VALSARTAN U.S. SUPPLIERS IN CHINA AND INDIA ON FDA RECALL RADAR: SEE FDA WARNING LETTER TO ZHEJIANG HUAHAI PHARMACEUTICAL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations

Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical 11/29/18

 

 

10903 New Hampshire Avenue
Silver Spring, MD 20993

Via UPS                                                          Warning Letter: 320-19-04

November 29, 2018

Mr. Jun Du

Executive Vice President

Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.

Coastal Industrial Zone, Chuannan No. 1 Branch No. 9 

Donghai Fifth Avenue, Linhai, Taizhou Zhejiang 317016

CHINA

Dear Mr. Du:

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected your drug manufacturing facility, Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., located at Coastal Industrial Zone, Chuannan No. 1 Branch No. 9, Donghai Fifth Avenue, Linhai, Taizhou Zhejiang, from July 23 to August 3, 2018.

 This warning letter summarizes significant deviations from current good manufacturing practice (CGMP) for active pharmaceutical ingredients (API).

Because your methods, facilities, or controls for manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding do not conform to CGMP, your API are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).

We reviewed your August 26, 2018, response in detail and acknowledge receipt of your subsequent correspondence.

During our inspection, our investigators observed specific deviations including, but not limited to, the following.

  1. Failure of your quality unit to ensure that quality-related complaints are investigated and resolved.

Valsartan API

Your firm received a complaint from a customer on June 6, 2018, after an unknown peak was detected during residual solvents testing for valsartan API manufactured at your facility. The unknown peak was identified as the probable human carcinogen N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA). Your investigation (DCE-18001) determined that the presence of NDMA was caused by the convergence of three process-related factors, one factor being the use of the solvent (b)(4)). Your investigation concluded that only one valsartan manufacturing process (referred to as the (b)(4) process in your investigation) was impacted by the presence of NDMA.

However, FDA analyses of samples of your API, and finished drug product manufactured with your API, identified NDMA in multiple batches manufactured with a different process, namely the (b)(4) process, which did not use the solvent (b)(4). These data demonstrate that your investigation was inadequate and failed to resolve the control and presence of NDMA in valsartan API distributed to customers. Your investigation also failed:

  • To include other factors that may have contributed to the presence of NDMA. For example, your investigation lacked a comprehensive evaluation of all raw materials used during manufacturing, including (b)(4).
  • To assess factors that could put your API at risk for NDMA cross-contamination, including batch blending, solvent recovery and re-use, shared production lines, and cleaning procedures.
  • To evaluate the potential for other mutagenic impurities to form in your products.

Our investigators also noted other examples of your firm’s inadequate investigation of unknown peaks observed in chromatograms. For example, valsartan intermediates (b)(4) and (b)(4) failed testing for an unknown impurity (specification ≤ (b)(4)%) with results of (b)(4)% for both batches. Your action plan indicated that the impurity would be identified as part of the investigation; however, you failed to do this. In addition, no root cause was determined for the presence of the unknown impurity. You stated that you reprocessed the batches and released them for further production.

Your response states that NDMA was difficult to detect. However, if you had investigated further, you may have found indicators in your residual solvent chromatograms alerting you to the presence of NDMA. For example, you told our investigators you were aware of a peak that eluted after the (b)(4) peak in valsartan API residual solvent chromatograms where the presence of NDMA was suspected to elute. At the time of testing, you considered this unidentified peak to be noise and investigated no further. Additionally, residual solvent chromatograms for valsartan API validation batches manufactured using your (b)(4) process, with (b)(4) in 2012 ((b)(4), and (b)(4)) show at least one unidentified peak eluting after the (b)(4) peak in the area where the presence of NDMA was suspected to elute.

Your response also states that you were not the only firm to identify NDMA in valsartan API. In your case, FDA analyses of samples identified amounts of NDMA in valsartan API manufactured at your firm that were significantly higher than the NDMA levels in valsartan API manufactured by other firms. FDA has grave concerns about the potential presence of mutagenic impurities in all intermediates and API manufactured at your facility, both because of the data indicating the presence of impurities in API manufactured by multiple processes, and because of the significant inadequacies in your investigation.

In response to this letter:

  • Submit risk assessments for all APIs and intermediates manufactured at your facility for the potential presence of mutagenic impurities.
  • Provide an update on investigations and CAPA plans initiated to address the presence of NDMA and other potential mutagenic impurities in all APIs manufactured at your firm.
  • Provide a thorough, independent assessment of your overall system for investigating deviations, discrepancies, out-of-specification (OOS) results, complaints, and other failures. In addition, provide a retrospective review of all distributed batches within expiry to determine if your firm released batches that did not conform to established specifications or appropriate manufacturing standards.
  • Provide test results for all (b)(4)and intermediates for the presence of NDMA, N-Nitrosodiethylamine (NDEA), and other potentially mutagenic impurities.

(b)(4) API

Your firm received a customer complaint on September 13, 2016, concerning (b)(4) API batches ((b)(4) and (b)(4)) that exceeded the specification for (b)(4) (≤ (b)(4)ppm). (b)(4) has been classified as a probable human carcinogen. Your customer’s test results conflicted with your (b)(4) test results, which showed the two batches meeting the specification upon release. Your complaint investigation (CC-16008) identified no clear laboratory error, and no anomalies were detected during the production of the batches. Your investigation failed to evaluate other (b)(4) API batches to determine if the presence of excess (b)(4) was an adverse trend. For example, (b)(4)batches (b)(4), and (b)(4) were OOS for (b)(4) because of production errors; however, they were not discussed in your complaint investigation.

Your response states that (b)(4) API batches (b)(4) and (b)(4) were returned, reprocessed, and released to customers in non-U.S. markets.

Your response also states that in August 2017 you implemented a new (b)(4) test method that uses a (b)(4) LC-MS/MS method, to replace the (b)(4) LC-MS method that was prone to erroneous OOS results. You failed to verify the reliability of the (b)(4) results for all (b)(4) API batches (including (b)(4) batch (b)(4)) originally released using your (b)(4) LC-MS method, which you indicated was inferior to your updated method.

In response to this letter, provide:

  • A risk assessment for all (b)(4) API batches manufactured within expiry.
  • A revised complaint handling procedure and details of any further controls your facility has implemented to ensure that all complaints are adequately documented and thoroughly investigated.
  • Procedures for accepting and reprocessing returned drugs.
  • Results of (b)(4) testing of all (b)(4)API batches released to the U.S. market using your updated (b)(4) LC-MS/MS (b)(4) test method.
  1. Failure to evaluate the potential effect that changes in the manufacturing process may have on the quality of your API.

In November 2011 you approved a valsartan API process change (PCRC – 11025) that included the use of the solvent (b)(4). Your intention was to improve the manufacturing process, increase product yield, and lower production costs. However, you failed to adequately assess the potential formation of mutagenic impurities when you implemented the new process. Specifically, you did not consider the potential for mutagenic or other toxic impurities to form from (b)(4) degradants, including the primary (b)(4) degradant, (b)(4). According to your ongoing investigation, (b)(4) is required for the probable human carcinogen NDMA to form during the valsartan API manufacturing process. NDMA was identified in valsartan API manufactured at your facility.

You also failed to evaluate the need for additional analytical methods to ensure that unanticipated impurities were appropriately detected and controlled in your valsartan API before you approved the process change. You are responsible for developing and using suitable methods to detect impurities when developing, and making changes to, your manufacturing processes. If new or higher levels of impurities are detected, you should fully evaluate the impurities and take action to ensure the drug is safe for patients.

Your response states that predicting NDMA formation during the valsartan manufacturing process required an extra dimension over current industry practice, and that that your process development study was adequate. We disagree. We remind you that common industry practice may not always be consistent with CGMP requirements and that you are responsible for the quality of drugs you produce.

Your response does not describe sufficient corrective actions to ensure that your firm has adequate change management procedures in place: (1) to thoroughly evaluate your API manufacturing processes, including changes to those processes; and (2) to detect any unsafe impurities, including potentially mutagenic impurities. For FDA’s current thinking on control of potentially mutagenic impurities, see FDA’s guidance document M7(R1) Assessment and Control of DNA Reactive (Mutagenic) Impurities in Pharmaceuticals To Limit Potential Carcinogenic Risk for approaches that FDA considers appropriate for evaluating mutagenic impurities, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM347725.pdf.

In response to this letter, provide:

  • Detailed revised change management procedures describing how your firm will assess and control all impurities, including mutagenic impurities, in API and intermediates manufactured at your facility.
  • Detailed procedures describing how your firm establishes impurity profiles for products manufactured at your firm. These procedures should contain instructions for comparing at appropriate intervals against the impurity profile in the regulatory submission, or for comparing against historical data, to detect changes to the API resulting from modifications in raw materials, equipment operating parameters, or the production process.
  • A retrospective analysis of other API and intermediates manufactured at your firm to determine if they were adequately evaluated for anticipated and unanticipated impurities, including potentially mutagenic impurities.
     

CGMP Consultant Recommended

Based upon the nature of the deviations we identified at your firm, we strongly recommend engaging a consultant qualified to evaluate your operations and assist your firm in meeting CGMP requirements. Your use of a consultant does not relieve your firm’s obligation to comply with CGMP. Your firm’s executive management remains responsible for fully resolving all deficiencies and ensuring ongoing CGMP compliance.

 Quality Systems Guidance

 Your firm’s quality systems are inadequate. For guidance on establishing and following CGMP compliant quality systems, see FDA’s guidances: Q8(R2) Pharmaceutical Development, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm073507.pdfQ9 Quality Risk Management, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm073511.pdf; and Q10 Pharmaceutical Quality System, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm073517.pdf.

 Additional API CGMP guidance

FDA considers the expectations outlined in ICH Q7 in determining whether API are manufactured in conformance with CGMP. See FDA’s guidance document Q7 Good Manufacturing Practice Guidance for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients for guidance regarding CGMP for the manufacture of API, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/…/Guidances/ucm073497.pdf.

Conclusion

Deviations cited in this letter are not intended as an all-inclusive list. You are responsible for investigating these deviations, for determining the causes, for preventing their recurrence, and for preventing other deviations.

If you are considering an action that is likely to lead to a disruption in the supply of drugs produced at your facility, FDA requests that you contact CDER’s Drug Shortages Staff immediately, at drugshortages@fda.hhs.gov, so that FDA can work with you on the most effective way to bring your operations into compliance with the law. Contacting the Drug Shortages Staff also allows you to meet any obligations you may have to report discontinuances or interruptions in your drug manufacture under 21 U.S.C. 356C(b) and allows FDA to consider, as soon as possible, what actions, if any, may be needed to avoid shortages and protect the health of patients who depend on your products.

FDA placed your firm on Import Alert 66-40 on September 28, 2018.

Until you correct all deviations completely and we confirm your compliance with CGMP, FDA may withhold approval of any new applications or supplements listing your firm as a drug manufacturer.

Failure to correct these deviations may also result in FDA continuing to refuse admission of articles manufactured at Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., located at Coastal Industrial Zone, Chuannan No. 1 Branch No. 9, Donghai Fifth Avenue, Linhai, Taizhou Zhejiang, into the United States under section 801(a)(3) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 381(a)(3). Under the same authority, articles may be subject to refusal of admission, in that the methods and controls used in their manufacture do not appear to conform to CGMP within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).

After you receive this letter, respond to this office in writing within 15 working days. Specify what you have done since our inspection to correct your deviations and to prevent their recurrence. If you cannot complete corrective actions within 15 working days, state your reasons for delay and your schedule for completion.

 Send your electronic reply to CDER-OC-OMQ-Communications@fda.hhs.gov or mail your reply to:

Rory K. Geyer

Compliance Officer

U.S. Food and Drug Administration

White Oak Building 51, Room 4235

10903 New Hampshire Avenue

Silver Spring, MD 20993

USA

Please identify your response with FEI 3003885745.

Sincerely,

/S/

Francis Godwin

Acting Director

Office of Manufacturing Quality

Office of Compliance

Center for Drug Evaluation and Research

 

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MEDICAL DEVICE IMPLANT OVERSIGHT BY FDA IS NOT HAPPENING: WHY?

WHY THE MOTTO OF “PROFITS BEFORE PATIENTS” IS STILL THE BANNER: 

HERE’S A FULL REPORT

 By Mark A. York (November 26, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) For years, medical device companies have stated that the products they are developing and placing into the marketplace are safe and helping patients in the USA and worldwide. That is often not the case and people around the world are suffering.

Medical device makers and compensated doctors have touted FDA approved implants and other devices as the surgical cure for millions of patients suffering from a wide range of pain disorders, making them one of the fastest-growing products in the $400 billion medical device industry. Companies and doctors aggressively push them as a safe antidote to the deadly opioid crisis in the U.S. and as a treatment for an aging population in need of chronic pain relief and many other afflictions.

Why Device Makers Tout FDA Approvals

Manufacturer headlines like these instill consumer confidence that medical devices are safe and effective. After all, they have the FDA’s stamp of approval, right? NO!

The reality is, the FDA seldom requires rigorous evidence that a device works well–and safely–before allowing it onto the market. Medical devices are the diverse array of non-drug products used to diagnosis and treat medical conditions, from bandages to MRI scanners to smartphone apps to artificial hips.

This low standard of evidence applies to even the highest risk devices such as those that are implanted in a person’s body. Surgical mesh, pacemakers and gastric weight loss balloons are just a few examples of devices that have had serious safety problems.

Devices are subject to weaker standards than drugs because they’re regulated under a different law. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 was intended to encourage innovation while allowing for a range of review standards based on risk, according to legal expert Richard A. Merrill. An array of corporate lobbying has since prompted Congress to ease regulations and make it easier for devices to get the FDA’s approval.

In 2011, an Institute of Medicine panel recommended that the “flawed” system be replaced, because it does not actually establish safety and effectiveness. At the time the FDA said it disagreed with the group’s recommendations.

Defective devices cleared through this system have included hip replacements that failed prematurely, surgical mesh linked to pain and bleeding and a surgical instrument that inadvertently spread uterine cancer.

FDA Does Not Do What’s Needed

Congress, FDA Poised to Loosen Oversight of Medical Devices, June 20, 2017

When makers of medical devices learn that one of their products has malfunctioned in a way that could kill or seriously injure people, they are required to file a report with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The reports are meant to alert regulators that patients may be in danger.

However, in the future, under a deal the FDA has negotiated with industry lobbyists, manufacturers could generally wait three months before reporting malfunctions, and they could report malfunctions in “summary” form, according to an FDA document.

This 2017 deal apparently means that the government and the public could receive less detailed and less timely warnings.

To see how many FDA recalls take place daily see the FDA recall database link: https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/default.htm

Spinal Cord Stimulator Failures

Jim Taft listened intently as his pain management doctor described a medical device that could change his life, it wouldn’t fix the nerve damage in his mangled right arm, but a spinal-cord stimulator would cloak his pain, making him “good as new.”

Taft’s stimulator failed soon after it was surgically implanted. After an operation to repair it, he said the device shocked him so many times that he couldn’t sleep and even fell down a flight of stairs. Today, the 45-year-old Taft is virtually paralyzed.

“I thought I would have a wonderful life,” Taft said. “But look at me.” Taft is just one of the thousands of patients who have been injured by an implanted medical device, almost always by a device that was made in the USA.

A recent global investigation has found that hundreds of thousands of unsafe medical devices have been implanted in patients around the world and device failures are considered very normal.

A recent worldwide investigation was carried out by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in coordination with the British Medical Journal and various media outlets including the Guardian newspaper and BBC Panorama.

