XARELTO RECENT LABEL CHANGE: Is Rat Poison Safer?

A WHITE PAPER REPORT BY MASS TORT NEXUS

(The following information and conclusions are based on opinions formed after a review of relevant facts and data by John Ray and edited by Lisa Powell, Mass Tort Nexus www.masstortnexus.com)

XARELTO LABEL CHANGE AND CLINICAL TRIAL BACKGROUND

On October 11, 2018, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a division of Johnson & Johnson) changed its Xarelto® drug safety label as follows:

Monitoring for the anticoagulation effect of rivaroxaban using a clotting test (PT, INR or aPTT) for anti-factor XA (FXa) activity is not recommended.

Rivaroxaban is an anticoagulant medication. Anticoagulants thin blood. Rivaroxaban is sold under its trade name, Xarelto®. Xarelto® is used to prevent and/or treat blood clots that could result in strokes in patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation, in patients undergoing knee and hip reconstruction or replacement surgery, and for secondary prevention in patients who have had an Acute coronary syndrome event.

Prior to FDA approval in 2011, clinical trials were conducted to test the safety and efficacy of Xarelto® and to compare it to other anticoagulants. Trial administrators measured both the medication’s effectiveness in thinning the blood and how long it took to be within the therapeutic range. A blood test is used to measure the international randomized ratio (INR). The INR was used to determine the appropriate dose and dosage (i.e., amount and rate of administration) specific to each patient; or, in this case, each trial participant.

The safety label update made last week by the drug maker, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a division of Johnson & Johnson) in effect states that the INR test used to gain FDA approval—and that doctors continue to use to dose and monitor the effects of Xarelto® in their patients—is arguably defective. Not only would this render the clinical trial results invalid but also bolster plaintiffs’ new and existing claims that the drug maker(s) failed to adequately inform doctors that there was no means by which to determine the correct dose and dosage for any given patient. Essentially a doctor would have to wait until the patient bleeds out or throws a clot before determining that the patient may not be on the right dose and/or dosage. In other words, the INR test likely has no diagnostic value and is no more effective than a shot in the dark.

Summary of Facts and Subsequent Findings

  • On October 11, 2018, the Xarelto® drug safety label was changed to “not” recommend INR testing to monitor the effects Xarelto® on patients
  • INR testing was used in clinical trials to establish the safety and efficacy of Xarelto® and to compare it to other anticoagulants prior to FDA approval and market release in 2011
  • Title 21 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulation requires that drug labels include a summary of essential scientific information including a statement of the recommended or usual dosage
  • Results from Xarelto® clinical trials using INR testing are at best, questionable, and at worst, invalid
  • A change to the Xarelto® drug safety label likely indicates that the drug makers failed to adequately warn that there was no means by which to determine correct dosage for any given patient
  • A pharmaceutical product for which correct dose and dosage cannot be established for a given patient is arguably defective in a significant way
  • Physicians that rely on INR testing without knowing that it may render inaccurate results could lead them to incorrectly dose Xarelto® potentially causing significant harm to their patients

Methodology Flaws in the Xarelto Clinical Trials

INR testing was used in the original Xarelto® clinical trials known as the ROCKET-AF and EINSTEIN DVT/PE trials. These trials were paid for by the drug makers—Bayer Healthcare and Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (a division of Johnson & Johnson). These trials were conducted to establish the safety and efficacy of Xarelto® and to compare it to other anticoagulants.

The following is an excerpt from the EINSTEIN DVT/PE clinical trial results:

EINSTEIN DVT/PE trial design: Randomized, phase 3, multicenter, open-label, parallel group,

active-controlled, event-driven noninferiority studies (EINSTEIN DVT and EINSTEIN PE) with patients receiving XARELTO® at an initial dose of 15 mg twice daily with food for the first 3 weeks, followed by XARELTO® 20 mg once daily with food or enoxaparin 1 mg/kg twice daily for at least 5 days with VKA, then VKA only after target INR (2.0-3.0) was reached. Patients were treated for 3, 6, or 12 months at HCP discretion.

In other words, Xarelto® was administered to trial participants and after a target INR was reached, they received a different anticoagulant—a VKA (i.e., vitamin K antagonist).

Given the drug safety update added to the Xarelto® label by Janssen on October 11, 2018:

Monitoring for the anticoagulation effect of rivaroxaban using a clotting test (PT, INR or aPTT) for anti-factor Xa (FXa) activity is not recommended.

Results from Xarelto® clinical trials using INR testing are at best, questionable, and at worst, invalid.

Thank You for Sharing. Not!

In May 2017—17 months before Janssen changed the Xarelto® label—Clinical Therapeutics, an international peer-reviewed journal, published an article entitled, “International Normalized Ratio Is Significantly Elevated with Rivaroxaban and Apixaban Drug Therapies: A Retrospective Study Published.” An excerpt from the article follows (emphasis added):

Purpose

Direct factor Xa inhibitors such as rivaroxaban or apixaban may prolong prothrombin time (PT) and elevate international normalized ratio (INR). However, these tests are not reliable for assessing the anticoagulation effects of these agents. PT assay sensitivity is relatively weak at therapeutic drug concentrations and is subjected to significant variations depending on the reagent used. Conversion of PT to INR may even increase the variability. We conducted a retrospective cross-sectional study aiming to assess the prevalence and extent of INR elevation in hospitalized patients receiving rivaroxaban or apixaban as part of their home medications and to find out whether other existing factors could elevate INR apart from the drug entity itself. [Emphasis added.]

Methods

The data collected from 218 hospitalized patients׳ charts included PT and INR taken on admission, patients׳ characteristics, laboratory results, other medications regularly used, and coexisting clinical conditions.

Findings

No statistically significant association between INR elevation and the parameters examined was found in our study. INR was significantly elevated in both drug groups (P < 0.001), with 84.2% of rivaroxaban patients and 78.3% of apixaban patients presenting with INR levels above the higher limit of the normal range. Furthermore, INR was significantly higher in the rivaroxaban group than in the apixaban group (P < 0.001).

Implications

Both of the reviewed drugs significantly elevated INR. Moreover, rivaroxaban elevates INR significantly more than apixaban, and there are apparently no other factors affecting INR but the drugs themselves. Larger prospective studies are needed to confirm and clarify the clinical significance of these results.

In that the common tests used to determine the correct administration of Xarelto® are not recommended by the drug maker, how are doctors to determine what dose and dosage of Xarelto® is correct vs. what dose and dosage may render a patient over anticoagulated and more likely to experience severe bleeding, or under anticoagulated, leaving patients more likely to suffer the adverse events Xarelto® is intended to treat?

In other words, doctors have relied on—and may continue to rely on—the test that the makers of Xarelto® now say is not recommended to determine the blood-thinning effects of the drug without knowing that these tests were likely rendering inaccurate results which could lead to their treating patients in a manner likely to cause them significant harm.

If the means to determine the correct dosage to administer to a given patient does not exist, the product is arguably defective. In addition, it would be impossible for a drug maker to comply with the requirements of Title 21, as follows:

21 CFR § 201.56 (a)(1): The labeling must contain a summary of the essential scientific information needed for the safe and effective use of the drug.

21 CFR § 201.100(b)(2): Requires labels for prescription drugs bear a statement of the recommended or usual dosage.

Janssen’s Misleading Advertising Campaign

There are three types of anticoagulants used in the United States. Xarelto® is a direct factor Xa inhibitor type. Benefits claimed by its U.S. manufacturer, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., include once daily administration of an oral pill, no dietary restrictions, and less testing requirements resulting in fewer blood draws. Warfarin, another type of anticoagulant, is a vitamin K inhibitor.  If a patient’s blood becomes too thin after taking warfarin, vitamin K is administered to reverse its blood-thinning effects (i.e., an antidote or reversal agent). While the INR measurement is an effective test to dose and monitor warfarin in patients, Janssen’s advertising campaign touting less testing requirements for Xarelto® as a benefit is laughable given that the INR test used repeatedly to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of Xarelto® “is not recommended.” Until early 2018—approximately seven years after its market release–Xarelto® did not have a reversal agent, and to date, there is not a “recommended” test for doctors to accurately dose and monitor the effects of Xarelto® in their patients.

In 2014, the FDA required Janssen to add new language to its official warnings and precautions including an update to its “black box” because the test equipment used to measure the INR during clinical trials was deemed faulty. The black box is the strongest and most urgent FDA warning added to an official drug label. The update notifies patients and caregivers about certain risks and potentially dangerous side effects from Xarelto®. A year earlier, the FDA cited Johnson & Johnson for its misleading advertising campaign in contradiction to U.S. laws and regulations.

