follows:

  • Migration downward and upward. The IVC Filters can tilt or shift, making them almost impossible to remove.
  • Device fracture, causing blood clots (embolism) in the heart, lung, liver and kidneys. Research shows that the devices experienced fracture rates of 37% to 40% after five and a half years.
  • Perforation, where stress on the IVC Filter struts leads to fractures that puncture adjacent organs and vessels.

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How did IVC Filters Obtain FDA Approval without Proving they were Safe and Effective

How did IVC Filters Obtain FDA Approval without Proving they were Safe and Effective?

 

In that the first IVC Filter device to be approved was the Mobin Uddin IVC Filter under the 510k process, the question arises “How does a device gain FDA approval under 510k when there is no predicate device.” The 510k approval pathway, (process) unlike the Prior Market Approval (PMA) pathway, only requires that the applicant claim that the product they seek approval for is “substantially equivalent” to a device that has already been approved by the FDA. (predicate device)

It is worth mentioning that an applicant for a 510k FDA approval does not have to use their own device as the predicate device, the applicant may use any manufacturers device as the “substantially equivalent” predicate device.

The answers to the question “How did so many IVC Filter devices gain FDA approval without being required to prove they were safe and effective” is found in the Medical Device Act of 1976 and the timing of the Mobin Uddin IVC Filter FDA approval.

Both the Kim Ray Greenfield IVC Filter  and the Mobin Uddin IVC Filter  were preamendment devices (In Commerce Prior to the Medical Device Act of 1976.) The Mobin Uddin was classified as a Class II and approved 5 months after the Medical Device Act of 1976 went into effect.

Mobin Uddin IVC Filter First Approved by the FDA
Mobin Uddin IVC Filter First Approved by the FDA

The Mobin Uddin IVC Filter was approved in August of 1976 . The Medical Device act of  1976 was passed in May of 1976. (See original 510k Approval for Mobin Uddin IVC Filter)

Due to the fact that the Modin Uddin IVC filter was a  preamendment device and the provisions of the act for preamendment devices applied to the FDA approval process for this device, it was not necessary for the Modin Uddin device to prove safety nor efficacy. In that no standard ( predicate) existed for IVC filters, the Mobin Uddin  devices became the standard essentially be default.

Because the Mobin Uddin was classified as a Class II (when it arguably should have been a III per the standards set forth in the Medical Device Act of 1976) the device was not required to undergo the PMA process. It appears that the only requirement for Class II preamendment devices was that the manufacture assure the FDA their devices were safe no proof of safety was necessary. Preamendment  devices were also not required to prove efficacy. In that the Mobin Uddin was approved 5 months after the Medical Device Act of 1976 took effect, we can assume that the FDA had its hands full with implementing the mandates of the act in 1976 and it was very easy for bad devices to be misclassified and improperly approved during this time period.

Once the Mobin Uddin was Classified as a Class II device and was approved under the 510k process, all other devices save the Cook Birdnest IVC Filter* have been approved under the 510k process.

Essentially, because the FDA arguably made a mistake in Classifying IVC Filters as a Class II Medical Devices and granted 510k approval for the Mobin Uddin IVC Filter, without any testing or proof of safety and efficacy, the IVC Filter as a product made it to market with FDA approval, without having to prove it was safe and effective. IVC Filters that followed used the Mobin Uddin as a “substantially equivalent” predicate device in their 510k applications. As more IVC Filter devices were approved via 510k, those newly approved devices were then used as predicate devices for approval of even more new devices. All of these IVC filters were approved by the FDA without a single device having to demonstrate safety or efficacy. (With the exception of the Birdnest IVC Filter which is a dramatically different design)

The proverbial train came off the track with the approval of the Modin Uddin IVC Filter and all subsequent devices that followed (with the exception of the Birdsnest IVC Filter) also gained approval without having to demonstrate that the devices were safe or effective due to what was obviously a mistake on the part of the FDA in 1976.

In conclusion, the answer to the question “How did IVC Filters obtain FDA Approval” without ever proving they were safe and effective” is simple. It all comes down to timing.  We bear the burdens of the mistake of those who came before us. In the case of the “IVC Filter” mistake the burden for many has been death and severe injury.

 

* The Cook Birdsnest IVC Filter was originally approved via PMA and there were nine supplemental approvals for the Birdsnest Filter through 2006. A modified version of the Birdnest was later approved under the 510k process citing the prior Birdnest design(s) as the predicate device. The Birdsnest IVC Filter has not been used as the predicate device for any other devices 510k applications as it’s design is dramatically different than other devices.

 

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