The probe found that pacemakers, artificial knees, hips and rods to support the spinal cord are among the faulty devices that were implanted in patients and that failed. These unsafe medical devices have resulted in thousands of injuries and deaths and quite often patients are forced to undergo removal or revision surgeries.

The investigation found that many of the unsafe medical devices did not complete patient trials before their commercial launch, adding  that some of the pacemakers were implanted when the manufacturers were aware of the problems, while some devices were approved on the basis of a regulatory nod secured in other countries.

Poor regulations across countries, lenient testing standards and lack of clarity allowed these faulty medical devices to reach the market.

In the UK alone, the regulators received 62,000 “adverse incident” reports associated with medical devices between 2015 and 2018. About 1,004 of such cases even resulted in the death of patients.

In the USA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been notified of 5.4 million ‘adverse events’ over the last ten years. Faulty devices were linked to approximately 1.7 million injuries and 83,000 deaths.

Even though these medical devices are made in the USA, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration had not, and still has not, deemed them good enough for Americans. The FDA has permitted sales overseas of unproven devices and products via an obscure FDA provision in which products are registered as an “export only” device, requiring far less FDA scrutiny than for devices that are sold domestically.

An example is PyroTITAN, by Intergra LifeSciences of New Jersey, among the biggest medical device companies in the world and maker of more than a dozen export-only devices with troubled track records identified as “export only” which is a U.S.-made implant for losing weight that instead led to  numerous emergency surgeries, stents that could cut into arteries and heart valves sold in Spain and Italy that, according to the FDA, caused severe infections and may have caused a five-year-old child to die. These items were found by analyzing and comparing databases in 10 countries, and a lack of international standards for identifying devices means it is difficult to know how many other troubled devices exist.

For U.S. companies, exporting medical devices is big business, valued last year at more than $41 billion. Currently about 4,600 devices are registered with the FDA as “export only” devices. Several executives for medical device makers said registering the devices is faster, less expensive and has involved less oversight than getting them approved for sale inside the U.S. The troubled devices identified by NBC News have been sold around the world. The destinations range from the Netherlands to Namibia, Chile to Canada, Japan to Germany.

Recently, NBC probed export-only devices as part of the same global project organized by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, a news organization notable for its work on the Panama Papers, to examine the medical device industry. More than 250 reporters in 36 countries worked on stories that began publishing Sunday.

Worldwide US Device Exports are Often Substandard

Zimmer Biomet is one of the big medical device companies named in the investigation. The company has previously had to discontinue sales of a metal-on-metal hip implant system which was cause to flesh-rotting via metallosis poisoning. The company seems to have maintained the tried and true Big Pharma mantra of “we do what the FDA requires, therefor we are excluded from accepting responsibility for defective medical products” which is often pushed as a coverall statement by medical device makers when they are under scrutiny.

“We adhere to strict regulatory standard, and work closely with the FDA and all applicable regulatory agencies in each of our regions as part of our commitment to operating a first-rate quality management system across our global manufacturing network.

Abbott has also come under scrutiny for its Nanostim pacemaker, which has received complaints about implant battery failures and parts of the device falling off inside patients.  The company released the following statement: “In accordance with the European CE Mark approval process, the Nanostim leadless pacing system was approved based on strong performance and safety data.”

Johnson & Johnson (J&J) is another one of the big medical device companies to be named in the investigation. Earlier this year, J&J agreed to work with the Indian government to offer compensation to patients who were affected by faulty hip implants.

Although there are roughly 4,000 types of medical devices in the FDA’s data, just six of them accounted for a quarter of device injury reports since 2008.

 

Spinal Cord Stimulator Misinformation:

Medical device companies and doctors tout spinal-cord stimulators to treat patients suffering from a wide range of pain disorders. But an investigation by AP found the devices rank third in injury reports to the FDA in 10 years.

But the stimulators — devices that use electrical currents to block pain signals before they reach the brain — are more dangerous than many patients know, an Associated Press investigation found. They account for the third-highest number of medical device injury reports to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, with more than 80,000 incidents flagged since 2008.

Patients report that they have been shocked or burned or have suffered spinal-cord nerve damage ranging from muscle weakness to paraplegia, FDA data shows. Among the 4,000 types of devices tracked by the FDA, only metal hip replacements and insulin pumps have logged more injury reports.

The FDA data contains more than 500 reports of people with spinal-cord stimulators who died but details are scant, making it difficult to determine if the deaths were related to the stimulator or implant surgery.

An animated look at the spinal cord stimulator, its benefits and potential problems. (AP Animation/Peter Hamlin)

Medical device manufacturers insist spinal-cord stimulators are safe — some 60,000 are implanted annually — and doctors who specialize in these surgeries say they have helped reduce pain for many of their patients.

Most of these devices have been approved by the FDA with little clinical testing and the agency’s data shows that spinal-cord stimulators have a disproportionately higher number of injuries compared to hip implants, which are far more plentiful.

The AP reported on spinal stimulators as part of a year long joint investigation of the global medical devices industry that included NBC, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and more than 50 other media partners around the world. Reporters collected and analyzed millions of medical records, recall notices and other product safety warnings, in addition to interviewing doctors, patients, researchers and company whistleblowers.

The media partners found that, across all types of medical devices, more than 1.7 million injuries and nearly 83,000 deaths were reported to the FDA over the last decade.

The investigation also found that the FDA — considered by other countries to be the gold standard in medical device oversight — puts people at risk by pushing devices through an abbreviated approval process, then responds slowly when it comes to forcing companies to correct sometimes life-threatening products.

Devices are rarely pulled from the market, even when major problems emerge, and the FDA does not disclose how many devices are implanted in the U.S. each year — critical information that could be used to calculate success and failure rates.

The FDA acknowledges its data has limitations, including mistakes, omissions and under-reporting that can make it difficult to determine whether a device directly caused an injury or death, but it rejects any suggestion of failed oversight.

“There are over 190,000 different devices on the U.S. market. We approve or clear about a dozen new or modified devices every single business day,” Dr. Jeffrey Shuren, the FDA’s medical device director said at an industry conference in May. “The few devices that get attention at any time in the press is fewer than the devices we may put on the market in a single business day. That to me doesn’t say that the system is failing. It’s remarkable that the system is working as it does.”

In response to reporters’ questions, the FDA said last week that it was taking new action to create “a more robust medical device safety net for patients through better data.” ″Unfortunately, the FDA cannot always know the full extent of the benefits and risks of a device before it reaches the market,” the agency said. In the last 50 years, the medical device industry has revolutionized treatment for some of the deadliest scourges of modern medicine, introducing devices to treat or diagnose heart disease, cancer and diabetes.

Medical device companies have “invested countless resources — both capital and human — in developing leading-edge compliance programs,” said Janet Trunzo, head of technology and regulatory affairs for AdvaMed, the industry’s main trade association.

At the same time, medical device makers also have spent billions to try to influence regulators, hospitals and doctors.

In the United States, where drug and device manufacturers are required to disclose payments to physicians, the 10 largest medical device companies paid nearly $600 million to doctors or their hospitals last year to cover consulting fees, research, travel and entertainment expenses, according to an AP and ICIJ analysis of data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. This figure doesn’t include payments from device manufacturers like Johnson & Johnson and Allergan, which also sell other products.

On top of that, lobbying records show that the top four spinal-cord stimulator manufacturers have spent more than $22 million combined since 2017 to try to influence legislation benefiting their overall business, which includes other medical devices.

Some companies have been fined for bribing physicians, illegally promoting products for unapproved uses and paying for studies that proclaim the safety and effectiveness of their products, according to the joint investigation.

In a 2016 case, Olympus Corp. of the Americas, the largest U.S. distributor of endoscopes and related medical equipment, agreed to pay $623.2 million “to resolve criminal charges and civil claims relating to a scheme to pay kickbacks to doctors and hospitals,” according to the U.S. Justice Department. Olympus said that it “agreed to make various improvements to its compliance program.”

In a case the previous year involving spinal-cord stimulators, Medtronic,Inc. agreed to pay $2.8 million to settle Justice Department claims that the company had harmed patients and defrauded federal health care programs by providing physicians “powerful” financial inducements that turned them into “salesmen” for costly procedures. Medtronic denied wrongdoing. “As a matter of policy, Medtronic does not comment on specific litigation,” the company said in a statement. “We do stand behind the safety and efficacy of our Spinal Cord Stimulators and the strong benefits this technology provides to patients, many of whom have tried all other therapy options to no benefit.”

Some doctors enthusiastically promote spinal-cord stimulators without disclosing to patients they’ve received money from medical device manufacturers. Some experts say doctors are not legally required to disclose such payments, but they have an ethical obligation to do so. Sometimes the money goes to the doctors’ hospitals, and not directly to them.

As for Taft, he said he just wanted to get better, but he has lost hope. “This is my death sentence,” Taft said, stretched out beneath his bed’s wooden headboard on which he’s carved the words “death row.”

“I’ll die here,” he said.

Why Hasn’t The FDA Learned From Past Failures?

A generation ago, tens of thousands of women were injured by the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine device that caused life-threatening infections. Consumer advocates demanded testing and pre-market approval of medical devices to prevent deaths and injuries associated with defective products.

So in 1976, Congress passed the Medical Device Amendment, a law meant to assure Americans that devices recommended by their doctors would do good and not harm.

“Until today, the American consumer could not be sure that a medical device used by his physician, his hospital or himself was as safe and effective as it could or should be,” President Gerald Ford said when he signed the bill into law.

Charged with carrying out the law, the FDA created three classes of medical devices. High-risk products like spinal-cord stimulators are designated to be held to the most rigorous clinical testing standards. But the vast majority of devices go through a less stringent review process that provides an easy path to market for devices deemed “substantially equivalent” to products already approved for use.

As designed by Congress, that process should have been phased out. Instead, it became the standard path to market for thousands of devices, including hip replacements implanted in tens of thousands of patients that would later be recalled because metal shavings from the devices made some people sick.

The AP found that the FDA has allowed some spinal-cord stimulators to reach the market without new clinical studies, approving them largely based on results from studies of earlier spinal stimulators.

Spinal stimulators are complex devices that send electrical currents through wires placed along the spine, using a battery implanted under the skin. An external remote controls the device.

The four biggest makers of spinal-cord stimulators are Boston Scientific Corp., based in Marlborough, Massachusetts; Medtronic, with headquarters in Ireland and the U.S.; Nevro, in Redwood City, California; and Illinois-based Abbott, which entered the market after its $23.6 billion purchase of St. Jude Medical, Inc.

St. Jude’s application to go to market with its first spinal stimulator contained no original patient data and was based on clinical results from other studies, while Boston Scientific’s application for its Precision spinal-cord stimulator was based largely on older data, though it did include a small, original study of 26 patients who were tracked for as little as two weeks.

Once approved, medical device companies can use countless supplementary requests to alter their products, even when the changes are substantial.

For example, there have been only six new spinal-cord stimulator devices approved since 1984, with 835 supplemental changes to those devices given the go-ahead through the middle of this year, the AP found. Medtronic alone has been granted 394 supplemental changes to its stimulator since 1984, covering everything from altering the sterilization process to updating the design.

“It’s kind of the story of FDA’s regulation of devices, where they’re just putting stuff on the market,” said Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research, who has studied medical devices for nearly 30 years.

Medical device manufacturers have cited multiple industry-funded studies showing the effectiveness of spinal-cord stimulation in the treatment of chronic pain. Experts say treatment is considered successful if pain is reduced by at least half, but not every patient experiences that much pain reduction.

A 2016 study looking at different stimulation systems found “significant evidence” that they were “a safe, clinical and cost-effective treatment for many chronic pain conditions.”

But Zuckerman noted that the more extensive studies came after the devices were being widely used on people. “These patients are guinea pigs,” she said.

FDA said in a statement that it approves, clears or grants marketing authorization to an average of 12 devices per business day and its decisions are “based on valid scientific evidence” that the devices are safe and effective.

Dr. Walter J. Koroshetz, director at the neurological disorders and stroke division at the National Institutes of Health, said trials for medical devices like spinal-cord stimulators are generally small and industry-sponsored, with a “substantial” placebo effect.

“I don’t know of anyone who is happy with spinal-cord technology as it stands,” Koroshetz said. “I think everybody thinks it can be better.”

Why Device Makers Don’t Reveal Adverse Product Issues  

Every time Jim Taft walked into his pain management doctor’s office, he would glance at the brochures touting spinal-cord stimulators — the ones with pictures of people swimming, biking and fishing.

Inside the exam room, Taft said, his doctor told him the device had been successful for his other patients and would improve his quality of life.

On lifetime worker’s compensation after his right arm was crushed as he was hauling materials for an architectural engineering company, Taft had been seeing the doctor for five years before he decided to get a stimulator in 2014. What finally swayed him, he said, was the doctor’s plan to wean him off painkillers.

Taft said his pain management doctor praised the technology, saying stimulators had improved the quality of life for his patients. But four years later, Taft is unable to walk more than a few steps.

Taft is one of 40 patients interviewed by the AP who said they had problems with spinal-cord stimulators. The AP found them through online forums for people with medical devices. Twenty-eight of them said their spinal-cord stimulators not only failed to alleviate pain but left them worse off than before their surgeries.

Zuckerman, who has worked at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and as a senior policy adviser to then-first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, said no doctor wants to think they’re harming patients.

“But there’s a tremendous financial incentive to downplay, ignore or forget bad patient experiences and just focus on how happy patients are,” she said.

More than half the patients interviewed by the AP said they felt pressured to get stimulators because they feared their doctors would cut off their pain medications — the only thing helping them.

Stimulators are considered a treatment of “last resort” by insurance companies, as well as Medicare and Medicaid. That means doctors must follow a protocol before insurance will pay for the device and implantation.

Physicians must show that conservative treatments failed to help, and patients also undergo psychological assessments to evaluate the likelihood of success. They then typically undergo a trial period lasting three days to a week with thin electrodes inserted under the skin. If patients say they got relief from the external transmitter sending electrical pulses to the contacts near their spines, they have surgery to implant a permanent stimulator.

Taft said his three-day trial helped reduce his pain so, a few days before his surgery, he began preparing for a new life. He ordered lumber to refurbish a patio and deck for his wife, Renee, as thanks for her years of support.

In April 2014, Boston Scientific’s Precision stimulator was implanted in Taft by Jason Highsmith, a Charleston, South Carolina, neurosurgeon who has received $181,000 from the company over the past five years in the form of consulting fees and payments for travel and entertainment. A Boston Scientific sales representative was in the operating room — a common practice, the AP found.

Highsmith would not comment on the payments. Other doctors have defended the practice, saying they do important work that helps the companies — and ultimately patients — and deserve to be compensated for their time.

From the time Taft was cut open and the device placed inside his body, he had nothing but problems, according to hundreds of pages of medical records reviewed by the AP. The device began randomly shocking him, and the battery burned his skin.

Taft and his wife complained repeatedly, but said his doctors and a Boston Scientific representative told them that spinal-cord stimulators don’t cause the kind of problems he had.

That runs counter to Boston Scientific’s own literature, which acknowledges that spinal stimulators and the procedures to implant them carry risks, such as the leads moving, overstimulation, paralysis and infections.

That also is not reflected in the AP’s analysis of FDA injury reports, which found shocking and burning had been reported for all major models of spinal-cord stimulators. For Boston Scientific devices, infection was the most common complaint over the past decade, mentioned in more than 4,000 injury reports.

In response to questions, the company called infection “unfortunately a risk in any surgical procedure” that the company works hard to avoid. It added that the FDA’s data “shouldn’t be interpreted as a causal sign of a challenge with our device. In fact, many examples of reportable infections include those that were caused by the surgical procedure or post-operative care.”