According to Recall Center, a consumer protection organization:

Since the drug’s release, there have been multiple updates to the label warning users of possible risks. In 2013, the FDA issued a determination letter to Johnson & Johnson advising them that their print advertising published in WebMD magazine earlier that year was misleading. They cited the following deficiencies:

  • Effects of the drug to potential patients were downplayed
  • Efficacy claims appeared to be disassociated from the potential risks
  • Assertions that Xarelto has “no dosage adjustments,” which the FDA noted is inaccurate according to the product information’s section on warnings and precautions, as well as its section on dosage and administration.

Because of these allegations, the FDA declared Johnson & Johnson to be in violation of U.S. laws and regulations that oversee drug marketing. [U.S. Food & Drug Administration. “Letter to Roxanne McGregor-Beck, RE: NDA #202439.” (June 6, 2013) FDA.gov. Accessed Oct. 27, 2014]

According to a 2017 PR Newswire press release published by Business Insider (emphasis added):

Johnson & Johnson (NYSE: JNJ), Janssen Pharmaceuticals and Bayer Healthcare (OTC: BAYRY) are accused of downplaying the risks of taking Xarelto and aggressively marketing the drug as an alternative for warfarin in patients needing blood thinners to reduce the risk of dangerous clots. The companies positioned the drug as more convenient, calling for a once-a-day dose and eliminating the need for regular monitoring of a patient’s blood. However, the lawsuits charge that doctors and patients were not fully informed of the risks.

While Janssen’s Xarelto® advertising campaign claims:

And with XARELTO® you can

  • Spend your time how you want to spend it, with no regular blood monitoring

MISLEADING. A more accurate statement would arguably be:

Regular blood monitoring would be useless because it will not identify whether a patient is under anti-coagulated [i.e. clotting too much] or over anti-coagulated [i.e., bleeding too much].

  • Enjoy a full variety of healthy foods with no known dietary restrictions

TRUE.

  • Know it’s working, with no frequent dosage adjustments

MISLEADING. A more accurate statement would arguably be:

There is no means by which to determine if a dosage adjustment is needed in that the common tests to make such a determination are inaccurate in patients who have been administered Xarelto®.

It bears repeating:

A pharmaceutical product for which correct dosage cannot be established or determined for any given patient is arguably defective in a significant way.

With Testing, Rat Poison Can Be Correctly Dosed for Benefit

There may be no better example of why correctly dosing an anticoagulant is important than warfarin. Warfarin first came into commercial use as a rat poison in 1948. Correctly dosed, warfarin is an effective anticoagulant for humans; incorrectly dosed, warfarin is poison.

Unlike Xarelto®, INR testing is reliable for dosing warfarin. To optimize the therapeutic effect without risking dangerous side effects such as bleeding, close monitoring of the degree of anticoagulation is required. During the initial stage of treatment, the INR is checked daily. Intervals between tests can be lengthened if the patient manages stable therapeutic INR levels on an unchanged warfarin dose. Newer point-of-care testing is available and has increased the ease of INR testing in the outpatient setting. Instead of a blood draw, the new INR point-of-care test involves a simple finger prick.

Therefore, an anticoagulant that cannot be accurately dosed is arguably not as safe as rat poison.

———-

The foregoing is an observation of statistics and data related to Xarelto®. The conclusions contained herein are based on opinions formed by the author after a review of the relevant data. We acknowledge that others could draw differing conclusions and opinions based on the same observations.

 References:

https://www.clinicaltherapeutics.com/article/S0149-2918(17)30242-4/pdf

https://www.recallcenter.com/xarelto/fda-news/

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/report-more-than-15-000-adverse-events-linked-to-xarelto-in-2016-1002203317

https://www.xareltohcp.com/dvt-pe/clinical-trials

Read More

XARELTO INITIAL ROCKET & EINSTEIN CLINICAL TRIALS NOW SEEN AS FLAWED: ADD THE MAY 2018 FAILURE OF TWO LATEST BAYER/JANSSEN STUDIES = BAD SCIENCE

Xarelto Study Red Flags Ignored: Why were medical research professionals ignored when red flags were raised over the viability of the Xarelto Rocket AF and Einstein DVT study results? Now the clinical trials for both are considered flawed, and the two most recent studies, the “Commander HF” and “Mariner,” failed to produce clear evidence that Xarelto is able to reduce the rate of blood clots in certain high-risk patients or after an acute decline in their condition.

By Mark A. York (October 23, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) Xarelto (rivaroxaban) is a prescription blood thinner created by Bayer and Janssen Pharmaceuticals that was approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2011. This drug is an anticoagulant for preventing blood from clotting, often used to treat deep vein thrombosis, atrial fibrillation, pulmonary embolism, stroke, and other conditions.

More than one study has shown Xarelto can cause a higher rate of internal bleeding, than other anticoagulant drugs and until very recently, there was no available “antidote” for stopping internal bleeding in patients taking Xarelto. With warfarin, vitamin K has been shown to stop bleeding but there is no vitamin K “parallel” for people taking Xarelto. For Xarelto, it can take 24 hours for a dose to get out of the body. That means that if internal bleeding starts, the patient may simply have to wait it out and hope it stops on its own.

What The Medical Studies Say About Xarelto?

The FDA has received thousands of adverse event reports regarding Xarelto and medical studies have examined the safety of this drug:

  • New England Journal of Medicine (2011): Published the ROCKET-AF study, which compared Xarelto to Warfarin in patients suffering from atrial fibrillation. This was the biggest clinical trial of this medication and it compared the effects of Xarelto to the effects of a similar drug known as Warfarin in over 14,000 patients. The study concluded that “there was not significant between-group difference in the risk of major bleeding.”
  • Archives of Internal Medicine (2012): The study discussed the risk of uncontrollable bleeding outweighing the benefits for several different blood thinners including Xarelto. The researchers in this study found that there was a tripled risk of bleeding among the patients, who were given the drug, and no improvement in overall survival rates.
  • Institute for Safe Medication Practices (2012): Issued a report based on FDA data from the first quarter of 2012. During this period, the FDA received 356 adverse event reports of Xarelto side effects including “serious, disabling, or fatal injury.” Additionally, 158 reports indicated blood clots were the serious side effect.
  • New England Journal of Medicine (2013): Published the results of the ROCKET study, which found that Xarelto may carry an increased risk of bleeding.
  • Medscape (2013): Xarelto is associated with a higher risk of bleeding in certain patients. It caused a nearly 3-fold increase of the risk of bleeding in “acutely ill patients” and 4-fold increased risk of major bleeding in patients that had “Acute Coronary Syndrome” (ACS).

Drug Makers Failed To Disclose Faulty Device In Xarelto Trials

 Rivaroxaban and the ROCKET AF trial issue chronicles: A closer look at benefit risk profile of the drug.

  • BMJ2016354 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i5131 (Published 28 September 2016)Cite this as: BMJ 2016;354:i5131
  • Study Analysis: There has been a lot of hue and cry over the recent question raised about the ROCKET AF[1] trial for rivaroxaban which was the only trial used by the company for drug approval from USFDA. This is indeed a very important concern as it directly impacts the well-being of the patients who are at the receiving end of this very highly prescribed anticoagulant drug in 2014.[2] The main concern with this whole confusion surrounding the ROCKET AF trial is that the device used for measuring the INR in trial arm of warfarin patient was faulty and gave lower INR values than it should have, leading to over dosing of warfarin and thereby increasing bleeding problems with the same, compared to the trial arm of rivaroxaban. However, there has been a reanalysis done by the ROCKET AF researchers, which again reinforced the prior result database of the trial and which was accepted by FDA as well[3]. In the reanalysis, the US FDA clearly mentioned that the effect of the faulty device results in causing bleeding episodes, both minor and major, was minimal.[4]
  • However, following this reanalysis, not everyone who raised the question in the first place was convinced and there was a demand that the data of the complete ROCKET AF trial should be made public for everyone to assess and understand the risks. But since the trial was done and results released before the principles on responsible clinical trial data sharing came into effect, the parent pharmaceutical company for rivaroxaban refused to share the patient level details, citing concerns on privacy and transparency policy [5].
  • In spite of everything said and written for and against this issue, a simple question arises, regarding the amount of belief, honesty and hard work that goes without questioning when you bring a new chemical entity to the research stage, get it approved and then bring it to market. For this to happen, there have to be maintained a very fine balance between pharmaceutical companies, drug regulatory authorities and marketing people. In this case, after initial suspicions, the drug regulatory authorities have cleared and supported the approval of rivaroxaban after reanalysis and that should have a say, in case we want to continue trust with this process of drug entry into the market.
  • Rivaroxaban has shown its efficacy and safety both in patients who required adequate anticoagulation e.g. those who had atrial fibrillation and underwent cardioversion. There are few other trials where rivaroxaban has performed better or equally good than warfarin in terms of both efficacy and safety [6]. These results lead us to believe that all was not wrong with the ROCKET AF trial results. All these, combined with personal experiences of those physicians who had been using the drug rivaroxaban for the last couple of years with a hugely favorable result clearly imply that the drug rivaroxaban is holding its side strongly in the midst of all the controversies surrounding its approval and efficacy and it is here to stay. Adding a last word to all this discussion is that rivaroxaban will always hold an upper hand compared to warfarin when prescribed because of its very favorable and easy to use once daily dosing. We cannot discard all the positive reports and positive experiences associated with this drug, based on real time data, only because of the question raised by some, and considering the fact that the question had been satisficatorily answered with a re analysis with no change in the result.

What Did Or Didn’t The FDA Do About Xarelto?

  • In July, 2011, the U.S Food and Drug Administration (FDA) initially approved the medicine for sale on the market for a limited group of people. This included people who had knee or hip replacement surgery because they were considered to be at a higher risk of blood clotting. Read the FDA News Release here.
  • In November, 2011, Xarelto was approved for a larger group of people, including people with an abnormal heart rhythm, and was used to prevent stroke. Read further.
  • In June, 2012, an FDA advisory panel voted against approving this medicine for the treatment of acute coronary syndrome.
  • In November, 2012, Xarelto was later approved for general treatment of deep vein thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary embolism (PE) after a fast track regulatory review by the FDA. Read more.
  • October 22, 2014, the FDA issued a recall for approximately 13,500 bottles of Xarelto after receiving a customer complaint about contamination in a sales sample.
  • January 12, 2015 – An antidote may have been discovered by Portola Pharmaceuticals for Xarelto. A late-stage clinical trial of the intravenous medication, andexanet alfa, met its goal of “immediately and significantly” reversing Xarelto.

The approval history for Xarelto was actually pretty controversial. FDA reviewers originally said that they recommended against approval, then there was an FDA advisory committee (independent group of key opinion leaders) and they voted in favor, so the FDA approved the drug. Their concern was with how the Phase III trials were run and whether Xarelto had really proved its efficacy. The tests compared patients on warfarin to patients on Xarelto, but the patients on the warfarin run had poor TTR. That means the patients weren’t well controlled on warfarin to begin with, which skews the data in favor of Xarelto.

During the approval process, Xarelto actually wanted a superiority label, which would say that the drug was better than warfarin and other blood thinners. Because of the concerns with the Phase III data, the FDA only gave them a non-inferior label, which says they’re essentially the same in terms of effectiveness.

The INRatio device was the subject of two FDA warning letters about inaccurate readings just as the trial was starting in 2005 and 2006. In 2014, the device was recalled. The use of the INRatio device may have skewed the results with inaccurate readings, making Xarelto look better in comparison with warfarin.

In a 2017 annual report issued by the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP), it was stated that oral anticoagulant drugs, including Xarelto (rivaroxaban), showed “unacceptably high risks,” according to two government data sources, the FAERS adverse events reports for 2016 and a new systematic study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Overall, the CDC found in its systematic study that the FDA’s FAERS voluntary reporting underestimates anticoagulant drug-related injuries. The CDC discovered that approximately 228,600 emergency department visits occur each year due to the use of blood thinner drugs, including Xarelto, which is 10 times more than the FAERS total number of voluntary reports.

Xarelto Clinical Trial Red Flags

Controversy Surrounding ROCKET-AF: A Call for Transparency, But Should We Be Changing Practice?

Jason D Matos1 and Peter J Zimetbaum1,,2

Arrhythm Electrophysiol Rev. 2016 May; 5(1): 12–13.

doi:  [10.15420/aer.2016.24.2]

Prior to the emergence of novel oral anticoagulants (NOACS), nearly all patients were prescribed vitamin K antagonists for thromboembolic prophylaxis in non-valvular atrial fibrillation (AF). Rivaroxaban (Xarelto, Bayer/Johnson & Johnson), an oral factor Xa inhibitor, is now one of the most frequently prescribed NOACs used for this indication.1,2

ROCKET-AF (Rivaroxaban Once Daily Oral Direct Factor Xa Inhibition Compared with Vitamin K Antagonism for Prevention of Stroke and Embolism Trial in Atrial Fibrillation), published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2011, demonstrated the non-inferiority of rivaroxaban compared with warfarin for the primary prevention of stroke or systemic embolism in patients with AF. This double-blinded randomised trial, which included 14,264 patients across 45 countries, also showed no significant difference in the risk of major bleeding between these two groups.3

Rivaroxaban use in AF has become widespread since the publication of this trial and US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. Two additional Factor Xa inhibitors, apixaban and edoxaban, have also been evaluated in similar randomised trials and have demonstrated non-inferiority to warfarin for stroke or systemic embolism prophylaxis in patients with non-valvular AF with no significant difference in major bleeding.4,5

In recent months, the results of ROCKET-AF have come into question after the FDA issued a recall notice for the device used to obtain International Normalised Ratio (INR) measurements in the warfarin control group. The FDA found that lower INR values were seen with the ‘point-of-care’ INRatio Monitor System (Alere) compared with a plasma-based laboratory in patients with certain medical conditions.2 These conditions included abnormal haemoglobin levels, abnormal bleeding and abnormal fibrinogen levels.6Since the FDA recall of this device, there has been widespread concern that falsely low INR readings in ROCKET-AF may have led to warfarin overdosing. Inappropriately high warfarin dosing could have increased bleeding rates in the control group and therefore made the rivaroxaban arm appear falsely favourable.7 This point-of-care device recall also highlighted a lack of transparency of the specifics of devices used in large clinical trials.

In response, the authors from ROCKET-AF released a correspondence in February 2016, citing the FDA recall. They also provided a post hoc analysis of patients who may have been affected by the recall. They found that major bleeding was greater in patients with conditions affected by the recall, but, reassuringly, the bleeding risk was greater in those who were on rivaroxaban and not warfarin.6

Despite this post hoc analysis, concern has arisen regarding the generalisability of ROCKET-AF given the faulty point-of-care INR readings. There has been a call for complete transparency of the data from this trial and a better explanation of the mechanism of the incorrect INR measurements.7

Once published, the data supporting an FDA-approved treatment should be available for independent analysis. One issue is that rivaroxaban was approved in the US prior to 1 January 2014, before a new transparency policy on clinical trial data sharing was approved by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).2 Drug companies are refusing to share any data on pharmaceuticals approved before 2014.

A device malfunction in a large clinical trial also should raise concern, especially when that trial has altered clinical practice for millions of patients. On review of Patel et al’s correspondence regarding the point-of-care malfunction, there is inadequate explanation of the mechanism of these faulty readings. Why are they only seen only in patients with abnormal haemoglobin and fibrinogen levels? How inaccurate could the readings be – within 0.1 or 1.0 of a gold standard value? Most alarming is the revelation that the manufacturer had evidence of faulty readings in similar models dating back to 2002.2

Despite legitimate concerns regarding the absence of data transparency and the faulty point-of-care device, rivaroxaban need not be removed from clinical practice for AF patients. In ROCKET-AF, the drug demonstrated non-inferiority to warfarin in preventing thromboembolic events. In addition, data has shown that patients potentially affected by the faulty point-of-care device actually bled more on rivaroxaban than warfarin.6 Therefore, the original risk–benefit ratio presented in ROCKET-AF remains true.

There are other, albeit smaller, randomised trials with shorter follow-up times that compare rivaroxaban and warfarin for thromboembolic prophylaxis.8,9 For example, Cappato et al in 2014, randomised 1,504 patients to show that oral rivaroxaban was non-inferior to warfarin in preventing a composite endpoint of stroke, transient ischaemic attack, peripheral embolism, myocardial infarction and cardiovascular death in patients with AF undergoing cardioversion. Major bleeding rates in the rivaroxaban and warfarin arms were similar (0.6 % versus 0.8 % respectively).8

The prospective observational trial XANTUS (Xarelto for Prevention of Stroke in Patients with Atrial Fibrillation) followed 6.784 patients on rivaroxaban for AF during a mean time of 329 days at 311 different hospitals. Major bleeding occurred in 128 patients (2.1 events/100 patient years) and 43 patients (0.7 events/100 patient years) suffered a stroke. These numbers are more reassuring than those seen in ROCKET-AF, though the patient population had a lower risk profile, with an average CHADS2 score of 2.0 compared with 3.5 in ROCKET-AF.10