“In our internal quality assessments, over 95 percent of the injury reports were temporary or reversible in nature,” the company added.

Taft said had he known the devices hurt so many people, he would have reconsidered getting one. A Boston Scientific sales representative tried reprogramming the device, he said, but nothing worked.

“I told them that it feels like the lead is moving up and down my spine,” Taft said. “They said, ‘It can’t move.’” But in July 2014, X-rays revealed the lead indeed had moved — two inches on one side.

Highsmith told the AP the electrode broke from “vigorous activity,” though Taft said that would not have been possible due to his condition. Taft said he was in such bad shape after his surgery that he was never able to redo the patio and deck for his wife or do anything else vigorous.

That October, Highsmith said, he operated on Taft to install a new lead, tested the battery and reinserted it.

Still, Taft’s medical records show that he continued to report numbness, tingling and pain. During a January 2015 appointment, a physician assistant wrote that the device “seemed to make his pain worse.”

The stimulator was surgically removed in August 2015. The following June, Taft got a second opinion from a clinic that specializes in spinal injuries, which said he had “significant axial and low back pain due to implantation and explantation” of the stimulator.

Highsmith said other doctors have documented severe arthritis in Taft and that, while he has not examined Taft in more than three years, it’s “likely his current condition is the result of disease progression and other factors.”

He did not answer questions about whether he informed Taft of the risks associated with stimulators.

The doctor said the overwhelming majority of his spinal-cord stimulator patients gain significant pain relief.

“Unfortunately, in spite of the major medical breakthroughs with devices like these, some patients still suffer from intractable pain,” he said.

Renee Taft, a paralegal, reached out to Boston Scientific in 2017, but said the company refused to help because her husband’s stimulator had been removed and blamed Taft for his problems, also saying he had engaged in “rigorous physical activity” after surgery.

In the letter from the company’s legal department, Boston Scientific also noted that federal law shielded manufacturers from personal liability claims involving medical devices approved by the FDA.

In response to questions from investigators, Boston Scientific again blamed Taft’s “activity level” but didn’t elaborate. The company also said other factors could contribute to his problems such as “hyperalgesia, a phenomenon associated with long-term opioid use which results in patients becoming increasingly sensitive to some stimuli.”

Since 2005, there have been 50 recalls involving spinal stimulators, averaging about four per year in the last five years. Roughly half the recalls involved stimulators made by Medtronic, the world’s largest device manufacturer, though none warned of a risk of serious injury or death.

The experience of nearly all the 40 patients interviewed by the AP reflected one common fact. Their pain was reduced during the trial but returned once their stimulators were implanted.

Experts say the answer may be a placebo effect created when expectations are built up during the trial that only the stimulator can offer relief from pain, exacerbated by patients not wanting to disappoint family members, who often have been serving as their caregivers.

“If patients know this is a last resort, a last hope, of course they will respond well,” said Dr. Michael Gofeld, a Toronto-based anesthesiologist and pain management specialist who has studied and implanted spinal-cord stimulators in both the U.S. and Canada.

By the time the trial ends, the patient is “flying high, the endorphin levels are high,” Gofeld said.

Manufacturer representatives are heavily involved during the entire process. Along with often being in the operating room during surgery in case the physician has questions, they meet with patients to program the devices in the weeks following surgery.

Most of the patients interviewed by the AP said the adjustments to their devices were performed by sales representatives, often with no doctor or nurse present. That includes one patient who was billed for programming as if the doctor was in the room, though he was not.

“People who are selling the device should not be in charge of maintenance,” Gofeld said. “It’s totally unethical.”

In a 2015 Texas case, a former Medtronic sales representative filed suit contending she was fired after complaining that the company trained employees to program neurostimulators without physicians present. She also claimed that a Medtronic supervisor snatched surgical gloves away from her when she refused to bandage a patient during a procedure, pushed her aside and then cleaned and dressed the patient’s wound. Medtronic denied the allegations, and the case was settled on undisclosed terms.

In the Justice Department case involving Medtronic, a salesman who said he earned as much as $600,000 a year selling spinal-cord stimulators claimed sales representatives encouraged physicians to perform unnecessary procedures that drove up the costs for Medicare and other federal health programs.

“While there have been a few instances where individuals or affiliates did not comply with Medtronic’s policies, we acted to remedy the situation in each case once discovered and to correct any misconduct,” the company said.

Gofeld said he believes stimulators do work, but that many of the problems usually arise when doctors don’t choose appropriate candidates. And he thinks the stimulators are used too often in the U.S.

Nevro, one of the four big manufacturers, has cited estimates that there are as many as 4,400 facilities in the U.S where spinal-stimulation devices are implanted by a variety of physicians, including neurosurgeons, psychiatrists and pain specialists.

It’s a lucrative business . Analysts say stimulators and the surgery to implant them costs between $32,000 and $50,000, with the device itself constituting $20,000 to $25,000 of that amount. If surgery is performed in a hospital, the patient usually stays overnight, and the hospital charges a facility fee for obtaining the device. Costs are typically covered by insurance.

The AP found that doctors can make more money if they perform the surgery at physician-owned outpatient surgery centers, since the doctor buys the device, marks it up and adds on the facility fee.

In Canada, where Gofeld now works, he said the surgeries are done only by those who specialize in the procedures. He said spinal-cord stimulators should be used when pain starts and not after failed back surgeries.

“By then,” he said, “it’s too late.”

When Surgeries Never Stop

While manufacturers and top FDA officials tout stimulators as a weapon in the battle against opioids, neurosurgeons like Steven Falowski are the front-line evangelists.

“Chronic pain is one of the largest health-care burdens we have in the U.S. It’s more than heart disease, cancer and diabetes combined,” Falowski said in an interview. If they’re used early enough for pain, they can prevent people from going on opium-based pain killers, said Falowski, who speaks at neuromodulation conferences and teaches other doctors how to implant stimulators.

Since 2013, device manufacturers have paid Falowski — or St. Luke’s University Health Network in Fountain Hill, Pennsylvania, where he works — nearly $863,000, including $611,000 from St. Jude or its new parent company, Abbott, according to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services database. The payments range from consulting fees to travel and entertainment expenses.

Falowski said he has conducted research and done other work for manufacturers, adding, “The contracts with industry are with my hospital and not with me.”

St. Luke’s told the AP that it keeps the majority of the payments from device makers, but that Falowski “may receive a portion of these payments through his annual compensation.” AP’s analysis showed Abbott products were more likely than other major models to include reports of a hot or burning sensation near the site of the battery, with about 5,600 injury reports since 2008 referring to the words “heat” or “burn.”

Abbott said that many of the “adverse events” reports in the FDA’s data stemmed from a device that was voluntarily recalled in 2011. The company added that feeling a temperature increase at the implant site “is often a reality for rechargeable spinal-cord stimulation systems,” which is why the company is now concentrating on devices that do not need to be recharged.

 

Falowski said doctors do important work for medical device companies, and he has been involved in device development, education, clinical trials and research.

“You’re trying to help patients and you realize as a physician by yourself you’re not going to generate $200 million to make the next best implant for a patient and it’s going to take a company to do that,” he said. “So I think the important part in that relationship is transparency and disclosures.”

Experts interviewed by the AP said doctors are not legally required to tell their patients about financial relationships with medical device manufacturers, but that it would be the right thing to do.

“The patient should be fully informed before consenting to a procedure,” said Genevieve P. Kanter, an assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania who specializes in internal medicine, medical ethics and health policy.

Abbott Issues Warning After Surgeries For Thousands of Patients

In October 2016, Abbott notified physicians and patients that a subset of ICD and cardiac resynchronization therapy defibrillator (CRT-D) devices manufactured between January 2010 and May 2015 could potentially experience premature battery depletion due to short circuits from lithium clusters.

The potential for premature battery depletion in the affected devices is low. The new Battery Performance Alert can be used as a tool to further assist in identifying the potential for these devices to experience premature battery depletion.

It’s a voluntary recall, so patients are being told to consult with their doctors before coming in for the procedure — which thankfully consists of a simple 3-minute wireless firmware update (using a wand, according to the pamphlet) instead of anything invasive.

The FDA-approved firmware update actually includes a pair of important-sounding fixes. In addition to some enhanced security, the update also comes with a way to detect if a device’s battery drains abnormally quickly and alert the patient.

The FDA and Abbott say they haven’t had issues with any of the 50,000 firmware updates they’ve installed on devices like this so far.

Summary:

Based on historical results as well as litigation related to adverse events with medical device FDA approvals and disclosures by device makers, it would seem that the reality of the dangers related to this device and thousands of other FDA approved devices, we may never know the truth on how dangerous these products really are.

(Images and text excerpts have been taken from NBC News and Associated Press media releases) 

Read More

XARELTO INITIAL ROCKET & EINSTEIN CLINICAL TRIALS NOW SEEN AS FLAWED: ADD THE MAY 2018 FAILURE OF TWO LATEST BAYER/JANSSEN STUDIES = BAD SCIENCE

Xarelto Study Red Flags Ignored: Why were medical research professionals ignored when red flags were raised over the viability of the Xarelto Rocket AF and Einstein DVT study results? Now the clinical trials for both are considered flawed, and the two most recent studies, the “Commander HF” and “Mariner,” failed to produce clear evidence that Xarelto is able to reduce the rate of blood clots in certain high-risk patients or after an acute decline in their condition.

By Mark A. York (October 23, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) Xarelto (rivaroxaban) is a prescription blood thinner created by Bayer and Janssen Pharmaceuticals that was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2011. This drug is an anticoagulant for preventing blood from clotting, often used to treat deep vein thrombosis, atrial fibrillation, pulmonary embolism, stroke, and other conditions.

More than one study has shown Xarelto can cause a higher rate of internal bleeding, than other anticoagulant drugs and until very recently, there was no available “antidote” for stopping internal bleeding in patients taking Xarelto. With warfarin, vitamin K has been shown to stop bleeding but there is no vitamin K “parallel” for people taking Xarelto. For Xarelto, it can take 24 hours for a dose to get out of the body. That means that if internal bleeding starts, the patient may simply have to wait it out and hope it stops on its own.

What The Medical Studies Say About Xarelto?

The FDA has received thousands of adverse event reports regarding Xarelto and medical studies have examined the safety of this drug:

  • New England Journal of Medicine (2011): Published the ROCKET-AF study, which compared Xarelto to Warfarin in patients suffering from atrial fibrillation. This was the biggest clinical trial of this medication and it compared the effects of Xarelto to the effects of a similar drug known as Warfarin in over 14,000 patients. The study concluded that “there was not significant between-group difference in the risk of major bleeding.”
  • Archives of Internal Medicine (2012): The study discussed the risk of uncontrollable bleeding outweighing the benefits for several different blood thinners including Xarelto. The researchers in this study found that there was a tripled risk of bleeding among the patients, who were given the drug, and no improvement in overall survival rates.
  • Institute for Safe Medication Practices (2012): Issued a report based on FDA data from the first quarter of 2012. During this period, the FDA received 356 adverse event reports of Xarelto side effects including “serious, disabling, or fatal injury.” Additionally, 158 reports indicated blood clots were the serious side effect.
  • New England Journal of Medicine (2013): Published the results of the ROCKET study, which found that Xarelto may carry an increased risk of bleeding.
  • Medscape (2013): Xarelto is associated with a higher risk of bleeding in certain patients. It caused a nearly 3-fold increase of the risk of bleeding in “acutely ill patients” and 4-fold increased risk of major bleeding in patients that had “Acute Coronary Syndrome” (ACS).

Drug Makers Failed To Disclose Faulty Device In Xarelto Trials

 Rivaroxaban and the ROCKET AF trial issue chronicles: A closer look at benefit risk profile of the drug.

  • BMJ2016354 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i5131 (Published 28 September 2016)Cite this as: BMJ 2016;354:i5131
  • Study Analysis: There has been a lot of hue and cry over the recent question raised about the ROCKET AF[1] trial for rivaroxaban which was the only trial used by the company for drug approval from USFDA. This is indeed a very important concern as it directly impacts the well-being of the patients who are at the receiving end of this very highly prescribed anticoagulant drug in 2014.[2] The main concern with this whole confusion surrounding the ROCKET AF trial is that the device used for measuring the INR in trial arm of warfarin patient was faulty and gave lower INR values than it should have, leading to over dosing of warfarin and thereby increasing bleeding problems with the same, compared to the trial arm of rivaroxaban. However, there has been a reanalysis done by the ROCKET AF researchers, which again reinforced the prior result database of the trial and which was accepted by FDA as well[3]. In the reanalysis, the US FDA clearly mentioned that the effect of the faulty device results in causing bleeding episodes, both minor and major, was minimal.[4]
  • However, following this reanalysis, not everyone who raised the question in the first place was convinced and there was a demand that the data of the complete ROCKET AF trial should be made public for everyone to assess and understand the risks. But since the trial was done and results released before the principles on responsible clinical trial data sharing came into effect, the parent pharmaceutical company for rivaroxaban refused to share the patient level details, citing concerns on privacy and transparency policy [5].
  • In spite of everything said and written for and against this issue, a simple question arises, regarding the amount of belief, honesty and hard work that goes without questioning when you bring a new chemical entity to the research stage, get it approved and then bring it to market. For this to happen, there have to be maintained a very fine balance between pharmaceutical companies, drug regulatory authorities and marketing people. In this case, after initial suspicions, the drug regulatory authorities have cleared and supported the approval of rivaroxaban after reanalysis and that should have a say, in case we want to continue trust with this process of drug entry into the market.
  • Rivaroxaban has shown its efficacy and safety both in patients who required adequate anticoagulation e.g. those who had atrial fibrillation and underwent cardioversion. There are few other trials where rivaroxaban has performed better or equally good than warfarin in terms of both efficacy and safety [6]. These results lead us to believe that all was not wrong with the ROCKET AF trial results. All these, combined with personal experiences of those physicians who had been using the drug rivaroxaban for the last couple of years with a hugely favorable result clearly imply that the drug rivaroxaban is holding its side strongly in the midst of all the controversies surrounding its approval and efficacy and it is here to stay. Adding a last word to all this discussion is that rivaroxaban will always hold an upper hand compared to warfarin when prescribed because of its very favorable and easy to use once daily dosing. We cannot discard all the positive reports and positive experiences associated with this drug, based on real time data, only because of the question raised by some, and considering the fact that the question had been satisficatorily answered with a re analysis with no change in the result.

What Did Or Didn’t The FDA Do About Xarelto?

  • In July, 2011, the U.S Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initially approved the medicine for sale on the market for a limited group of people. This included people who had knee or hip replacement surgery because they were considered to be at a higher risk of blood clotting. Read the FDA News Release here.
  • In November, 2011, Xarelto was approved for a larger group of people, including people with an abnormal heart rhythm, and was used to prevent stroke. Read further.
  • In June, 2012, an FDA advisory panel voted against approving this medicine for the treatment of acute coronary syndrome.
  • In November, 2012, Xarelto was later approved for general treatment of deep vein thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE) after a fast track regulatory review by the FDA. Read more.
  • October 22, 2014, the FDA issued a recall for approximately 13,500 bottles of Xarelto after receiving a customer complaint about contamination in a sales sample.
  • January 12, 2015 – An antidote may have been discovered by Portola Pharmaceuticals for Xarelto. A late-stage clinical trial of the intravenous medication, andexanet alfa, met its goal of “immediately and significantly” reversing Xarelto.

The approval history for Xarelto was actually pretty controversial. FDA reviewers originally said that they recommended against approval, then there was an FDA advisory committee (independent group of key opinion leaders) and they voted in favor, so the FDA approved the drug. Their concern was with how the Phase III trials were run and whether Xarelto had really proved its efficacy. The tests compared patients on warfarin to patients on Xarelto, but the patients on the warfarin run had poor TTR. That means the patients weren’t well controlled on warfarin to begin with, which skews the data in favor of Xarelto.

During the approval process, Xarelto actually wanted a superiority label, which would say that the drug was better than warfarin and other blood thinners. Because of the concerns with the Phase III data, the FDA only gave them a non-inferior label, which says they’re essentially the same in terms of effectiveness.

The INRatio device was the subject of two FDA warning letters about inaccurate readings just as the trial was starting in 2005 and 2006. In 2014, the device was recalled. The use of the INRatio device may have skewed the results with inaccurate readings, making Xarelto look better in comparison with warfarin.

In a 2017 annual report issued by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP), it was stated that oral anticoagulant drugs, including Xarelto (rivaroxaban), showed “unacceptably high risks,” according to two government data sources, the FAERS adverse events reports for 2016 and a new systematic study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Overall, the CDC found in its systematic study that the FDA’s FAERS voluntary reporting underestimates anticoagulant drug-related injuries. The CDC discovered that approximately 228,600 emergency department visits occur each year due to the use of blood thinner drugs, including Xarelto, which is 10 times more than the FAERS total number of voluntary reports.

Xarelto Clinical Trial Red Flags

Controversy Surrounding ROCKET-AF: A Call for Transparency, But Should We Be Changing Practice?

Jason D Matos1 and Peter J Zimetbaum1,,2

Arrhythm Electrophysiol Rev. 2016 May; 5(1): 12–13.

doi:  [10.15420/aer.2016.24.2]

Prior to the emergence of novel oral anticoagulants (NOACS), nearly all patients were prescribed vitamin K antagonists for thromboembolic prophylaxis in non-valvular atrial fibrillation (AF). Rivaroxaban (Xarelto, Bayer/Johnson & Johnson), an oral factor Xa inhibitor, is now one of the most frequently prescribed NOACs used for this indication.1,2

ROCKET-AF (Rivaroxaban Once Daily Oral Direct Factor Xa Inhibition Compared with Vitamin K Antagonism for Prevention of Stroke and Embolism Trial in Atrial Fibrillation), published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2011, demonstrated the non-inferiority of rivaroxaban compared with warfarin for the primary prevention of stroke or systemic embolism in patients with AF. This double-blinded randomised trial, which included 14,264 patients across 45 countries, also showed no significant difference in the risk of major bleeding between these two groups.3

Rivaroxaban use in AF has become widespread since the publication of this trial and US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. Two additional Factor Xa inhibitors, apixaban and edoxaban, have also been evaluated in similar randomised trials and have demonstrated non-inferiority to warfarin for stroke or systemic embolism prophylaxis in patients with non-valvular AF with no significant difference in major bleeding.4,5

In recent months, the results of ROCKET-AF have come into question after the FDA issued a recall notice for the device used to obtain International Normalised Ratio (INR) measurements in the warfarin control group. The FDA found that lower INR values were seen with the ‘point-of-care’ INRatio Monitor System (Alere) compared with a plasma-based laboratory in patients with certain medical conditions.2 These conditions included abnormal haemoglobin levels, abnormal bleeding and abnormal fibrinogen levels.6Since the FDA recall of this device, there has been widespread concern that falsely low INR readings in ROCKET-AF may have led to warfarin overdosing. Inappropriately high warfarin dosing could have increased bleeding rates in the control group and therefore made the rivaroxaban arm appear falsely favourable.7 This point-of-care device recall also highlighted a lack of transparency of the specifics of devices used in large clinical trials.

In response, the authors from ROCKET-AF released a correspondence in February 2016, citing the FDA recall. They also provided a post hoc analysis of patients who may have been affected by the recall. They found that major bleeding was greater in patients with conditions affected by the recall, but, reassuringly, the bleeding risk was greater in those who were on rivaroxaban and not warfarin.6

Despite this post hoc analysis, concern has arisen regarding the generalisability of ROCKET-AF given the faulty point-of-care INR readings. There has been a call for complete transparency of the data from this trial and a better explanation of the mechanism of the incorrect INR measurements.7

Once published, the data supporting an FDA-approved treatment should be available for independent analysis. One issue is that rivaroxaban was approved in the US prior to 1 January 2014, before a new transparency policy on clinical trial data sharing was approved by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).2 Drug companies are refusing to share any data on pharmaceuticals approved before 2014.

A device malfunction in a large clinical trial also should raise concern, especially when that trial has altered clinical practice for millions of patients. On review of Patel et al’s correspondence regarding the point-of-care malfunction, there is inadequate explanation of the mechanism of these faulty readings. Why are they only seen only in patients with abnormal haemoglobin and fibrinogen levels? How inaccurate could the readings be – within 0.1 or 1.0 of a gold standard value? Most alarming is the revelation that the manufacturer had evidence of faulty readings in similar models dating back to 2002.2

Despite legitimate concerns regarding the absence of data transparency and the faulty point-of-care device, rivaroxaban need not be removed from clinical practice for AF patients. In ROCKET-AF, the drug demonstrated non-inferiority to warfarin in preventing thromboembolic events. In addition, data has shown that patients potentially affected by the faulty point-of-care device actually bled more on rivaroxaban than warfarin.6 Therefore, the original risk–benefit ratio presented in ROCKET-AF remains true.

There are other, albeit smaller, randomised trials with shorter follow-up times that compare rivaroxaban and warfarin for thromboembolic prophylaxis.8,9 For example, Cappato et al in 2014, randomised 1,504 patients to show that oral rivaroxaban was non-inferior to warfarin in preventing a composite endpoint of stroke, transient ischaemic attack, peripheral embolism, myocardial infarction and cardiovascular death in patients with AF undergoing cardioversion. Major bleeding rates in the rivaroxaban and warfarin arms were similar (0.6 % versus 0.8 % respectively).8

The prospective observational trial XANTUS (Xarelto for Prevention of Stroke in Patients with Atrial Fibrillation) followed 6.784 patients on rivaroxaban for AF during a mean time of 329 days at 311 different hospitals. Major bleeding occurred in 128 patients (2.1 events/100 patient years) and 43 patients (0.7 events/100 patient years) suffered a stroke. These numbers are more reassuring than those seen in ROCKET-AF, though the patient population had a lower risk profile, with an average CHADS2 score of 2.0 compared with 3.5 in ROCKET-AF.10

To further mitigate concern regarding inaccuracies of bleeding rates in the ROCKET-AF control group, it is helpful to compare bleeding rates in the warfarin arms of the other major NOAC trials. The RE-LY (Randomised Evaluation of Long-Term Anticoagulation Therapy) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.4%/year.11 The ARISTOTLE (Apixaban for Reduction in Stroke and Other Thromboembolic Events in Atrial Fibrillation) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.1%/year.4 The ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48 (Effective Anticoagulation with Factor Xa Next Generation in Atrial Fibrillation-Thrombolysis in Myocardial Infarction 48) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.4 %/year.5The warfarin arm of ROCKET-AF had a 3.4 %/year major bleeding rate, comparable to the other studies. Furthermore, the ROCKET-AF patients are known to be at higher risk for stroke and bleeding; their average CHADS2 score was highest among these studies (3.5 compared with 2.1–2.8).3 In addition, ROCKET-AF had a very high percentage of patients with a HAS-BLED score ≥3 (62 %) compared with the other studies (23 % in ARISTOTLE and 51 % in ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48).1214

Several large randomised trials have compared the safety and efficacy of rivaroxaban versus warfarin for venous thromboembolic disease. The warfarin arm of the EINSTEIN-PE trial (Oral Direct Factor Xa Inhibitor Rivaroxaban in Patients with Acute Symptomatic Pulmonary Embolism), which randomised patients with pulmonary embolism to warfarin or rivaroxaban, had a major bleeding rate of 2.2 %. The bleeding rate was lower in the rivaroxaban arm (1.1 %) and notably patients received a higher loading dose of rivaroxaban for the first 3 weeks (15 mg twice daily) compared with the daily 20 mg daily in ROCKET-AF.15

The recent uncertainties surrounding ROCKET-AF demonstrate the need for widespread data transparency for major trials with the capability of so greatly affecting patients’ lives. These are complicated issues both for the companies’ manufacturing products and the clinical trial organisations who carry out these studies and analyse the data. Ultimately the goal of full transparency to allow increased confidence in trial results should be sought. In this instance there is no compelling evidence of imminent danger of excessive bleeding with rivaroxaban. We should take notice of the recent findings, but there is no need to change practice.

What Are Xarelto Side Effects?

The most dangerous Xarelto side effect is uncontrollable bleeding. Blood thinning drugs have also been associated with bleeding complications. Other side effects include:

  • Blood clots
  • Gastrointestinal bleeding
  • Spinal bleeding
  • Intracranial bleeding
  • Epidural bleeding
  • Cerebral bleeding
  • Stroke
  • Difficulty breathing

For Information on Xarelto and other mass torts see:

Michael Brady Lunch will speak on the Xarelto litigation as well as the status of Pradaxa litigation and related issues at the upcoming Mass Tort Nexus “CLE Immersion Course”

November 9 -12, 2018 at The Riverside Hotel in Fort Lauderdale , FL.

For class attendance information please contact Jenny Levine at 954.520.4494 or Jenny@masstortnexus.com.

  • For the most up to date information on all MDL dockets and related mass torts visit  masstortnexus.com and review our mass tort briefcases and professional site MDL briefcases.
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REFERNCES CITED IN STUDIES SHOWN ABOVE

 Rivaroxaban and the ROCKET AF trial issue chronicles: A closer look at benefit risk profile of the drug. References:
BMJ 2016354 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i5131 (Published 28 September 2016)Cite this as: BMJ 2016;354:i5131
  1. Patel MR, Mahaffey KW, Garg J, et al. Rivaroxaban versus warfarin in nonvalvular atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med 2011; 365:883-891. Article
    2. Top 50 pharmaceutical products by global sales. PMLiVE, Available here.
    3. FDA analyses conclude that Xarelto clinical trial results were not affected by faulty monitoring device.https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm524678.htm
    4. ROCKET AF Reanalysis Reviews.http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2011/202439Orig1s000Ro…
    5. Joint EFPIA-PhRMA Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing Become Effective.http://www.efpia.eu/mediaroom/132/43/Joint-EFPIA-PhRMA-Principles-for-Re…
    6. Cappato R, Ezekowitz MD, Klein AL, et al. Rivaroxaban vs vitamin K antagonists for cardioversion in atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J 2014; 35:3346-3355.

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Controversy Surrounding ROCKET-AF: A Call for Transparency, But Should We Be Changing Practice? References
Jason D Matos1 and Peter J Zimetbaum1,,2 Arrhythm Electrophysiol Rev. 2016 May; 5(1): 12–13.; doi:  [10.15420/aer.2016.24.2]
  1. Kubitza D, Becka M, Wensing G, et al. Safety, pharmacodynamics, and pharmacokinetics of BAY 59-7939 – an oral, direct Factor Xa inhibitor – after multiple dosing in healthy male subjects. Eur J Clin Pharmacol. 2005;61:873–80. PMID: 16328318. [PubMed]
  2. Cohen D. Rivaroxaban: can we trust the evidence? BMJ. 2016;352:i575. DOI: 10.1136/bmj.i575; PMID: 26843102. [PubMed]
  3. Patel MR, Mahaffey KW, Garg J, et al. Rivaroxaban versus warfarin in nonvalvular atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:883–91. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1009638; PMID: 21830957. [PubMed]
  4. Granger CB, Alexander JH, McMurray JJ, et al. Apixaban versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:981–92. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1107039; PMID: 21870978.[PubMed]
  5. Giugliano RP, Ruff CT, Braunwald E, et al. Edoxaban versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2013;369:2093–104. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1310907; PMID: 24251359. [PubMed]
  6. Patel MR, Hellkamp AS, Fox KA, et al. Point-of-care warfarin monitoring in the ROCKET AF Trial. N Engl J Med. 2016;374:785–8. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc1515842; PMID: 26839968. [PubMed]
  7. Mandrola J. Rivaroxaban: It’s not time to cut the rope, yet. Medscape. 9 February 2016. Available at: www.medscape.com/viewarticle/858648. (accessed 6 May 2016.
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  9. Cappato R, Marchlinski FE, Hohnloser SH, et al. Uninterrupted rivaroxaban vs. uninterrupted vitamin K antagonists for catheter ablation in non-valvular atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J. 2015;36:1805–11. DOI: 10.1093/eurheartj/ehv177; PMID: 25975659. [PMC free article] [PubMed]
  10. Camm AJ, Amarenco P, Haas S, et al. XANTUS: a real-world, prospective, observational study of patients treated with rivaroxaban for stroke prevention in atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J. 2016;37:1145–53.DOI: 10.1093/eurheartj/ehv466; PMID: 26330425. [PMC free article] [PubMed]
  11. Connolly SJ, Ezekowitz MD, Yusuf S, et al. Dabigatran versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2009;361:1139–51. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa0905561; PMID: 19717844.[PubMed]
  12. Sherwood MW, Nessel CC, Hellkamp AS, et al. Gastrointestinal bleeding in patients with atrial fibrillation treated With rivaroxaban or warfarin: ROCKET AF trial. J Am Coll Cardiol. 2015;66:2271–81.DOI: 10.1016/j.jacc.2015.09.024; PMID: 26610874. [PubMed]
  13. Lopes RD, Al-Khatib SM, Wallentin L, et al. Efficacy and safety of apixaban compared with warfarin according to patient risk of stroke and of bleeding in atrial fibrillation: a secondary analysis of a randomised controlled trial. Lancet. 2012;380:1749–58. DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60986-6; PMID: 23036896. [PubMed]
  14. Eisen A, Giugliano RP, Ruff CT, et al. Edoxaban vs warfarin in patients with nonvalvular atrial fibrillation in the US Food and Drug Administration approval population: An analysis from the Effective Anticoagulation with Factor Xa Next Generation in Atrial Fibrillation-Thrombolysis in Myocardial Infarction 48 (ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48) trial. Am Heart J. 2016;172:144–51. DOI: 10.1016/j.ahj.2015.11.004; PMID: 26856226. [PubMed]
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Why Does the FDA Ignore “Off-Label” Drug Marketing?

“BY REMOVING FDA OVERSIGHT BIG PHARMA RUNS AMOK”

By Mark A. York (August 1, 2018)

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA)  In 2017 and continuing into 2018, Big Pharma has been fighting major legal battles related to off-label marketing of drugs for unintended uses. They also engaged in a parallel strategy, where they were influencing the FDA and other policy making agencies behind the scenes in Washington DC. Big Pharma was paying millions to lobbyists, making campaign donations and generally buying influence as they always have. It was a foregone conclusion that with the Trump administration view of , “no regulatory oversight required” that there would be some loosening of the FDA regulatory shackles.

Big Pharma was getting ready for freedom to sell, sell, sell their drugs in any way they could, including off-label marketing of the drugs for unintended use purposes. A corporate policy, that’s technically illegal, yet results in billions of dollars in profits every years for Big Pharma. Then the FDA rolled out an unexpected new proposed rule, in March 2017 cracking down on “off-label’ marketing of drugs. This new rule change wasn’t in Big Pharma’s bests interests, sending the drug industry into a furious lobbying scramble. Bring in the Trump camp and on January 12, 2018 Big Pharma and the army of lobbyists and elected officials that were recruited, seem to have succeeded in stopping the FDA rules change that would have tightened up “off label” marketing of drugs.