To further mitigate concern regarding inaccuracies of bleeding rates in the ROCKET-AF control group, it is helpful to compare bleeding rates in the warfarin arms of the other major NOAC trials. The RE-LY (Randomised Evaluation of Long-Term Anticoagulation Therapy) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.4%/year.11 The ARISTOTLE (Apixaban for Reduction in Stroke and Other Thromboembolic Events in Atrial Fibrillation) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.1%/year.4 The ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48 (Effective Anticoagulation with Factor Xa Next Generation in Atrial Fibrillation-Thrombolysis in Myocardial Infarction 48) trial, had a warfarin-arm major bleeding rate of 3.4 %/year.5The warfarin arm of ROCKET-AF had a 3.4 %/year major bleeding rate, comparable to the other studies. Furthermore, the ROCKET-AF patients are known to be at higher risk for stroke and bleeding; their average CHADS2 score was highest among these studies (3.5 compared with 2.1–2.8).3 In addition, ROCKET-AF had a very high percentage of patients with a HAS-BLED score ≥3 (62 %) compared with the other studies (23 % in ARISTOTLE and 51 % in ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48).1214

Several large randomised trials have compared the safety and efficacy of rivaroxaban versus warfarin for venous thromboembolic disease. The warfarin arm of the EINSTEIN-PE trial (Oral Direct Factor Xa Inhibitor Rivaroxaban in Patients with Acute Symptomatic Pulmonary Embolism), which randomised patients with pulmonary embolism to warfarin or rivaroxaban, had a major bleeding rate of 2.2 %. The bleeding rate was lower in the rivaroxaban arm (1.1 %) and notably patients received a higher loading dose of rivaroxaban for the first 3 weeks (15 mg twice daily) compared with the daily 20 mg daily in ROCKET-AF.15

The recent uncertainties surrounding ROCKET-AF demonstrate the need for widespread data transparency for major trials with the capability of so greatly affecting patients’ lives. These are complicated issues both for the companies’ manufacturing products and the clinical trial organisations who carry out these studies and analyse the data. Ultimately the goal of full transparency to allow increased confidence in trial results should be sought. In this instance there is no compelling evidence of imminent danger of excessive bleeding with rivaroxaban. We should take notice of the recent findings, but there is no need to change practice.

What Are Xarelto Side Effects?

The most dangerous Xarelto side effect is uncontrollable bleeding. Blood thinning drugs have also been associated with bleeding complications. Other side effects include:

  • Blood clots
  • Gastrointestinal bleeding
  • Spinal bleeding
  • Intracranial bleeding
  • Epidural bleeding
  • Cerebral bleeding
  • Stroke
  • Difficulty breathing

For Information on Xarelto and other mass torts see:

Michael Brady Lunch will speak on the Xarelto litigation as well as the status of Pradaxa litigation and related issues at the upcoming Mass Tort Nexus “CLE Immersion Course”

November 9 -12, 2018 at The Riverside Hotel in Fort Lauderdale , FL.

For class attendance information please contact Jenny Levine at 954.520.4494 or Jenny@masstortnexus.com.

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REFERNCES CITED IN STUDIES SHOWN ABOVE

 Rivaroxaban and the ROCKET AF trial issue chronicles: A closer look at benefit risk profile of the drug. References:
BMJ 2016354 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i5131 (Published 28 September 2016)Cite this as: BMJ 2016;354:i5131
  1. Patel MR, Mahaffey KW, Garg J, et al. Rivaroxaban versus warfarin in nonvalvular atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med 2011; 365:883-891. Article
    2. Top 50 pharmaceutical products by global sales. PMLiVE, Available here.
    3. FDA analyses conclude that Xarelto clinical trial results were not affected by faulty monitoring device.https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm524678.htm
    4. ROCKET AF Reanalysis Reviews.http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2011/202439Orig1s000Ro…
    5. Joint EFPIA-PhRMA Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing Become Effective.http://www.efpia.eu/mediaroom/132/43/Joint-EFPIA-PhRMA-Principles-for-Re…
    6. Cappato R, Ezekowitz MD, Klein AL, et al. Rivaroxaban vs vitamin K antagonists for cardioversion in atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J 2014; 35:3346-3355.

_________________________________________________________

Controversy Surrounding ROCKET-AF: A Call for Transparency, But Should We Be Changing Practice? References
Jason D Matos1 and Peter J Zimetbaum1,,2 Arrhythm Electrophysiol Rev. 2016 May; 5(1): 12–13.; doi:  [10.15420/aer.2016.24.2]
  1. Kubitza D, Becka M, Wensing G, et al. Safety, pharmacodynamics, and pharmacokinetics of BAY 59-7939 – an oral, direct Factor Xa inhibitor – after multiple dosing in healthy male subjects. Eur J Clin Pharmacol. 2005;61:873–80. PMID: 16328318. [PubMed]
  2. Cohen D. Rivaroxaban: can we trust the evidence? BMJ. 2016;352:i575. DOI: 10.1136/bmj.i575; PMID: 26843102. [PubMed]
  3. Patel MR, Mahaffey KW, Garg J, et al. Rivaroxaban versus warfarin in nonvalvular atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:883–91. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1009638; PMID: 21830957. [PubMed]
  4. Granger CB, Alexander JH, McMurray JJ, et al. Apixaban versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2011;365:981–92. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1107039; PMID: 21870978.[PubMed]
  5. Giugliano RP, Ruff CT, Braunwald E, et al. Edoxaban versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2013;369:2093–104. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1310907; PMID: 24251359. [PubMed]
  6. Patel MR, Hellkamp AS, Fox KA, et al. Point-of-care warfarin monitoring in the ROCKET AF Trial. N Engl J Med. 2016;374:785–8. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc1515842; PMID: 26839968. [PubMed]
  7. Mandrola J. Rivaroxaban: It’s not time to cut the rope, yet. Medscape. 9 February 2016. Available at: www.medscape.com/viewarticle/858648. (accessed 6 May 2016.
  8. Cappato R, Ezekowitz MD, Klein AL, et al. Rivaroxaban vs. vitamin K antagonists for cardioversion in atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J. 2014;35:3346–55. DOI: 10.1093/eurheartj/ehu367; PMID: 25182247.[PubMed]
  9. Cappato R, Marchlinski FE, Hohnloser SH, et al. Uninterrupted rivaroxaban vs. uninterrupted vitamin K antagonists for catheter ablation in non-valvular atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J. 2015;36:1805–11. DOI: 10.1093/eurheartj/ehv177; PMID: 25975659. [PMC free article] [PubMed]
  10. Camm AJ, Amarenco P, Haas S, et al. XANTUS: a real-world, prospective, observational study of patients treated with rivaroxaban for stroke prevention in atrial fibrillation. Eur Heart J. 2016;37:1145–53.DOI: 10.1093/eurheartj/ehv466; PMID: 26330425. [PMC free article] [PubMed]
  11. Connolly SJ, Ezekowitz MD, Yusuf S, et al. Dabigatran versus warfarin in patients with atrial fibrillation. N Engl J Med. 2009;361:1139–51. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa0905561; PMID: 19717844.[PubMed]
  12. Sherwood MW, Nessel CC, Hellkamp AS, et al. Gastrointestinal bleeding in patients with atrial fibrillation treated With rivaroxaban or warfarin: ROCKET AF trial. J Am Coll Cardiol. 2015;66:2271–81.DOI: 10.1016/j.jacc.2015.09.024; PMID: 26610874. [PubMed]
  13. Lopes RD, Al-Khatib SM, Wallentin L, et al. Efficacy and safety of apixaban compared with warfarin according to patient risk of stroke and of bleeding in atrial fibrillation: a secondary analysis of a randomised controlled trial. Lancet. 2012;380:1749–58. DOI: 10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60986-6; PMID: 23036896. [PubMed]
  14. Eisen A, Giugliano RP, Ruff CT, et al. Edoxaban vs warfarin in patients with nonvalvular atrial fibrillation in the US Food and Drug Administration approval population: An analysis from the Effective Anticoagulation with Factor Xa Next Generation in Atrial Fibrillation-Thrombolysis in Myocardial Infarction 48 (ENGAGE AF-TIMI 48) trial. Am Heart J. 2016;172:144–51. DOI: 10.1016/j.ahj.2015.11.004; PMID: 26856226. [PubMed]
  15. EINSTEIN-PE Investigators, Buller HR, Prins MH, et al. Oral rivaroxaban for the treatment of symptomatic pulmonary embolism. N Engl J Med. 2012;366:1287–97. DOI: 10.1056/ NEJMoa1113572. PMID: 22449293. [PubMed]

 

 

 

 

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Pradaxa Federal Court Trial Win: $1.25 million verdict-with punitives of $1 million in death case

Betty Erelene Knight (Deceased), Claude R. Knight   vs. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  Docket No. 3:15-cv-06424; Judge Robert C. Chambers (United States District Court-Southern District of West Virginia)

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) A federal jury has awarded the family of a deceased West Virginia woman $1.25 million after finding that Boehringer Ingelheim failed to warn of risks associated with its blood thinner Pradaxa, causing her to suffer gastrointestinal bleeding.