Trump stops FDA enforcement rule change: January 12, 2018 Food and Drug Administration Press Release: FDA Delays Change to “Off-Label” Drug Use Enforcement Rules

This seems to be further evidence of the Trump administration permitting private corporations to control what goes on behind the scenes in federal regulatory agencies these days. The same loosening of enforcement rules has been seen in the EPA as well as in Dept. of Energy oversight enforcement authority. Whatever else you might think about the ramped up Trump vs. Obama administration mindset, this rule delay is an example of the new FDA leadership doing what is in the best interests of those they are supposed to be regulating, the drug makers, and not in the interests of the US consumers.

To put this into perspective, consider the current “Opioid Crisis” gripping the entire country, where “off-label” marketing of opiates for the last 20 years by drug makers, has resulted in thousands of deaths each year, unknown financial losses and the related social impact felt in every state across the country. Another result is the Opiate Prescription Litigation MDL 2804, (see OPIOID CRISIS BRIEFCASE: MDL 2804 OPIATE PRESCRIPTION LITIGATION) where litigation started when hundreds of counties, states and cities and other entities impacted by the catastrophic expense related to combatting the opiate healthcare crisis fought back. The various parties have filed lawsuits against opioid drug makers and distributors, demanding repayment of the billions of dollars spent on addressing the massive costs related to opioid abuse, primarily due to opioid based prescription drugs flooding the country.

When the Obama administration ended on January 9, 2017, the FDA issued a Final Rule on “Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Amendments to Regulations Regarding ‘Intended Uses.’” That “clarification” was meant to enable additional enforcement and control over drug makers rampant “off -label” marketing of drugs for purposes that were never FDA approved. This was an attempt by the FDA to have the ability to punish off-label promotions, where previously the process was a two-step regulatory review, whereby off-label promotions are said to prove an indicated use not included in the label and, thus, not accompanied by adequate directions for use – making the product misbranded. These regulations have been around since the 1950s, but a recent series of court decisions invoking the First Amendment called into question the FDA’s interpretation of “intended use” and its efforts to shut down truthful medical-science communications about potential benefits from off-label use.

In a 2015 proposed rule, the FDA referred to striking the language from regulations permitting the FDA to consider a manufacturer’s mere knowledge of actual use as evidence of intended use, which would have further enabled Big Pharma drug marketing abuses to go unchecked. But then, the FDA’s January 9, 2017 proposal reversed course, stating that retained knowledge of off-label use as evidence of intended use, clarified that any relevant source of evidence, whether circumstantial or direct could demonstrate intended use, and ultimately invoked the dreaded “totality of the evidence” standard. This would have enable the FDA to begin oversight and enforcement of practices such as the blatant and wide open “off-label” marketing of opioid prescription drugs that started in the mid-1990’s and never stopped.

Instead of putting a check on Big Pharma abuses, we have the Trump administration placing a hold on new regulations, and delaying the “intended use” regulation change to March 19, 2018, so that comments could be received and considered, and thereby enabling the Big Pharma “lobby machine” to become fully engaged across all DC circles, ensuring that the FDA changes are effectively put to rest.

The bottom line is that the FDA is now proposing to “delay until further notice” the portions of the final rule amending the FDA’s existing regulations on “off-label” drug use, when describing the types of evidence that may be considered in determining a medical product’s intended uses.  The FDA will receive comments on this proposal through February 5, 2018.

Here is the official FDA publication of January 16, 2018:

The Federal Register:  https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/01/16/2018-00555/clarification-of-when-products-made-or-derived-from-tobacco-are-regulated-as-drugs-devices-or

WHAT IS “OFF-LABEL” MARKETING?

Global health care giant Johnson & Johnson (J&J) and its subsidiaries will pay more than $2.2 billion to resolve criminal and civil liability arising from allegations relating to the prescription drugs Risperdal, Invega and Natrecor, including promotion for uses not approved as safe and effective by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and payment of kickbacks to physicians and to the nation’s largest long-term care pharmacy provider.  The global resolution is one of the largest health care fraud settlements in U.S. history, including criminal fines and forfeiture totaling $485 million and civil settlements with the federal government and states totaling $1.72 billion.

“The conduct at issue in this case jeopardized the health and safety of patients and damaged the public trust,” stated Eric Holder, then US Attorney General, “This multibillion-dollar resolution demonstrates the Justice Department’s firm commitment to preventing and combating all forms of health care fraud.  And it proves our determination to hold accountable any corporation that breaks the law and enriches its bottom line at the expense of the American people” he added.

The resolution includes criminal fines and forfeiture for violations of the law and civil settlements based on the False Claims Act arising out of multiple investigations of the company and its subsidiaries.

“When companies put profit over patients’ health and misuse taxpayer dollars, we demand accountability,” said Associate Attorney General Tony West.  “In addition to significant monetary sanctions, we will ensure that non-monetary measures are in place to facilitate change in corporate behavior and help ensure the playing field is level for all market participants.”

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) protects the health and safety of the public by ensuring, among other things, that drugs intended for use in humans are safe and effective for their intended uses and that the labeling of such drugs bear true, complete and accurate information.  Under the FDCA, a pharmaceutical company must specify the intended uses of a drug in its new drug application to the FDA.  Before approval, the FDA must determine that the drug is safe and effective for those specified uses.  Once the drug is approved, if the company intends a different use and then introduces the drug into interstate commerce for that new, unapproved use, the drug becomes misbranded.  The unapproved use is also known as an “off-label” use because it is not included in the drug’s FDA-approved labeling.

“When pharmaceutical companies interfere with the FDA’s mission of ensuring that drugs are safe and effective for the American public, they undermine the doctor-patient relationship and put the health and safety of patients at risk,” said Director of the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations John Roth.  “Today’s settlement demonstrates the government’s continued focus on pharmaceutical companies that put profits ahead of the public’s health.  The FDA will continue to devote resources to criminal investigations targeting pharmaceutical companies that disregard the drug approval process and recklessly promote drugs for uses that have not been proven to be safe and effective.”

 J&J RISPERDAL MARKETING ABUSE

In a related civil complaint filed today in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States alleges that Janssen marketed Risperdal to control the behaviors and conduct of the nation’s most vulnerable patients: elderly nursing home residents, children and individuals with mental disabilities.  The government alleges that J&J and Janssen caused false claims to be submitted to federal health care programs by promoting Risperdal for off-label uses that federal health care programs did not cover, making false and misleading statements about the safety and efficacy of Risperdal and paying kickbacks to physicians to prescribe Risperdal.

“J&J’s promotion of Risperdal for unapproved uses threatened the most vulnerable populations of our society – children, the elderly and those with developmental disabilities,” said U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Zane Memeger.  “This historic settlement sends the message that drug manufacturers who place profits over patient care will face severe criminal and civil penalties.”

In its complaint, the government alleges that the FDA repeatedly advised Janssen that marketing Risperdal as safe and effective for the elderly would be “misleading.”  The FDA cautioned Janssen that behavioral disturbances in elderly dementia patients were not necessarily manifestations of psychotic disorders and might even be “appropriate responses to the deplorable conditions under which some demented patients are housed, thus raising an ethical question regarding the use of an antipsychotic medication for inappropriate behavioral control.”

The complaint further alleges that J&J and Janssen were aware that Risperdal posed serious health risks for the elderly, including an increased risk of strokes, but that the companies downplayed these risks.  For example, when a J&J study of Risperdal showed a significant risk of strokes and other adverse events in elderly dementia patients, the complaint alleges that Janssen combined the study data with other studies to make it appear that there was a lower overall risk of adverse events.  A year after J&J had received the results of a second study confirming the increased safety risk for elderly patients taking Risperdal, but had not published the data, one physician who worked on the study cautioned Janssen that “[a]t this point, so long after [the study] has been completed … we must be concerned that this gives the strong appearance that Janssen is purposely withholding the findings.”

The complaint also alleges that Janssen knew that patients taking Risperdal had an increased risk of developing diabetes, but nonetheless promoted Risperdal as “uncompromised by safety concerns (does not cause diabetes).”  When Janssen received the initial results of studies indicating that Risperdal posed the same diabetes risk as other antipsychotics, the complaint alleges that the company retained outside consultants to re-analyze the study results and ultimately published articles stating that Risperdal was actually associated with a lower risk of developing diabetes.

The complaint alleges that, despite the FDA warnings and increased health risks, from 1999 through 2005, Janssen aggressively marketed Risperdal to control behavioral disturbances in dementia patients through an “ElderCare sales force” designed to target nursing homes and doctors who treated the elderly.  In business plans, Janssen’s goal was to “[m]aximize and grow RISPERDAL’s market leadership in geriatrics and long term care.”  The company touted Risperdal as having “proven efficacy” and “an excellent safety and tolerability profile” in geriatric patients.

In addition to promoting Risperdal for elderly dementia patients, from 1999 through 2005, Janssen allegedly promoted the antipsychotic drug for use in children and individuals with mental disabilities.  The complaint alleges that J&J and Janssen knew that Risperdal posed certain health risks to children, including the risk of elevated levels of prolactin, a hormone that can stimulate breast development and milk production.  Nonetheless, one of Janssen’s Key Base Business Goals was to grow and protect the drug’s market share with child/adolescent patients.  Janssen instructed its sales representatives to call on child psychiatrists, as well as mental health facilities that primarily treated children, and to market Risperdal as safe and effective for symptoms of various childhood disorders, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder and autism.  Until late 2006, Risperdal was not approved for use in children for any purpose, and the FDA repeatedly warned the company against promoting it for use in children.

The government’s complaint also contains allegations that Janssen paid speaker fees to doctors to influence them to write prescriptions for Risperdal.  Sales representatives allegedly told these doctors that if they wanted to receive payments for speaking, they needed to increase their Risperdal prescriptions.

In addition to allegations relating to Risperdal, today’s settlement also resolves allegations relating to Invega, a newer antipsychotic drug also sold by Janssen.  Although Invega was approved only for the treatment of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, the government alleges that, from 2006 through 2009, J&J and Janssen marketed the drug for off-label indications and made false and misleading statements about its safety and efficacy.

As part of the global resolution, J&J and Janssen have agreed to pay a total of $1.391 billion to resolve the false claims allegedly resulting from their off-label marketing and kickbacks for Risperdal and Invega.  This total includes $1.273 billion to be paid as part of the resolution announced today, as well as $118 million that J&J and Janssen paid to the state of Texas in March 2012 to resolve similar allegations relating to Risperdal.  Because Medicaid is a joint federal-state program, J&J’s conduct caused losses to both the federal and state governments.  The additional payment made by J&J as part of today’s settlement will be shared between the federal and state governments, with the federal government recovering $749 million, and the states recovering $524 million.  The federal government and Texas each received $59 million from the Texas settlement.

NURSING HOME PATIENT ABUSES BY J&J

The civil settlement also resolves allegations that, in furtherance of their efforts to target elderly dementia patients in nursing homes, J&J and Janssen paid kickbacks to Omnicare Inc., the nation’s largest pharmacy specializing in dispensing drugs to nursing home patients.  In a complaint filed in the District of Massachusetts in January 2010, the United States alleged that J&J paid millions of dollars in kickbacks to Omnicare under the guise of market share rebate payments, data-purchase agreements, “grants” and “educational funding.”  These kickbacks were intended to induce Omnicare and its hundreds of consultant pharmacists to engage in “active intervention programs” to promote the use of Risperdal and other J&J drugs in nursing homes.  Omnicare’s consultant pharmacists regularly reviewed nursing home patients’ medical charts and made recommendations to physicians on what drugs should be prescribed for those patients.  Although consultant pharmacists purported to provide “independent” recommendations based on their clinical judgment, J&J viewed the pharmacists as an “extension of [J&J’s] sales force.”

J&J and Janssen have agreed to pay $149 million to resolve the government’s contention that these kickbacks caused Omnicare to submit false claims to federal health care programs.  The federal share of this settlement is $132 million, and the five participating states’ total share is $17 million.  In 2009, Omnicare paid $98 million to resolve its civil liability for claims that it accepted kickbacks from J&J and Janssen, along with certain other conduct.

“Consultant pharmacists can play an important role in protecting nursing home residents from the use of antipsychotic drugs as chemical restraints,” said U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts Carmen Ortiz.  “This settlement is a reminder that the recommendations of consultant pharmacists should be based on their independent clinical judgment and should not be the product of money paid by drug companies.”

OFF-LABEL USE OF HEART DRUG NATRECOR

The civil settlement announced today also resolves allegations that J&J and another of its subsidiaries, Scios Inc., caused false and fraudulent claims to be submitted to federal health care programs for the heart failure drug Natrecor.  In August 2001, the FDA approved Natrecor to treat patients with acutely decompensated congestive heart failure who have shortness of breath at rest or with minimal activity.  This approval was based on a study involving hospitalized patients experiencing severe heart failure who received infusions of Natrecor over an average 36-hour period.

In a civil complaint filed in 2009 in the Northern District of California, the government alleged that, shortly after Natrecor was approved, Scios launched an aggressive campaign to market the drug for scheduled, serial outpatient infusions for patients with less severe heart failure – a use not included in the FDA-approved label and not covered by federal health care programs.  These infusions generally involved visits to an outpatient clinic or doctor’s office for four- to six-hour infusions one or two times per week for several weeks or months.

The government’s complaint alleged that Scios had no sound scientific evidence supporting the medical necessity of these outpatient infusions and misleadingly used a small pilot study to encourage the serial outpatient use of the drug.  Among other things, Scios sponsored an extensive speaker program through which doctors were paid to tout the purported benefits of serial outpatient use of Natrecor.  Scios also urged doctors and hospitals to set up outpatient clinics specifically to administer the serial outpatient infusions, in some cases providing funds to defray the costs of setting up the clinics, and supplied providers with extensive resources and support for billing Medicare for the outpatient infusions.

As part of today’s resolution, J&J and Scios have agreed to pay the federal government $184 million to resolve their civil liability for the alleged false claims to federal health care programs resulting from their off-label marketing of Natrecor.  In October 2011, Scios pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor FDCA violation and paid a criminal fine of $85 million for introducing Natrecor into interstate commerce for an off-label use.

“This case is an example of a drug company encouraging doctors to use a drug in a way that was unsupported by valid scientific evidence,” said First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California Brian Stretch.  “We are committed to ensuring that federal health care programs do not pay for such inappropriate uses, and that pharmaceutical companies market their drugs only for uses that have been proven safe and effective.”

Non-Monetary Provisions of the Global Resolution and Corporate Integrity Agreement

In addition to the criminal and civil resolutions, J&J executed a five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG).  The CIA includes provisions requiring J&J to implement major changes to the way its pharmaceutical affiliates do business.  Among other things, the CIA requires J&J to change its executive compensation program to permit the company to recoup annual bonuses and other long-term incentives from covered executives if they, or their subordinates, engage in significant misconduct.  J&J may recoup monies from executives who are current employees and from those who have left the company.  The CIA also requires J&J’s pharmaceutical businesses to implement and maintain transparency regarding their research practices, publication policies and payments to physicians.  On an annual basis, management employees, including senior executives and certain members of J&J’s independent board of directors, must certify compliance with provisions of the CIA.  J&J must submit detailed annual reports to HHS-OIG about its compliance program and its business operations.

“OIG will work aggressively with our law enforcement partners to hold companies accountable for marketing and promotion that violate laws intended to protect the public,” said Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Daniel R. Levinson.  “Our compliance agreement with Johnson & Johnson increases individual accountability for board members, sales representatives, company executives and management.  The agreement also contains strong monitoring and reporting provisions to help ensure that the public is protected from future unlawful and potentially harmful off-label marketing.”

FEDERAL AND STATE JOINT CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

This resolution marks the culmination of an extensive, coordinated investigation by federal and state law enforcement partners that is the hallmark of the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT) initiative, which fosters government collaborations to fight fraud.  Announced in May 2009 by Attorney General Eric Holder and Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, the HEAT initiative has focused efforts to reduce and prevent Medicare and Medicaid financial fraud through enhanced cooperation.

The criminal cases against Janssen and Scios were handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of California and the Civil Division’s Consumer Protection Branch.  The civil settlements were handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of California and the District of Massachusetts and the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch.  Assistance was provided by the HHS Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, Office of the General Counsel-CMS Division, the FDA’s Office of Chief Counsel and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units.

This matter was investigated by HHS-OIG, the Department of Defense’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations, the Office of Personnel Management’s Office of Inspector General, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Labor, TRICARE Program Integrity, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s Office of the Inspector General and the FBI.

One of the most powerful tools in the fight against Medicare and Medicaid financial fraud is the False Claims Act.  Since January 2009, the Justice Department has recovered a total of more than $16.7 billion through False Claims Act cases, with more than $11.9 billion of that amount recovered in cases involving fraud against federal health care programs.

The department enforces the FDCA by prosecuting those who illegally distribute unapproved, misbranded and adulterated drugs and medical devices in violation of the Act.  Since 2009, fines, penalties and forfeitures that have been imposed in connection with such FDCA violations have totaled more than $6 billion.

The civil settlements described above resolve multiple lawsuits filed under the qui tam, or whistleblower, provisions of the False Claims Act, which allow private citizens to bring civil actions on behalf of the government and to share in any recovery.  From the federal government’s share of the civil settlements announced today, the whistleblowers in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania will receive $112 million, the whistleblowers in the District of Massachusetts will receive $27.7 million and the whistleblower in the Northern District of California will receive $28 million.  Except to the extent that J&J subsidiaries have pleaded guilty or agreed to plead guilty to the criminal charges discussed above, the claims settled by the civil settlements are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability

With the Trump Administration still claiming that no regulatory oversight is needed to monitor the US drug industry, that they can self-regulate, it appears that there will be no letup in the rampant “off-label: and unintended use marketing of pharmaceutical drugs in the United States.  The one way that Big Pharma is held accountable is in the courtroom, although financial damages and penalties against the drug companies amounting to billions of dollars each year being awarded by juries, wont change FDA policy, it does provide a small amount of official recognition that there are ongoing abuses by the pharmaceutical industry in the USA.

 

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HOW CAN WE SOLVE THE OPIOID CRISIS STARTING NOW? With An Opioid Crisis Summit Like No Other

A Definitive Opioid Crisis Solutions Event

By Mark A. York (May 29, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) It’s been called the most perilous drug crisis ever in the United States, the epicenter of the opioid epidemic, overdose deaths have quadrupled since 1999, killing more than 100 people every day. Pharmaceutical opiate pain relief is an essential clinical tool, but with physicians writing over 240 million opioid prescriptions to Americans every year, the potential for catastrophe is enormous. Now it seems to be coming into realization that the opioid crisis is here and the damage is catastrophic, gauged against the devastating impact on families and communities across the United States.  How can we get the message out that addiction is now  recognized as a medical, not a criminal problem, and new treatments are on the horizon. How do we protect the population from misusing opioids? An Opioid Crisis Summit featuring national leaders who are involved in the day to day efforts to fight this opiate crisis on all levels, including Ohio Lieutenant Governor Mary Taylor, Dr. Rahul Gupta, West Virginia Director of Public Health and others who are involved in providing real time solutions to the opiate epidemic as well as treating physicians and legal professionals who are active in offering solutions.

The Definitive Opioid Crisis Summit For All of America:

July 21-22, 2018

www.opioidcrisissummit.com

OPIOD CRISIS SUMMIT

By Mass Tort Nexus

Fort Lauderdale, FL

 How did the opioid crisis happen?

In the late 1990s, pharmaceutical companies reassured the medical community that patients would not become addicted to prescription opioid pain relievers, and healthcare providers began to prescribe them at greater rates. This subsequently led to widespread diversion and misuse of these medications before it became clear that these medications could indeed be highly addictive. Opioid overdose rates began to increase. In 2015, more than 33,000 Americans died as a result of an opioid overdose, including prescription opioids, heroin, and illicitly manufactured fentanyl, a powerful synthetic opioid.1That same year, an estimated 2 million people in the United States suffered from substance use disorders related to prescription opioid pain relievers, and 591,000 suffered from a heroin use disorder (not mutually exclusive).

 What do we know about the opioid crisis?

  • Roughly 21 to 29 percent of patients prescribed opioids for chronic pain misuse them.
  • Between 8 and 12 percent develop an opioid use disorder.
  • An estimated 4 to 6 percent who misuse prescription opioids transition to heroin.
  • About 80 percent of people who use heroin first misused prescription opioids.
  • Opioid overdoses increased 30 percent from July 2016 through September 2017 in 52 areas in 45 states.
  • The Midwestern region saw opioid overdoses increase 70 percent from July 2016 through September 2017.
  • Opioid overdoses in large cities increase by 54 percent in 16 states.

Quarterly rate of suspected opioid overdose, by US region
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

This issue has become a public health crisis with devastating consequences including increases in opioid misuse and related overdoses, as well as the rising incidence of neonatal abstinence syndrome due to opioid use and misuse during pregnancy. The increase in injection drug use has also contributed to the spread of infectious diseases including HIV and hepatitis C. As seen throughout the history of medicine, science can be an important part of the solution in resolving such a public health crisis.

 The Opioid Crisis Summit Agenda

An unprecedented group of elected officials, political and medical experts, and academic leaders from around the country are set to examine the crisis and offer insight and solutions.

On July 21-22, 2018, the definitive Opioid Crisis Summit presented by Mass Tort Nexus will convene a symposium to present a firsthand account as to the depth and severity of the crisis. The research team at Mass Tort Nexus has brought together influential speakers including the Lieutenant Governor of Ohio, Mary Taylor; State Attorney for Palm Beach County Florida, Dave Aronberg, Esq.; Director of Public Health, State of West Virginia, Rahul Gupta, MD; Executive Director, Novus Medical Detox Centers, Kent Runyon; The Amy Winehouse Project Addiction Recovery Center, Susan Anderson and Blades Williamson; Opioid Crisis Advocate, Stephen Gelfand, MD and Opioid Crisis Expert, John Ray.  These speakers are coming together to give our attendees a firsthand look at just how dramatic the impact of the opioid crisis is within our communities.

Summit attendees including attorneys, elected officials and healthcare officials will be giving specific information regarding the legal aspects of the Opioid Crisis as well. This relates to the Opiate Prescription MDL 2804, where hundreds of counties, states and cities across the country have filed lawsuits against the opiate pharmaceutical industry as a whole. This includes key MDL 2804 leadership counsel who will discuss signing of both entity and individual cases, regarding case criteria, damage models and estimated timeframes for settlement. See MDL 2804 Opiate Prescription Litigation US District Court of Ohio, for the National Prescription Opiate Litigation docket information.

This level of professional expertise and real time awareness of the issues regarding the opioid crisis in the United States has never been assembled on a scale such as this and if you are wanting to get the most critical and complete information, please contact someone at Mass Tort Nexus before all seats are taken.

Media Contact: media@masstortnexus.com 954.870.7323, Mark A. York

Event Contact:

Barbara Capasso

Jenny Levine

954.530.9892

barbara@masstortnexus.com

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First State Court Opioid Crisis Trial Set In Oklahoma With May 2019 Start Date

By Mark A. York (May 24, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

May 28, 2019 trial date set in the first opioid litigation case to go to trial where a  state filed suit versus the opioid pharmaceutical companies

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) The first of many opioid litigation trials where states, counties and cities have filed lawsuits against the Opioid Big Pharma industry and it’s affiliates, is now set in Oklahoma where Cleveland County District Judge Thad Balkman set May 28, 2019 for the start of the trial.  The trial date date has been anticipated in the lawsuit by the State of Oklahoma against pharmaceutical companies over the opioid epidemic, according to Oklahoma‘s attorney general Mike Hunter. See Original Complaint – State of Oklahoma vs. Purdue Pharma et al, June 30, 2017 (Cleveland County, OK District Court)

To summarize the view in Oklahoma and other states who are pursuing the Opioid prescription drugmakers in courts all across the country, Oklahoma Attorney General Mike Hunter stated in his filings  “Defendants created the worst public health crisis in modern history. Families destroyed,”adding “Children killed. Babies addicted. Morgues overflowing. Prisons full.” This is a common view across the entire United States at this point.

Oklahoma, one of at least 13 states that have filed lawsuits against drugmakers, alleges fraudulent marketing of drugs that fueled the opioid epidemic in the lawsuit filed in June 2017, and seeks unspecified damages from Purdue Pharma, Allergan, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Teva Pharmaceuticals and several of their subsidiaries.

“We appreciate the urgency Judge (Thad) Balkman saw in getting the case to trial,” Attorney General Mike Hunter said. “Oklahomans who have suffered immeasurably from the years of fraudulent marketing campaigns will see this case resolved sooner rather than later.” Hunter said Balkman scheduled the trial to begin May 28, 2019.

For up to date information on the Opioid Litigation across the country see, OPIOID-CRISIS-BRIEFCASE-INCLUDING-MDL-2804-OPIATE-PRESCRIPTION-LITIGATION (https://www.masstortnexus.com/Briefcases/Drugs/254/)

Within the last 2 weeks, state attorneys general of Nevada, Texas, Florida, North Carolina, North Dakota and Tennessee lawsuits have now joined many other states who have filed lawsuits asserting that Purdue Pharma violated state consumer protection laws by falsely denying or downplaying the addiction risk while overstating the benefits of opioids. The lawsuits also names pharmaceutical manufacturers Endo Pharmaceuticals, Allergan, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries and Mallinckrodt, as well as drug distributors AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health and McKesson Corporation.

“It’s time the defendants pay for the pain and the destruction they’ve caused,” Florida State Attorney General Pam Bondi told a press conference.

Joining, Oklahoma are states who’ve previously filed claims against opiate drugmakers are Ohio, AlaskaKentuckyLouisianaMississippiMissouriMontanaNew HampshireNew JerseyNew MexicoSouth Carolina and Washington state. West Virginia has been catastrophically affected by the opioid crisis and has previously attempted to stop Opioid Big Pharma from pushing opiates into their communities, without much success.  See How drug companies submerged West Virginia in opioids for years: “A small West Virginia town of 3,000 people got 21 million pills”

Medical professionals say a shift in the 1990s to “institutionalize” pain management opened the doors for pharmaceutical companies to encourage doctors to massively increase painkiller prescriptions, and Purdue Pharma led that effort. Which is now directly linked to the massive increase in drug overdoses, now see as the leading cause of accidental death for Americans under age 50, killing more than 64,000 people in 2016, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

OxyContin was launched in the mid-90s by Purdue Pharma and aggressively marketed as a safe way to treat chronic pain. But it created dependency in many even as prescribed, and the pills were easy to abuse. Mass overprescribing has led to an addiction and overdose catastrophe across the US, more recently rippling out into rising heroin and fentanyl deaths.

Opioid overdoses made up a staggering 66 percent of all drug overdose deaths in 2016, surpassing the annual number of lives lost to breast cancer.

Florida and the other states also, named drug makers Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., Allergan, units of Johnson & Johnson and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, and Mallinckrodt, as well as drug distributors AmerisourceBergen Corp., Cardinal Health Inc. and McKesson Corp. The distributors played a part in opioid abuse through oversupply, including failing to identify suspicious orders and report them to authorities, including the DEA and other oversight agencies, contributing to an illegal secondary market in prescription opioids, such as Purdue’s OxyContin, Endo’s Percocet and Insys Therapeutics fentanyl drug Subsys, a fast acting and extremely addictive drug.

The companies deny wrongdoing and say they complied with Federal Drug Administration requirements that include warning labels showing potential risks that come with using their drugs. “We are deeply troubled by the prescription and illicit opioid abuse crisis, and are dedicated to being part of the solution,” Purdue Pharma said in a statement Friday. “We vigorously deny these allegations and look forward to the opportunity to present our defense.”

Ohio Filed First

In announcing his office’s lawsuit in May 2017, Ohio Attorney General DeWine said the drug companies helped unleash the crisis by spending millions of dollars marketing and promoting such drugs as Purdue’s OxyContin, without consideration of the long term effects of the related addiction, which Purdue was absolutely aware of throughout the years of profits that now total billions of dollars.

The lawsuit said the drug companies disseminated misleading statements about the risks and benefits of opioids as part of a marketing scheme aimed at persuading doctors and patients that drugs should be used for chronic rather than short-term pain.  Pain centers and medical practices across the country started writing an ever increasing number of high dose opioid prescriptions for what would be considered low to mid-level pain treatment.

Similar lawsuits have been filed by local governments, including those in several California counties, as well as the cities of Chicago, Illinois and Dayton, Ohio, three Tennessee district attorneys, and nine New York counties have also filed individual suits.

It is unknown at this time, if all of the legal actions filed by governmental entities across the country will be consolidated into MDL 2804, which may be the most effective way to manage the soon to be massive number of legal claims against Big Pharma and their long term opiate profit centers. Municipalities across the country seeking to recoup the enormous financial losses brought on by the opioid crisis.

The state lawsuits are separate from pending lawsuits in Ohio by dozens of local governments, and lawsuits by Native American tribes in the Dakotas and Oklahoma.

In South Dakota, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe and the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate filed a federal lawsuit in January against 24 opioid industry groups. See https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/04/11/navajonationopioid.pdf.  n Oklahoma, a federal judge has ruled that another similar lawsuit by the Cherokee Nation cannot be tried in tribal court, and Cherokee Nation Attorney General Todd Hembree told the Tulsa World that the tribe will re-file the lawsuit in state court.

Lawsuits have already been filed by 16 other U.S. states and Puerto Rico against Purdue and the related opioid drug companies and distributors. Purdue, which is a privately held company, owned by the Sackler brothers and family, in February said it stopped promoting opioids to physicians after widespread criticism of the ways drugmakers market highly addictive painkillers.

Purdue Pharma is owned by the Sackler family, listed at 19th on the annual Forbes list of wealthiest families in the country at a worth of $13 billion. The family’s fortune largely comes from OxyContin sales, which its company branded and introduced as an extended release painkiller in 1995.

Two branches of the Sackler family control Purdue, which developed and continues to make OxyContin, the narcotic prescription painkiller regarded as the “ground zero” of America’s opioids crisis.

Bondi said state attorneys general from New York, California and Massachusetts were preparing similar lawsuits, with Massachusetts last week sending a letter to Purdue notifying the company of its intention to sue. The California and New York attorney general offices did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Stamford, Connecticut-based Purdue, in a statement, denied the accusations, saying its drugs were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and accounted for only 2 percent of all opioid prescriptions, seemingly ignoring the 600 lawsuits filed against them in the last year, as well as the minimum of 15 federal and state criminal investigations that are underway across the country.  At the forefront of the criminal investigations is the U.S. Attorney, John H. Durham, District of Connecticut, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, based in New Haven, CT the state which is also where Purdue Pharma is headquartered, who is leading a multi-group task force looking into the potential criminal conduct of not only Purdue, but the entire Opiate Big Pharma industry as a whole.

“We are disappointed that after months of good faith negotiations working toward a meaningful resolution to help these states address the opioid crisis, this group of attorneys general have unilaterally decided to pursue a costly and protracted litigation process,” Purdue said.

Opioids were involved in more than 42,000 overdose deaths in 2016, the last year for which data was available, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Kentucky, one of the nation’s hardest-hit states, lost more than 1,400 people to drug overdoses that year.