The federal trial in Huntington, WV, (US District Court Southern District of West Virginia) awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages to the estate of Betty Erelene Knight and her husband Claude R. Knight, and added $1,000,000 more in punitive damages. The jury added the large punitive award after plaintiff counsel showed that Boehringer Ingelheim engaged in wanton and willful acts in handling of its blockbuster drug Pradaxa, primarily in failing to warn of the risks.

The October 17th plaintiffs’ verdict was the first trial win in the country against Boehringer Ingelheim the German drugmaker, showing that the blockbuster drug is dangerous. The Pradaxa defense team had won three earlier trials for the company, and this verdict on behalf of  the estate of Erelene Knight and her surviving spouse Claude, shows that juries can be convinced of the dangers including fatal risks related to Pradaxa. Mrs. Knight, who was in her 80’s passed away while taking Pradaxa.

She suffered from an irregular heartbeat, a condition that often leads to the development of blood clots, which can travel into the brain and cause a stroke. The plaintiff’s doctor stated that she was at “high risk of stroke.”

Prior to being prescribed Pradaxa, her doctors initially prescribed Coumadin, another prescription blood thinner. Because of the risk of uncontrolled bleeding with this particular drug, the victim required “frequent monitoring” which is what the Pradaxa marketing teams focused on, when meeting with doctors while marketing Pradaxa as a “safer alternative to Coumadin.”  Eventually, the victim grew weary of the inconvenience of such monitoring and learned about Pradaxa, which performs a similar function to Coumadin, from a television commercial.

Her doctor agreed to switch her to Pradaxa, and after about 18 months on the drug, she started to suffer from severe, uncontrolled internal bleeding. At one point she required surgery, which significantly weakened her and set into motion a decline in her health. Within several months of the surgery Erelene Knight passed away. Defense vigorously attempted to point the finger at other health conditions and place blame on anything besides Pradaxa, which failed as the punitive damage award of $1 million showed that the jury clearly saw that Boehringer Ingelheim knew the risks of Pradaxa, yet continued offering the drug without sufficient warnings.

The winning plaintiff trial team consisted of the Childers, Schlueter & Smith Firm and partner  Andy Childers, Neal Moskow of Ury & Moskow, LLC and Yvette Ferrer of Ferrer Poirot & Wansbrough. Congratulations to everyone, as the mass tort world looks forward to additional plaintiff verdicts in the many other Pradaxa cases pending in dockets around the country.

WHAT IS PRADAXA?

·        Pradaxa is an anticoagulant medication used to reduce the risk of stroke and blood clots in patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation (AF), the most common type of heart rhythm abnormality.

·        The safety and efficacy of Pradaxa were studied in a clinical trial comparing Pradaxa with the anticoagulant warfarin. In the trial, patients taking Pradaxa had fewer strokes than those who took warfarin.1

·        From approval in October 2010 through August 2012, a total of approximately 3.7 million Pradaxa prescriptions were dispensed, and approximately 725,000 patients received a dispensed prescription for Pradaxa from U.S. outpatient retail pharmacies.2

Rulings Prior to Trial

The estate’s lawsuit against Boehringer Ingelheim, focused on Pradaxa’s label, asserting claims that the company knew that “certain blood plasma concentrations of Pradaxa increased the risk of a major bleed without contributing any additional stroke prevention benefit.” This risk was actually disclosed on labels for Pradaxa in Europe, but not the United States at the time of the victim’s care. Boehringer also knew that patients should not take Pradaxa if they also use P-gp inhibitor drugs, which Erelene Knight did. And while the company later altered its label to include this information, it did not directly inform doctors of the risk.

Based on all this, the judge presiding over the case ruled the estate presented sufficient evidence to submit the question of liability for “failure to warn” to the jury. Defense protested that at the relevant time, Pradaxa contained a general warning that the drug “can cause serious and, sometimes, fatal bleeding.” But whether or not this was an “adequate” warning given what BI allegedly knew, but failed to disclose on the original U.S. label, will be for the jury to decide.

How the favorable verdict predicts future trial outcomes in not only Pradaxa cases currently pending around the country, but in the more than 25,000 Xarelto blood thinner cases that are filed in the Xarelto MDL 2592 litigation, see Mass Tort Nexus Briefcase XARELTO-(rivaroxaban)-MDL-2592-USDC-ED-Louisiana (Judge Eldon Fallon), and in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, see XARELTO-Case-No-2349-in-Philadephia-Court-of-Common-Pleas–Complex-Litigation-(PA-State-Court). There are several bellwether trials set for the Philadelphia Xarelto cases in 2019, where Laura Feldman and Rosemary Pinto of the Philadelphi firm of Feldman & Pinto, will be co-lead counsel for the trial team.

Michael Brady Lunch will speak on the Pradaxa litigation as well as the status of Xarelto and related issues at the upcoming Mass Tort Nexus “CLE Immersion Course”

November 9 -12, 2018 at The Riverside Hotel in Fort Lauderdale , FL.

For class attendance information please contact Jenny Levine at 954.520.4494 or Jenny@masstortnexus.com.

For the most up to date information on all MDL dockets and related mass torts visit  www.masstortnexus.com and review our mass tort briefcases and professional site MDL briefcases.

To obtain our free newsletters that contain real time mass tort updates, visit www.masstortnexus.com/news and sign up for free access.

WWW.MASSTORTNEXUS.COM

 

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ZOSTAVAX VACCINE: Unpacking the Data from Merck & Co. Clinical Trials

ZOSTAVAX VACCINE:

Unpacking the Data from Merck & Co. Clinical Trials

October 11, 2018

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The following information and conclusions are based on opinions formed after a review of relevant facts and data by John Ray, Senior Consultant, Mass Tort Nexus

Background

Herpes zoster (shingles) is a symptom of the varicella-zoster virus, the same virus that causes chickenpox. Individuals experiencing active herpes zoster infections often report debilitating pain and blistering skin rashes typically located on the face and torso. The varicella-zoster virus (chickenpox) can remain dormant in the body indefinitely and may emerge decades later as herpes zoster (shingles). Not all persons who have the varicella-zoster virus will develop herpes zoster, and it is impossible to predict who will and who won’t.

American pharmaceutical giant, Merck & Co. (Merck), released its Zostavax vaccine to the market in 2006. In its marketing campaign, Merck claims that “you have a 1 in 3 chance of contracting shingles,” and that the Zostavax vaccine reduces the occurrence of zoster by “51% overall in subjects aged 60 years or older.” The FDA approved the Zostavax vaccine prior to its market release.

Summary of Findings

  1. At a minimum, valid clinical trial results are based on two conditions: (1) trial participants must be diagnostically homogeneous (i.e., they share the same medical diagnosis); and, (2) the number of trial participants must be statistically significant (i.e., results may be reliably extrapolated to a larger group).
  2. Results from the Zostavax clinical trials conducted by Merck are arguably invalid because the trial participants were neither diagnostically homogeneous or comprised a statistically significant number.
  3. Because the risk of developing herpes zoster is higher for those that received the Zostavax vaccine than those who didn’t, Merck’s public marketing campaign of the Zostavax vaccine misled consumers, at best, and caused significant harm, at worst.

 Methodology Flaws in the Zostavax Clinical Trials

Diagnostically Homogeneous Trial Participants

Generally, clinical trials are intended to observe occurrences and outcomes from product administration with trial participants that share a medical diagnosis (i.e., diagnostically homogenous). For example, a clinical trial involving a drug to treat type 2 diabetes would only enroll individuals diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. Once a diagnostically homogenous group is identified and recruited for a clinical trial, an equal proportion of the group will be administered the drug being studied while the remainder will be administered either a placebo or another drug intended to treat the same disease or condition in trials testing one drug against another.

Zostavax vaccine clinical trials conducted by Merck differed significantly from normal clinical trial methodology in that Zostavax is not intended to treat an existing diagnosed disease or condition but rather is intended to prevent herpes zoster, a symptom of the varicella-zoster virus. If trial participants did not share a diagnosis of an existing disease or condition and could not reliably predict the future onset of a herpes zoster condition, trial participants were not—and could not be—diagnostically homogeneous. Therefore, conclusions reached by Merck from the Zostavax clinical trials are arguably invalid.

Statistically Significant Number of Trial Participants

After clinical trial observations are recorded, the results are extrapolated to represent predictable outcomes in a larger population. Extrapolations from statistically significant numbers are never as reliable as data collected from a larger, real-world population. Significant real-world data (e.g., data collected from Medicare, countries with national health care systems and/or unbiased third-party authorities) existed prior to the Zostavax trials regarding occurrence rates of herpes zoster by age group.