Separate litigation involving at least 433 lawsuits by U.S. cities and counties were consolidated in a federal court in Cleveland, Ohio. The defendants include Purdue, J&J, Teva, Endo, AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health and McKesson. The federal litigation is growing daily see, Opiate Prescription MDL 2804, US District Court of Ohio link.

The federal lawsuits which accuse drugmakers and the opioid industry as a whole, of deceptively marketing opioids and the distributors of ignoring indications that the painkillers were being diverted for improper uses.

U.S. District Judge Dan Polster, who is overseeing the consolidated litigation, has been pushing for a global settlement. He had previously invited state attorneys general with cases not before him to participate in those talks, from the start of the MDL 2804 litigation being assigned to his courtroom.

Despite filing separate lawsuits, the six attorneys general on Tuesday said they would continue to engage in settlement discussions with Purdue and other companies. “You always want to settle and prevent a prolonged litigation,” said Florida’s Bondi. “But we’re sending a message that we’re fully prepared to go to war.”

Will litigation in most every state in the union paired with the National Opiate Prescription MDL 2804 reign in the Opioid industry that’s earned billions and billions of dollars over the last 20 years, all at the expense of the people of the United States and their families?  If history is a gauge of how things will end up, chances are a big “NO” as money and greed at the corporate levels have traditionally overruled anything affiliated with long term public health concerns in our for-profit healthcare system currently entrenched in the United States.

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More States Are Now Filing Lawsuits Against Big Pharma’s Opioid Rx Cash Cow Industry

Florida, Texas, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota and Tennessee Join Opioid Litigation

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Mass Tort Nexus Media) Litigation against OxyContin maker Purdue Pharma LP and the rest of the Opioid Big Pharma industry just jumped significantly, as six more states have filed lawsuits against Purdue Pharma, et al. The ongoing allegations against the opioid pharmaceutical industry as a whole, where numerous governmental entities from across the country have asserted that the opiate makers have fueled a national opioid crisis. This is primarily based on corporate boardroom designed deceptive opioid marketing campaigns, designed to sell prescription opioids, and minimize the previously well-known medical risks, including addiction and overdose, while generating billions of dollars in sales.

For up to date information on the Opioid Litigation across the country see, OPIOID-CRISIS-BRIEFCASE-INCLUDING-MDL-2804-OPIATE-PRESCRIPTION-LITIGATION (https://www.masstortnexus.com/Briefcases/Drugs/254/)

Prescription and illegal opioids account for more than 60 percent of overdose deaths in the United States, a toll that has quadrupled over the past two decades, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. Drug overdose deaths in 2015 far outnumbered deaths from auto accidents or guns.

Texas saw 1,186 opioid-related deaths in 2015, while the nation as a whole had 33,000 such deaths that year. Researchers have flagged opioids as one possible factor in Texas’ staggering rise in women’s deaths during and shortly after pregnancy.

State attorneys general of Nevada, Texas, Florida, North Carolina, North Dakota and Tennessee assert that Purdue Pharma violated state consumer protection laws by falsely denying or downplaying the addiction risk while overstating the benefits of opioids. The lawsuits also names pharmaceutical manufacturers Endo Pharmaceuticals, Allergan, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries and Mallinckrodt, as well as drug distributors AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health and McKesson Corporation.

“It’s time the defendants pay for the pain and the destruction they’ve caused,” Florida State Attorney General Pam Bondi told a press conference.

Medical professionals say a shift in the 1990s to “institutionalize” pain management opened the doors for pharmaceutical companies to encourage doctors to massively increase painkiller prescriptions, and Purdue Pharma led that effort. Which is now directly linked to the massive increase in drug overdoses, now see as the leading cause of accidental death for Americans under age 50, killing more than 64,000 people in 2016, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

OxyContin was launched in the mid-90s by Purdue Pharma and aggressively marketed as a safe way to treat chronic pain. But it created dependency in many even as prescribed, and the pills were easy to abuse. Mass overprescribing has led to an addiction and overdose catastrophe across the US, more recently rippling out into rising heroin and fentanyl deaths.

Opioid overdoses made up a staggering 66 percent of all drug overdose deaths in 2016, surpassing the annual number of lives lost to breast cancer.

Florida and the other states also, named drug makers Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc., Allergan, units of Johnson & Johnson and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, and Mallinckrodt, as well as drug distributors AmerisourceBergen Corp., Cardinal Health Inc. and McKesson Corp. The distributors played a part in opioid abuse through oversupply, including failing to identify suspicious orders and report them to authorities, including the DEA and other oversight agencies, contributing to an illegal secondary market in prescription opioids, such as Purdue’s OxyContin, Endo’s Percocet and Insys Therapeutics fentanyl drug Subsys, a fast acting and extremely addictive drug.

Teva, in a statement, emphasized the importance of safely using opioids, while AmerisourceBergen said it was committed to collaborating with all stakeholders to combat opioid abuse.

The Healthcare Distribution Alliance, an umbrella group for drug distributors, said in a statement that accusations that distributors were responsible for the abuse of opioid prescriptions defied common sense and lacked understanding of the pharmaceutical supply chain.

BILLIONS IN PROFITS

The pharmaceutical industry spent a vast $6.4 billion in “direct-to-consumer” advertisements to hype new drugs in 2016, according tracking firm Kantar Media. That figure has gone up by 62% since 2012, Kantar Media says. This number may seem large at first but compared to the multi-billions in yearly profits just by opioid manufacturers over the last 15 years, the numbers is small.  Corporate earnings have risen every year since the push to increase opioid prescriptions in every way possible, to became an accepted business model in Big Pharma boardrooms across the country.

THE SACKLERS AND PURDUE

Lawsuits have already been filed by 16 other U.S. states and Puerto Rico against Purdue and the related opioid drug companies and distributors. Purdue, which is a privately held company, owned by the Sackler brothers and family, in February said it stopped promoting opioids to physicians after widespread criticism of the ways drugmakers market highly addictive painkillers.

Purdue Pharma is owned by the Sackler family, listed at 19th on the annual Forbes list of wealthiest families in the country at a worth of $13 billion. The family’s fortune largely comes from OxyContin sales, which its company branded and introduced as an extended release painkiller in 1995.

Two branches of the Sackler family control Purdue, which developed and continues to make OxyContin, the narcotic prescription painkiller regarded as the “ground zero” of America’s opioids crisis.

Bondi said state attorneys general from New York, California and Massachusetts were preparing similar lawsuits, with Massachusetts last week sending a letter to Purdue notifying the company of its intention to sue. The California and New York attorney general offices did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Stamford, Connecticut-based Purdue, in a statement, denied the accusations, saying its drugs were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and accounted for only 2 percent of all opioid prescriptions, seemingly ignoring the 600 lawsuits filed against them in the last year, as well as the minimum of 15 federal and state criminal investigations that are underway across the country.  At the forefront of the criminal investigations is the U.S. Attorney, John H. Durham, District of Connecticut, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, based in New Haven, CT the state which is also where Purdue Pharma is headquartered, who is leading a multi-group task force looking into the potential criminal conduct of not only Purdue, but the entire Opiate Big Pharma industry as a whole.

“We are disappointed that after months of good faith negotiations working toward a meaningful resolution to help these states address the opioid crisis, this group of attorneys general have unilaterally decided to pursue a costly and protracted litigation process,” Purdue said.

Opioids were involved in more than 42,000 overdose deaths in 2016, the last year for which data was available, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Kentucky, one of the nation’s hardest-hit states, lost more than 1,400 people to drug overdoses that year.

Separate litigation involving at least 433 lawsuits by U.S. cities and counties were consolidated in a federal court in Cleveland, Ohio. The defendants include Purdue, J&J, Teva, Endo, AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health and McKesson. The federal litigation is growing daily see, Opiate Prescription MDL 2804, US District Court of Ohio link.

The federal lawsuits which accuse drugmakers and the opioid industry as a whole, of deceptively marketing opioids and the distributors of ignoring indications that the painkillers were being diverted for improper uses.

U.S. District Judge Dan Polster, who is overseeing the consolidated litigation, has been pushing for a global settlement. He had previously invited state attorneys general with cases not before him to participate in those talks, from the start of the MDL 2804 litigation being assigned to his courtroom.

Despite filing separate lawsuits, the six attorneys general on Tuesday said they would continue to engage in settlement discussions with Purdue and other companies. “You always want to settle and prevent a prolonged litigation,” said Florida’s Bondi. “But we’re sending a message that we’re fully prepared to go to war.”

PURDUE-OXYCONTIN HISTORY

On December 12, 1995, the Food and Drug Administration approved the opioid analgesic OxyContin. It hit the market in 1996. In its first year, OxyContin accounted for $45 million in sales for its manufacturer, Stamford, Connecticut-based pharmaceutical company Purdue Pharma. By 2000 that number would balloon to $1.1 billion, an increase of well over 2,000 percent in a span of just four years. Ten years later, the profits would inflate still further, to $3.1 billion. By then the potent opioid accounted for about 30 percent of the painkiller market. What’s more, Purdue Pharma’s patent for the original OxyContin formula didn’t expire until 2013. This meant that a single private, family-owned pharmaceutical company with non-descript headquarters in the Northeast controlled nearly a third of the entire United States market for pain pills.

OxyContin’s ball-of-lightning emergence in the health care marketplace was close to unprecedented for a new painkiller in an age where synthetic opiates like Vicodin, Percocet, and Fentanyl had already been competing for decades in doctors’ offices and pharmacies for their piece of the market share of pain-relieving drugs. In retrospect, it almost didn’t make sense. Why was OxyContin so much more popular? Had it been approved for a wider range of ailments than its opioid cousins? Did doctors prefer prescribing it to their patients?

During its rise in popularity, there was a suspicious undercurrent to the drug’s spectrum of approved uses and Purdue Pharma’s relationship to the physicians that were suddenly privileging OxyContin over other meds to combat everything from back pain to arthritis to post-operative discomfort. It would take years to discover that there was much more to the story than the benign introduction of a new, highly effective painkiller.

US DEPT OF JUSTICE INDICTMENTS

While the FDA has failed, the US Department of Justice has launched a massive crackdown on opiate drug makers including indictments of company executives, sales & marketing personnel as well as the doctors and pharmacies that have enabled the flood of easy access narcotics into the US market for over 15 years. The question is “how and why” did the FDA drop the ball or was this an intentional lack of enforcement and oversight by the FDA and other agencies due to Big Pharma influence over Congressional members who would blunt any true oversight of drug companies.

For criminal opioid cases see: Federal Venues and Courts Where Opioid Indictments Are Pending As Of July 2017

FORMER PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON SPEAKS TO THE OPIATE CRISIS ISSUES”

Former President Bill Clinton pulled no punches as he focused directly on the opiate issues “Nobody gets out of this for free,” which seems to be where most of the finger pointing and blame game rests, which is one of the prime issues of the highest importance. The checkbook to pull the country out of this national opiate epidemic will be in the hundreds of billions of dollars and even then, the costs of social and economic damage to date, will never be recovered. Clinton further commented on how the opioid epidemic “creeps into every nook and cranny of our country” and needs to be addressed as both a huge national problem and a community-by-community tragedy, adding “this can rob our country of the future.”

RURAL vs. BIG CITY OPIATES

Almost 2.75 million opioid prescriptions were filled in New York City each year from 2014 to 2016. Which is a very high number for a major city, but not nearly the millions of opiate prescriptions written in the more rural regions of Ohio, West Virginia and Kentucky, where the number of opiates prescribed equaled 100 plus pills per month for every resident in these states, with West Virginia numbers being, 780 million painkillers prescribed in six years.

As more and more cities, states and counties files suits against the opiate drug industry as a whole, there will be a point where Opiate Big Pharm will have to decide whether to admit it’s fault in the opioid crisis, or simply continue to evade responsibility and leave the process up to lawyers and the courts to assign a financial penalty for the alleged corporate opioid abuses.

FDA Failed to Cite Opioid Big Pharma

Perhaps a look at former US Representative Tom Price, will provide insight into how our lawmakers work within the healthcare industry. Rep. Price was appointed by President Trump to head the Department of Health and Human Services, which the FDA reports to, was forced to resign as HHS head due to various transgression within 6 months of being appointed, as well as leaks that while a sitting congressman he enacted a bill favoring a medical device makers extension of a multi-year government contract. Not only did Price enact the bill, he purchased stock in the company prior to the bill introduction and secured a massive profit on the stock price increase after the contract extension was announced. In normal business circles this is considered “insider trading” and is illegal, but when you’re one of those people in charge of creating the rules and regulations, there’s an apparent “get out of jail card” that comes with your congressional seat.

As long as the US Congress fails to correct the lack of oversight by the FDA and other regulatory agencies into what and how dangerous drugs and products are placed into the US marketplace, there will always be bad drugs entering the healthcare pipeline in the United States, with the now enduring default misnomer of “Profits Before Patients” firmly in place in boardrooms and within our government.

As the Opioid litigation expands across the country in both state and federal courtrooms, it remains to be seen if the anticipated payouts will surpass the $200 billion payday for governments in the 1998 Big Tobacco Litigation settlement.

What remains to be seen is where and how the directly affected “individuals” who were prescribed millions of addictive opiates and subsequently became addicted and where thousands more overdosed and died, remains to be seen.

Who will be the advocate to make sure that these individuals as well as their children, families and communities as a whole are placed on the road to recovery. Historically, Big Pharma is not an industry to put the best interests of the paying consumer at the forefront of their agendas.

 

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“PELVIC MESH” – WHAT’S CHANGED SINCE JANUARY 2016? HAS THE FDA LOOKED CLOSER AT THE THOUSANDS OF FILED ADVERSE EVENTS? MESH IS NOW A CLASS III HIGH RISK MEDICAL DEVICE

Who’s Telling Who About The High Risk Of Synthetic Surgical Mesh?

By Mark A. York (February 21, 2018)

Do you want polypropylene “fishing line” in your body? That’s what surgical mesh is made of.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) FDA labels pelvic mesh as a “High Risk Medical Device” yet minimal review, investigation or action has been undertaken regarding the thousands of annual adverse events that are recognized in the medical industry as caused by “plastic or synthetic mesh” which is comparative to high quality polypropylene fishing line, which in both mesh and fishing line is available in various strengths. Is this something that’s either disclosed by your doctor and would it have an affect on your surgical decision?

WHO DISCLOSES RISK?

In January 2016, the FDA said vaginal mesh will now be classified as a “high-risk” medical device with a class III warning. Previously the implants were considered “moderate-risk” devices and carried a class II warning. Are healthcare professionals and surgical mesh manufacturers making sure this is a known factor in pre-surgical decisions? If notice to the public of the high risk designation of surgical mesh devices follows historical medical device manufacturers standards, that answer is an emphatic “NO”- medical device makers and their sales and marketing staff do not advertise or declare FDA and other regulatory defined risks to the public unless forced to, which includes patients undergoing surgeries. You physician may disclose whatever minimal product warning or risk statements that they’ve been provided by the medical product manufacturer.

DOES THIS HELP PATIENTS?

Mesh surgical implants used to repair pelvic organ prolapse in women, a condition that frequently develops after childbirth, will face tougher federal scrutiny following thousands of injuries reported with these devices.

The Food and Drug Administration said Monday that pelvic mesh will now be considered a class III, or high-risk, medical device, and manufacturers will be required to submit premarket approval applications demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of their products.

The change follows years of reports of pain, bleeding and infection among women who had the devices implanted to correct pelvic organ prolapse (POP). The condition occurs when the bladder or other reproductive organs slip out of place, causing pain, constipation and urinary issues. The new FDA requirements do not apply to mesh products used to treat other conditions such as hernias or urinary incontinence.