Numerous authorities and governments had already established that the probability of contracting herpes zoster during a lifetime was between 30 and 33%. Given the fact that a “risk without vaccination rate” was generated using far more reliable methods, there was no reason for Merck to include a placebo group in their trials when real-world data existed relevant to the unvaccinated.

In addition, Merck disqualified participants with compromised immune function from the Zostavax clinical trials. Immuno-compromised individuals are significantly more likely to develop herpes zoster. The 30 – 33% lifetime occurrence rate established by trusted sources from real-world data included persons with compromised immune function. As a result, the real-world data must be considered more accurate than the Zostavax trial data relevant to the placebo group.

The following chart shows the broad results of the first Zostavax trial conducted by Merck. Merck claims that for subjects 60 years of age or older there is a 51% reduction of risk. These results are misleading because they average occurrence rates of persons 80 years of age and older (who are significantly more likely to develop herpes zoster based on real-world data) with occurrence rates from age groups that are significantly less likely to develop herpes zoster. These statistics were used by Merck to obtain licensure for Zostavax from the FDA.

[Merck’s Zostavax link: https://www.merckvaccines.com/Products/Zostavax/efficacy/]

Methodology Flaws in the Zostavax Clinical Trials

Diagnostically Homogeneous Trial Participants

Generally, clinical trials are intended to observe occurrences and outcomes from product administration with trial participants that share a medical diagnosis (i.e., diagnostically homogenous). For example, a clinical trial involving a drug to treat type 2 diabetes would only enroll individuals diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. Once a diagnostically homogenous group is identified and recruited for a clinical trial, an equal proportion of the group will be administered the drug being studied while the remainder will be administered either a placebo or another drug intended to treat the same disease or condition in trials testing one drug against another.

Zostavax vaccine clinical trials conducted by Merck differed significantly from normal clinical trial methodology in that Zostavax is not intended to treat an existing diagnosed disease or condition but rather is intended to prevent herpes zoster, a symptom of the varicella-zoster virus. If trial participants did not share a diagnosis of an existing disease or condition and could not reliably predict the future onset of a herpes zoster condition, trial participants were not—and could not be—diagnostically homogeneous. Therefore, conclusions reached by Merck from the Zostavax clinical trials are arguably invalid.

Statistically Significant Number of Trial Participants

After clinical trial observations are recorded, the results are extrapolated to represent predictable outcomes in a larger population. Extrapolations from statistically significant numbers are never as reliable as data collected from a larger, real-world population. Significant real-world data (e.g., data collected from Medicare, countries with national health care systems and/or unbiased third-party authorities) existed prior to the Zostavax trials regarding occurrence rates of herpes zoster by age group.

Numerous authorities and governments had already established that the probability of contracting herpes zoster during a lifetime was between 30 and 33%. Given the fact that a “risk without vaccination rate” was generated using far more reliable methods, there was no reason for Merck to include a placebo group in their trials when real-world data existed relevant to the unvaccinated.

In addition, Merck disqualified participants with compromised immune function from the Zostavax clinical trials. Immuno-compromised individuals are significantly more likely to develop herpes zoster. The 30 – 33% lifetime occurrence rate established by trusted sources from real-world data included persons with compromised immune function. As a result, the real-world data must be considered more accurate than the Zostavax trial data relevant to the placebo group.

The following chart shows the broad results of the first Zostavax trial conducted by Merck. Merck claims that for subjects 60 years of age or older there is a 51% reduction of risk. These results are misleading because they average occurrence rates of persons 80 years of age and older (who are significantly more likely to develop herpes zoster based on real-world data) with occurrence rates from age groups that are significantly less likely to develop herpes zoster. These statistics were used by Merck to obtain licensure for Zostavax from the FDA.

[Merck’s Zostavax link: https://www.merckvaccines.com/Products/Zostavax/efficacy/]

Merck’s Misleading Marketing Scheme

 

 

 

 

 

Merck used the blanket statement, “You have a 1 in 3 chance of contracting shingles,” in their fear-based advertising campaigns for Zostavax. If we ignore the placebo trial group data in favor of the more reliable real-world data which tells us that 33% of individuals will experience herpes zoster during their lifetime leaving 67% that will not, we can conclude the following:

Age Group 60-69

Merck claimed a Zostavax efficacy rate of 64%. When this rate is compared to the real-world data rate, we can conclude that administration of the Zostavax vaccine increased the risk of experiencing herpes zoster by 3% for this group. Those who do not receive the Zostavax vaccine have a 67% chance of never manifesting herpes zoster symptoms while those that do receive the vaccine have a 64% chance of never contracting Herpes Zoster.

Age Group 70-79

Merck claimed a Zostavax efficacy rate of 41%. When this rate is compared to the real-world data rate, we can conclude that administration of the Zostavax vaccine increased the risk of developing herpes zoster by 26% for this group. Those who do not receive Zostavax have a 67% chance of never manifesting herpes zoster symptoms while those that receive the vaccine have a 41% chance of never contracting Herpes Zoster.

 Age Group > 80

Merck claimed a Zostavax efficacy rate of 18%. When this rate is compared to the real-world data rate, we can conclude that administration of Zostavax increased the risk of developing herpes zoster by 49% for this group. Those who do not receive Zostavax have a 67% chance of never manifesting herpes zoster symptoms while those that receive the vaccine have an 18% chance of never contracting Herpes Zoster.

The blended rate (all age groups in the study combined) of 51% efficacy claimed by Merck compared with occurrence rates from real-world data, leads us to conclude that for all intended users, the risk of developing herpes zoster after vaccination with Zostavax is greater than prior to vaccination. Real-world data demonstrates that the relative risk of contracting herpes zoster post-vaccination is 49% while those who are not vaccinated face a 33% risk.

The following graph shows herpes zoster occurrence rates by age group. A comparison of Zostavax trial data to real-world occurrence rates supports another conclusion—the age groups most at risk for developing herpes zoster (and most in need of an effective vaccine) had the least probability of protection from administration of the Zostavax vaccine and were arguably at the highest risk for developing Zostavax as a result of receiving the vaccine.

The foregoing is an observation of statistics and data related to Zostavax. The method by which Merck used and manipulated this data in misleading marketing and advertising is covered in other sections of the material.

The conclusions contained herein are based on opinions formed by the author after a review of the relevant data. We acknowledge that others could draw differing conclusions and opinions based on the same observations.

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WHY THE ZOSTAVAX MDL 2848 IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE “VACCINE COURT” and the “VACCINE ACT”

There would be no MDL 2848 if this was a Vaccine Court case…

By Mark A. York (October 11, 2018)

See: Vaccine Rules – Court of Federal Claims

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP or NVICP) was established by the 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA), passed by the United States Congress in response to a threat to the vaccine supply due to a 1980s scare over the DPT vaccine. Despite the belief of most public health officials that claims of side effects were unfounded, large jury awards had been given to some plaintiffs, most DPT vaccine makers had ceased production, and officials feared the loss of herd immunity.[1]

The official standing of the “Vaccine Court” was confirmed February 22, 2011 by the US Supreme Court in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC et al, in https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-152.pdf

The Office of Special Masters of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, popularly known as “vaccine court“, administers a no-fault system for litigating vaccine injury claims. These claims against vaccine manufacturers cannot normally be filed in state or federal civil courts, but instead must be heard in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, sitting without a jury.

“In the vaccine court, the burden is on a plaintiff to show a biological theory of harm, demonstrate a logical sequence of events connecting the vaccine to the injury, and establish an appropriate time frame in which injury occurred. The petitioner must also show that there is not another biologically plausible explanation for the injury.[13]

A 2005 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruling[14] held that an award should be granted if a petitioner either establishes a “Table Injury” or proves “causation in fact” by proving the following three prongs:

  1. a medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury;
  2. a logical sequence of cause and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury; and
  3. showing of a proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and injury.

Pursuant to §11(c)(1)(A) of the Vaccine Act, the Vaccine Court has jurisdiction to only hear cases listed on the Vaccine Injury Table see 42 CFR 100.3 Vaccine Injury Table (Drug List).

  1. The ZOSTAVAX vaccine is not a vaccine listed in the Vaccine Injury Table
  2. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (“Vaccine Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 et seq. does not preempt a Plaintiff from filing a civil complaint in federal court.

 No Special Tax Was Paid By Zostavax

Merck & Co. did not pay the 75 cent tax per dose to the vaccine court, to have Zostavax included on the “Vaccine Injury Table” see 42 CFR 100.3 Vaccine Injury Table, that lists which drugs are under the “Vaccine Court” jurisdiction and not the normal courts of civil procedure in the United states.

Merck & Co. have taken the position that there is no overriding public interest in Zostavax being available, as there is with vaccines for contagious viruses that could potentially cause a public health epidemic.

The 75 cent excise tax on each vaccine administered to children and others, routinely gets routed to the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund, which is collected by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

CDC Shingles Vaccine Warning of Feb. 12, 2018

Women should avoid getting pregnant for at least 1 month after getting a shingles vaccine. Have a weakened immune system due to disease (such as cancer or AIDS) or medical treatments (such as radiation, immunotherapy, high-dose steroids, or chemotherapy).Feb 12, 2018

For additional CDC information on vaccines see: https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/index.html

Why is Varicella Vaccine on the Vaccine Court List?

Some confusion may exist due to the fact that Varicella vaccines are listed on the Vaccine Court list, this reference however does not refer to Zostavax. The Varicella Vaccines subject to vaccine court are related to the Chickenpox vaccines and not the Shingles vaccine.

Only vaccines that have been determined to be in the public interest despite being unavoidably unsafe are on the vaccine court list. No Vaccine Act preemption arguments arise from the Vaccine Act. for Zostavax.  Zostavax was not permitted to be unsafe as drugs listed on the Vaccine Injury Table are classified.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services set up the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) in 1988 to compensate individuals and families of individuals injured by covered childhood vaccines.[4] The VICP was adopted in response to concerns over the pertussis portion of the DPT vaccine.[1] The VICP uses a no-fault system for resolving vaccine injury claims. Compensation covers medical and legal expenses, loss of future earning capacity, and up to $250,000 for pain and suffering; a death benefit of up to $250,000 is available. If certain minimal requirements are met, legal expenses are compensated even for unsuccessful claims.[5]

Since 1988, the program has been funded by an excise tax of 75 cents on every purchased dose of covered vaccine. To win an award, a claimant must have experienced an injury that is named as a vaccine injury in a table included in the law within the required time period or show a causal connection. The burden of proof is the civil law preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, in other words a showing that causation was more likely than not. Denied claims can be pursued in civil courts, though this is rare.[1]

John Ray and other speakers will cover the Zostavax MDL 2848 case criteria and related issues at the upcoming Mass Tort Nexus “CLE Immersion Course”
November 9 -12, 2018 at The Riverside Hotel in Fort Lauderdale , FL.
For class attendance information please contact Jenny Levine at 954.520.4494 or Jenny@masstortnexus.com.
For the most up to date information on all MDL dockets and related mass torts visitwww.masstortnexus.com and review our mass tort briefcases and professional site MDL briefcases.
To obtain our free newsletters that contain real time mass tort updates, visitwww.masstortnexus.com/news and sign up for free access.

 

“VACCINE COURT” Related References

  1. Sugarman SD (2007). “Cases in vaccine court—legal battles over vaccines and autism”. N Engl J Med. 357 (13): 1275–7. doi:1056/NEJMp078168PMID 17898095.
  2. Doja A, Roberts W (2006). “Immunizations and autism: a review of the literature”. Can J Neurol Sci. 33 (4): 341–6. doi:1017/s031716710000528xPMID 17168158.
  3.  Maugh TH II, Zajac A (2010-03-13). “‘Vaccines court’ rejects mercury–autism link in 3 test cases”. Los Angeles Times.
  4. Edlich RF; Olson DM; Olson BM; et al. (2007). “Update on the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program”. J Emerg Med. 33(2): 199–211. doi:1016/j.jemermed.2007.01.001PMID 17692778.
  5. “Filing a claim with the VICP”. Health Resources and Services Administration. Retrieved 2013-08-19.
  6.  “Vaccine Injury Table”. Health Resources and Services Administration. 2007. Retrieved 2008-01-22.
  7. “National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program statistics reports”. Health Resources and Services Administration. 2008-01-08. Retrieved 2008-01-22.
  8. Balbier TE Jr (1999-09-28). “Statement on National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program”. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Retrieved 2008-01-22.
  9.  “Who Can File”. www.hrsa.gov. Last Reviewed: February 2016: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Services Administration. Retrieved 12 October 2016.
  10. Holder v. Abbott Laboratories, 444 F.3d 383
  11. Davis WN (2006). “No longer immune”. ABA Journal. 92 (7): 19, 43.
  12. Pear R (2002-12-14). “Threats and responses: legal risks; for victims of vaccine, winning case will be hard”. New York Times. Retrieved 2008-01-22.
  13. Keelan, J; Wilson, K (November 2011). “Balancing vaccine science and national policy objectives: lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Omnibus Autism Proceedings”. American Journal of Public Health. 101 (11): 2016–21. doi:2105/ajph.2011.300198PMC 3222385PMID 21940934.
  14. Althen v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2005). Text This decision, which is binding upon the United States Court of Federal Claims, clarified the standing for proving “causation in fact” absent a “Table Injury” under 42 U.S.C. 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)
  15. Offit PA (2008). “Vaccines and autism revisited—the Hannah Poling case”. N Engl J Med. 358 (20): 2089–91. doi:1056/NEJMp0802904PMID 18480200.
  16. Rovner J (2008-03-07). “Case stokes debate about autism, vaccines”. NPR. Retrieved 2008-03-07.
  17.  Holtzman D (2008). “Autistic spectrum disorders and mitochondrial encephalopathies”. Acta Paediatr. 97 (7): 859–60. doi:1111/j.1651-2227.2008.00883.xPMID 18532934.
  18.  Honey K (2008). “Attention focuses on autism”. J Clin Invest. 118 (5): 1586–7. doi:1172/JCI35821PMC 2336894PMID 18451989.
  19. Kirkland, A. (13 March 2012). “Credibility battles in the autism litigation”. Social Studies of Science. 42 (2): 237–261. doi:1177/0306312711435832PMID 22848999.
  20. Omnibus Autism Proceeding, US Court of Federal Claims, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/omnibus-autism-proceeding, visited October 12, 2016.
  21. Bridges A (2007-06-12). “Children with autism get day in court”. USA Today. Retrieved 2007-10-14.
  22. Freking K, Neergaard L (2009-02-12). “Court says vaccine not to blame for autism”. Associated Press. Retrieved 2009-02-12.

 

 

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BARD HERNIA MESH MDL 2846: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW TO GET INVOLVED

IS YOUR FIRM LOOKING AT THE BARD HERNIA MESH LITIGATION?

By Mark A. York (October 9, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) One of the fastest growing emerging mass torts is the C.R. Bard/ Davol, Polypropylene Hernia Mesh Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2846, (Judge Edmund A. Sargus, US District Court, Southern District of Ohio). Bard/Davol controls close to 70 percent of the hernia mesh implant market in the United States and have for close to 10 years, and by simply doing the math you can calculate the number of cases that will be filed into the MDL.

With more than 300,000 surgical mesh implant procedures per year, and a conservative failure rate of 20% and Bard’s 70% market share, the numbers for just the last 5 years would exceed 200,000 potential cases. Using the same figures reflects over 42,000 potentially new failures per year, and accordingly the number of potential cases.

For real time case docket information see the Mass Tort Nexus briefcase: BARD-DAVOL-Hernia-Mesh-MDL-2846-(Polypropylene-Mesh)-USDC-Southern-District-of-Ohio

The U.S. National Library of Medicine reports that incisional hernia repair involving mesh has a recurrence rate of 20-45%. Overall, patients with complex ventral hernias (a bulge in the abdominal wall which can include incisional hernias) have a recurrence rate of approximately 30-40% nationally.

Additional synthetic mesh failure data: “Hernia Reoperation Rate Underestimates Real Recurrence Numbers”. American College of Surgeons, Oct. 24, 2017

http://www.mdedge.com/acssurgerynews/article/55911/general-surgery/hernia-reoperation-rate-underestimates-real-recurrence

Discussions on the Bard Hernia Mesh MDL 2846 took place with Kelsey L. Stokes of Fleming, Nolen & Jez, L.L.P., Houston, Texas, co-lead counsel, who commented “We represent hundreds of clients that have been seriously injured by hernia mesh products manufactured by Davol/C.R. Bard.  We have observed that these devastating injuries are occurring all across the United States.

For additional case related information or potential case referrals, please contact Kelsey Stokes at Kelsey_Stokes@fleming-law.com.

MESH WARNINGS OFFERED LONG AGO

The history of synthetic mesh failures and formal warnings being raised can be traced back more than 20 years, after news broke that mesh firms were warned 21 years ago about the risks of the device’s material. Court filings and other sources reveal that manufacturers were warned decades ago that plastic should not be used to make implants.

CR Bard and its subsidiary Davol were allegedly warned that they should discontinue their use of polypropylene resin back in 1997.

Marlex, the Bard supplier of the synthetics resins,  said repeatedly that they were afraid of being sued if the product was used in implants. In 2004, formal warning notices were sent stating that Marlex was “not for human implantation” and told medical mesh companies that they did not want their custom mesh products used “at any price.”