Plastic mesh is often used to strengthen the pelvic wall and support internal organs in cases of prolapse. The mesh is often inserted through the vagina, using a small surgical incision. The Washington Post recently reported that as many as half of women may experience pelvic floor symptoms in their lifetime, and 200,000 undergo such operations each year.

Surgical mesh is a medical device that is used to provide additional support when repairing weakened or damaged tissue. The majority of surgical mesh devices currently available for use are made from man-made (synthetic) materials or animal tissue.

Surgical mesh made of synthetic materials can be found in knitted mesh or non-knitted sheet forms. The synthetic materials used can be either absorbable, non-absorbable, or a combination of absorbable and non-absorbable materials.

WHAT IS MESH?

Animal-derived mesh are made of animal tissue, such as intestine or skin, that have been processed and disinfected to be suitable for use as an implanted device. These animal-derived mesh are absorbable. The majority of tissue used to produce these mesh implants are from a pig (porcine) or cow (bovine).

Non-absorbable mesh will remain in the body indefinitely and is considered a permanent implant. It is used to provide permanent reinforcement in strength to the urogynecologic repair. Absorbable mesh will degrade and lose strength over time. It is not intended to provide long-term reinforcement to the repair site. As the material degrades, new tissue growth is intended to provide strength to the repair.

Surgical mesh can be used for urogynecologic procedures, including repair of pelvic organ prolapse (POP) and stress urinary incontinence (SUI). It is permanently implanted to reinforce the weakened vaginal wall for POP repair or support the urethra or bladder neck for the repair of SUI. There are three main surgical procedures performed to treat pelvic floor disorders with surgical mesh:

  • Transvaginal mesh to treat POP
  • Transabdominal mesh to treat POP
  • Mesh sling to treat SUI

MESH REPAIR VERSUS SUTURES

The FDA action comes more than four years after the agency concluded that women getting vaginal mesh have more complications than women who undergo traditional surgery with stitches. Mesh products were introduced for pelvic repair in the 1990s and promoted as a way to speed patients’ recovery time. But the FDA said in 2011 that about ten percent of women experienced complications from mesh, sometimes requiring multiple surgeries to reposition or remove it.

50,000+ MESH LAWSUITS FILED

Patients have filed tens of thousands of lawsuits against mesh manufacturers, including Johnson & Johnson, Boston Scientific and Endo International. In 2014, Ireland-based Endo said it would pay $830 million to settle more than 20,000 personal injury lawsuits.  For more information see Mesh Litigation Briefcase -50,000 Cases Pending and More Each Day along with TVM mesh cases there are now two more “hernia mesh” multidistrict litigation cases , designated as “Ethicon Physiomesh MDL 2782 (Ethicon Physiomesh MDL 2782 Briefcase Re: Hernia-Mesh-Litigation) and the Atrium Medical C-Qur Hernia Mesh MDL 2753 (ATRIUM MDL 2753 Re: C-QUR-HERNIA-PATCH Briefcase) these case apply to synthetic hernia mesh complication with adverse systems and long term medical complications, being the same as those alleged in the massive TVM litigation, which are pending in federal court across the country.

In a second rule, the FDA said vaginal mesh will now be classified as a “high-risk” medical device with a class III warning. Previously the implants were considered “moderate-risk” devices and carried a class II warning.

FDA recommends that women be aware of the risks associated with surgical mesh. On an advice page on the FDA website, the agency writes: “Ask your surgeon about all POP treatment options, including surgical repair with or without mesh and non-surgical options.”

Non-surgical options include pelvic floor exercises known as Kegels. There are also non-invasive devices such as the PeriCoach, a smartphone-connected pelvic floor muscle training device for incontinence.

WHY WAS THERE AN FDA DELAY?

The FDA first proposed the 2016 changes in 2014 draft orders, why would a regulatory safety agency wait two years to announce the high risk designation of a product being used over 200 thousand times a year in the USA? This reflects the back office control and influence of the medical manufacturing industry as a whole and how they use influence to defer and often stop disclosure of adverse risk s related to the medical products they sell to consumers. Profits before patient in the general rule in most device manufacturer boardrooms..

Like 90 percent of medical devices sold in the U.S., pelvic mesh was originally cleared under a streamlined FDA review process for devices deemed similar to older products. This has resulted in billions of dollars in profits for major medical manufacturers and the medical field as a whole, while thousands and thousands of patients have been afflicted with life changing post-surgical complications and until the FDA or other parties make the high risks known, many thousands more patients will have plastic products surgically implanted into their bodies, without knowing the true risks.

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$28 Million Xarelto Jury Verdict Reversed by Judge in Philadelphia Court

Defense gets fourth win in the four Xarelto bellwether trials

By Mark York (January 11, 2018)

 Xarelto Blood Thinner Developed by Bayer and Janssen

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) The December 2017 Xarelto jury verdict of $27.8 million awarded to an Indiana couple, was overturned earlier this week, when the trial judge vacated the verdict. The plaintiffs had accused Bayer AG and Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary, of failing to warn of internal bleeding risks of their drug Xarelto.

Judge Michael Erdos, Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, heard arguments on January 9, 2018 in a motion hearing to reverse the December verdict, which was the first defense trial loss in litigation over the Xarelto blood thinner, and also the first trial outside the Xarelto MDL 2592, (see XARELTO MDL 2592 US District Court ED Louisiana briefcase) in front of Judge Eldon Fallon, US District Court of Louisiana.

Judge Erdos issued his ruling from the bench after the hearing on defense motions for a new trial or alternatively, for a judgement notwithstanding the verdict, and at the close of a full day of arguments stating, “a new trial is not necessary because plaintiff did not adequately demonstrate responsible cause,” and he then entered judgement for the defendants.

“J&J’s Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc and Bayer, which jointly developed Xarelto, welcomed the decision and issued statements saying they will continue to defend against the allegations in all Xarelto litigation, with a total of more than 20,000 pending lawsuits now in both state and federal Xarelto dockets.

Bayer stated “Bayer stands behind the safety and efficacy of Xarelto and will continue to vigorously defend it.”

The December 5, 2017 verdict came in a lawsuit filed by Lynn Hartman, who was prescribed Xarelto as treatment for an irregular heartbeat also known as atrial fibrillation, to prevent strokes. The testimony and opinions of Ms. Hartman’s treating physician and views on continued willingness to prescribe Xarelto, had a significant impact on the final ruling to overturn the verdict by Judge Erdos.

Hartman claimed she was prescribed the drug for a little more than a year, starting in February 2013, and was hospitalized with severe gastrointestinal bleeding in June 2014, at age 72, with the bleed attributed to taking Xarelto. The court record reflected that Ms. Hartman has since recovered from the hospitalization.

Lynn Hartman and her husband filed their complaint against the drugmakers in 2015, (see XARELTO Case No. 2349 Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas briefcase) with the six week trial starting the first week of November 2017, resulting in the jury awarding $1.8 million in compensatory damages and $26 million in punitive damages. This verdict was seen as a high note for plaintiff counsel in the Xarelto litigation, after three prior trial losses, in Xarelto MDL 2592 bellwether trials in Louisiana and Mississippi.

The Hartman trial is just one of about 21,400 against Bayer and Janssen pending in federal and state courts blaming injuries on Xarelto, and the first selected for trial from more than 1,400 Xarelto cases pending in the Complex Litigation docket of the Philadelphia court.

Plaintiff trial counsel Michael Weinkowitz, said the decision related to a “very narrow issue related to Mrs. Hartman’s prescribing physician.” He said he looked forward to trying the next series of Xarelto-related cases in Philadelphia. The post trial legal arguments were related to the “learned intermediary doctrine and proximate cause” and was raised by defense in post trial motions and aggressively argued, which plaintiff counsel was unable to overcome in the full day hearing.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved Xarelto in 2011, to be prescribed for people with atrial fibrillation, a common heart rhythm disorder, and to treat and reduce the risk of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolisms, often after implant surgeries.

Plaintiffs in the Hartman trial as well as in thousands of other Xarelto lawsuits, alleged that the drug was unreasonably dangerous and that Janssen (J&J) and Bayer failed to warn patients about a serious risk of uncontrollable, irreversible bleeding in emergencies and were aware of adverse events for a long period of time. These allegations will be argued aggressively by defense in all forthcoming trials, as the defendants do not seem to be willing to bend on their winning trial strategy.

Bayer and Janssen have defended Xarelto’s label stating that the label adequately warns of bleeding risks. After four trials verdicts, all in their favor, defense seems to be using an effective trial strategy that has worked in venues across the country.

The three bellwether trials in the Xarelto MDL 2592, all resulted in defense wins for Bayer and Janssen, with this Philadelphia trial shifting the focus from the federal Xarelto docket to the Philadelphia court and the Hartman trial. What impact the initial plaintiff’s trial win followed by the Judge Erdos reversal this week has on both Xarelto dockets remains to be seen.

 

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The Week In Mass Torts By Mass Tort Nexus for December 18, 2017

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By Mark York, Mass Tort Nexus Media

(December 21, 2017)

New Jersey Supreme Court Review Reinstatement Of Accutane Experts

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently granted petitions and cross-petitions to appeal a state appellate court’s reversal of expert exclusions in the state’s Accutane multicounty litigation and the reinstatement of 2,076 dismissed cases (In Re:  Accutane Litigation, C-388 September Term 2017, C-329 September Term 2017 and C-390 September Term 2017, N.J. Sup.) See Mass Tort Nexus Accutane Briefcase Accutane New Jersey State Court Litigation.

New Trial Denied in 3rd Xarelto MDL Bellwether Case After Defense Verdict

Judge Eldon Fallon, overseeing the Xarelto multidistrict litigation, recently denied a motion for a new trial by the plaintiff in the third bellwether trial, where Bayer was found not liable in the Dora Mingo trial that took place in a Mississippi federal court in front of Judge Fallon. He ruled that plaintiff was unsuccessful in presenting new findings, among other things, that the plaintiff’s “newly discovered evidence” is actually cumulative of previously known and admitted evidence (In Re:  Xarelto [Rivaroxaban] Products Liability Litigation, MDL Docket No. 2592, E.D. La., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205422). See Mass Tort Xarelto Briefcase for the entire Mingo trial transcripts as well as full transcripts of the Orr and Boudreaux trials, XARELTO MDL 2592 US District Court ED Louisiana Including Trial Transcripts.

 With Last 2 Cases Gone, Pradaxa MDL Judge Again Recommends Termination

With the final two pending cases now closed, the Illinois federal judge overseeing the Pradaxa multidistrict litigation on Dec. 11 again recommended that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPMDL) terminate the MDL (In Re:  Pradaxa [Dabigatran Etexilate]Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2385, No. 12-md-2385, S.D. Ill.).  After a global settlement was reached in 2014 with defendant Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals Inc., the JPMDL suspended the transfer of tag-along actions into the MDL, and now the judge has moved for termination of the Pradaxa MDL. However, there remains over 700 Pradaxa cases pending in the State Court of Connecticut, Complex Litigation Docket, known as “Connecticut Pradaxa Actions”, see Mass Tort Nexus Pradaxa Case Briefcase,  Connecticut Consolidated Pradaxa Litigation.

Boehringer To Pay $13.5M To End Off-Label Marketing Claims

Drugmaker Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals Inc. has agreed to distribute $13.5 million among all 50 states and the District of Columbia to end allegations that it marketed four of its prescription drugs for off-label uses, attorneys general announced Wednesday.
The settlement would resolve allegations that Boehringer marketed its prescription drugs Micardis, Aggrenox, Atrovent and Combivent for uses that weren’t approved by their labels or backed by scientific evidence. (Getty) The settlement, of which New York will receive about $490,000, would resolve allegations that the drugmaker marketed it products for off-label use, which often leads to unknown or studied adverse events and medical complications for patients taking these drugs for unapproved purposes.

 J&J Fined $30 Million Over French Opioid Drug Smear Campaign In Efforts To Sell Fentanyl Patch

France’s antitrust enforcer fined Johnson & Johnson and its Janssen-Cilag unit €25 million ($29.7 million) on Wednesday for hindering the marketing and sale of a generic version of the company’s Durogesic pain patch.The French Competition Authority found that Janssen and J&J had not only successfully delayed a generic competitor for the powerful opioid for several months, but had also done lasting damage by discrediting rival versions of the drug with doctors and pharmacists in a country where medical professionals still remain reluctant to opt for prescribing opioids.  The J&J conduct reflects the same claims being asserted against opioid drug makers in the US, where lawsuits have been consolidate into Opiate Prescription Litigation MDL No. 2804, in the US District Court of Ohio, see Mass Tort Nexus Opioid Crisis Briefcase, OPIOID CRISIS MATERIALS INCLUDING: MDL 2804 OPIATE PRESCRIPTION LITIGATION.

11th Circuit Affirms Pelvic Mesh Group Trial, Exclusion Of 510(k) Status

(October 24, 2017, 1:25 PM EDT) -The 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals on Oct. 19 said multidistrict litigation court judge did not err in consolidating four pelvic mesh cases for a bellwether trial and in excluding the so-called 510(k) defense raised by defendant Boston Scientific Corp. (BSC) (Amal Eghnayem, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corporation, No. 16-11818, 11th Cir., 2017)   See Mass Tort Nexus Mesh Case Briefcase, All Pelvic Mesh Litigation Case Files.

Preemption Summary Judgment Reversed By 9th Circuit In Incretin Mimetic MDL Appeal

The Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals on Dec. 6 unsealed its Nov. 28 opinion reversing summary judgment in the incretin mimetic multidistrict litigation, saying the MDL judge misapplied a U.S. Supreme Court precedent, improperly blocked discovery, misinterpreted what constituted new evidence and improperly disqualified a plaintiff expert (In Re:  Incretin-Based Therapies Products Liability Litigation, Jean Adams, et al. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., et al., No. 15-56997, 9th Cir., 2017 )

Pennsylvania Appeals Court Affirms $29.6M Remitted Zimmer Knee Judgment

A Pennsylvania appeals court panel on Dec. 15 said a trial judge did not err when remitting a Zimmer Inc. knee verdict to $29.6 million and said it declined to substitute its judgment in place of the jury’s (Margo Polett, et al. v. Public Communications, Inc., et al., No. 80 EDA 2017, Pa. Super., 2017 Pa. Superior Court)

Risperdal Gynecomastia Cases Barred By Michigan Shield Law, Pennsylvania Panel Says

A Pennsylvania state appeals panel on Nov. 28 affirmed the dismissal of 13 Risperdal gynecomastia cases, agreeing with a trial judge that the plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by Michigan’s drug shield law and that the plaintiffs could not prove that the fraud exception

applied to their claims (In Re:  Risperdal Litigation versus Janssen Pharmaceuticals Inc., et al., No. 55 EDA 2015, et al., Pennsylvania Court of Appeals, 2017.

U.S. Supreme Court Asks Solicitor General To Weigh In On Fosamax Preemption

The U.S. Supreme Court on has invited the U.S. solicitor general to express the views of the United States on whether there is “clear and convincing evidence” that the Food and Drug Administration would have rejected a stronger warning about femur fractures from the osteoporosis drug Fosamax (Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Doris Albrecht, et al., No. 17-290, U.S. Supreme Court)  This is a unique turn when the Supreme Court is seeking input from an outside agency in what is now a common legal issue placed in front of the court, where dug makers are using the FDA regulatory process as a shield in defending thousands of claims where warnings of drug dangers are not clear or not provided. See Mass Tort Nexus Fosamax Case Briefcase, FOSAMAX MDL 2243 (FEMUR FRACTURE CLAIMS).

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