In an email, CR Bard vice president Roger Darois said “We purchase our polypropylene monofilament from an extrusion supplier who purchases the resin directly from the resin manufacturers,” he said. “Thus, it is likely that they do not know of our implant application. Please do NOT mention Davol’s name in any discussions with these manufacturers. In fact, I would advise purchasing the resign through a third party, not the resin supplier, to avoid a supply issue once the medical application is discovered”

 Different Types Of Mesh Placement

  • Overlay– The hernia mesh is placed between the skin/subcutaneous tissue and the rectus abdominis. Mesh is easiest to remove when it is placed in the overlay position.
  • Inlay– The hernia mesh is placed between layers of the rectus abdominis.
  • Underlay– The hernia mesh is placed between the rectus abdominis and the peritoneum. The hernia mesh has a higher chance of attaching to the patients underlying organs when placed in the underlay position.

THE BARD MDL 2846 POLYPROPYLENE HERNIA MESH PRODUCTS

  • Composix
  • Composix E/X
  • Composix L/P
  • Ventralight
  • Spermatex
  • Sepramesh
  • Ventralex
  • Ventralex ST
  • Kugel Patch
  • Composix Kugel
  • Ventrio
  • Visilex
  • Ventrio ST
  • Marlex (AKA Flat Mesh; Bard Mesh)
  • Perfix Plug
  • Perfix Light Plug
  • 3D Max-Lite
  • 3D Max

 

FDA Hernia Surgical Mesh Implants Information and Links

FDA describes hernias, the different treatment options to repair hernias and recommendations for patients that are considering surgery for their hernias. The FDA wants to help patients make informed decisions about their health care and to facilitate a discussion between patients and their surgeons

Official FDA Links: Hernia Surgical Mesh

htts://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/HerniaSurgicalMesh/ucm317438.htmsurgeons.

 https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/HerniaSurgicalMesh/ucm317440.htm

 https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/HerniaSurgicalMesh/ucm317438.htm

 Hernia Surgical Mesh Implants- Reporting of Adverse Events to the FDA

(Review these sources and checklists for case evaluation and product identification)

Prompt reporting of adverse events can help the FDA identify and better understand the risks associated with medical devices. If you suspect a problem with surgical mesh, we encourage you to file a voluntary report through MedWatch, the FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting program. Health care personnel employed by facilities that are subject to the FDA’s user facility reporting requirements should follow the reporting procedures established by their facilities. Device manufacturers must comply with the Medical Device Reporting (MDR) regulations.

FDA Related Hernia Mesh Information:

Hernia mesh specifics:

  • Manufacturer’s name
  • Product name (brand name)
  • Catalog number
  • Lot number
  • Size
  • Date of implant
  • Date of explant (if mesh was removed)

Hernia repair involving surgical mesh operation specifics:

  • Preoperative diagnosis, postoperative diagnosis and operative procedure
  • Hernia description including size, location, and status (e.g. reducible, sliding, nonreducible, strangulated)
  • Mesh placement (e.g. onlay, underlay, bridging, extent of fascial overlap, fixation method)

Adverse event specifics:

  • Description of the problem including time of onset, inciting factors and severity,
  • Time to resolution
  • Detailed description of the medical and/or surgical interventions (if required) undertaken in response to the adverse event

What is a Hernia?

A hernia occurs when an organ, intestine or fatty tissue squeezes through a hole or a weak spot in the surrounding muscle or connective tissue. Hernias often occur at the abdominal wall.  Sometimes a hernia can be visible as an external bulge particularly when straining or bearing down.

Types of Hernias

The most common types of hernias are:

  • Inguinal:occurs in the inner groin
  • Femoral:occurs in the upper thigh/outer groin
  • Incisional:occurs through an incision or scar in the abdomen
  • Ventral:occurs in the general abdominal/ventral wall
  • Umbilical:occurs at the belly button
  • Hiatal:occurs inside the abdomen, along the upper stomach/diaphragm

Causes of Hernias

Most hernias are caused by a combination of pressure and an opening or weakness of muscle or connective tissue. The pressure pushes an organ or tissue through the opening or weak spot. Sometimes the muscle weakness is present at birth but more often it occurs later in life. Anything that causes an increase in abdominal pressure can cause a hernia, including obesity, lifting heavy objects, diarrhea or constipation, or persistent coughing or sneezing. Poor nutrition, smoking, and overexertion can weaken muscles and contribute to the likelihood of a hernia.

Treatment Options for Hernias

Hernia repairs are common—more than one million hernia repairs are performed each year in the U.S. Approximately 800,000 are to repair inguinal hernias and the rest are for other types of hernias.1

  • Non-Surgical
    • Watchful Waiting– Your surgeon will watch the hernia and make sure that it is not getting larger or causing problems. Although surgery is the only treatment that can repair hernias, many surgical procedures are elective for adult inguinal hernias. Watchful waiting is an option for people who do not have complications or symptoms with their hernias, and if recommended by their surgeon.
  • Surgical
    • Laparoscopic– The surgeon makes several small incisions in the abdomen that allow surgical tools into the openings to repair the hernia. Laparoscopic surgery can be performed with or without surgical mesh.
    • Open Repair– The surgeon makes an incision near the hernia and the weak muscle area is repaired. Open repair can be done with or without surgical mesh. Open repair that uses sutures without mesh is referred to as primary closure. Primary closure is used to repair inguinal hernias in infants, small hernias, strangulated or infected hernias.

Hernias have a high rate of recurrence, and surgeons often use surgical mesh to strengthen the hernia repair and reduce the rate of recurrence. Since the 1980s, there has been an increase in mesh-based hernia repairs—by 2000, non-mesh repairs represented less than 10% of groin hernia repair techniques.

The use of surgical mesh may also improve patient outcomes through decreased operative time and minimized recovery time. However, recovery time depends on the type of hernia, the surgical approach, and the patient’s condition both before and after surgery.

Information found in medical literature has consistently demonstrated a reduced hernia recurrence rate when surgical mesh is used to repair the hernia compared to hernia repair without surgical mesh. For example, inguinal hernia recurrence is higher with open repair using sutures (primary closure) than with mesh repair2.

Despite reduced rates of recurrence, there are situations where the use of surgical mesh for hernia repair may not be recommended. Patients should talk to their surgeons about their specific circumstances and their best options and alternatives for hernia repair.

 What is Surgical Mesh

Surgical mesh is a medical device that is used to provide additional support to weakened or damaged tissue. The majority of surgical mesh devices currently available for use are constructed from synthetic materials or animal tissue.

Surgical mesh made of synthetic materials can be found in knitted mesh or non-knitted sheet forms. The synthetic materials used can be absorbable, non-absorbable or a combination of absorbable and non-absorbable materials.

Animal-derived mesh are made of animal tissue, such as intestine or skin, that has been processed and disinfected to be suitable for use as an implanted device. These animal-derived mesh are absorbable. The majority of tissue used to produce these mesh implants are from a pig (porcine) or cow (bovine) source.

Non-absorbable mesh will remain in the body indefinitely and is considered a permanent implant. It is used to provide permanent reinforcement to the repaired hernia. Absorbable mesh will degrade and lose strength over time. It is not intended to provide long-term reinforcement to the repair site. As the material degrades, new tissue growth is intended to provide strength to the repair.

Hernia Repair Surgery Complications

Based on FDA’s analysis of medical device adverse event reports and of peer-reviewed, scientific literature, the most common adverse events for all surgical repair of hernias—with or without mesh—are pain, infection, hernia recurrence, scar-like tissue that sticks tissues together (adhesion), blockage of the large or small intestine (obstruction), bleeding, abnormal connection between organs, vessels, or intestines (fistula), fluid build-up at the surgical site (seroma), and a hole in neighboring tissues or organs (perforation).

The most common adverse events following hernia repair with mesh are pain, infection, hernia recurrence, adhesion, and bowel obstruction. Some other potential adverse events that can occur following hernia repair with mesh are mesh migration and mesh shrinkage (contraction).

Many complications related to hernia repair with surgical mesh that have been reported to the FDA have been associated with recalled mesh products that are no longer on the market. Pain, infection, recurrence, adhesion, obstruction, and perforation are the most common complications associated with recalled mesh. In the FDA’s analysis of medical adverse event reports to the FDA, recalled mesh products were the main cause of bowel perforation and obstruction complications.

Please refer to the recall notices here for more information if you have recalled mesh. For more information on the recalled products, please visit the FDA Medical Device Recall website. Please visit the Medical & Radiation Emitting Device Database to search a specific type of surgical mesh.

If you are unsure about the specific mesh manufacturer and brand used in your surgery and have questions about your hernia repair, contact your surgeon or the facility where your surgery was performed to obtain the information from your medical record.

The FDA approved most Bard hernia mesh devices for use in hernia repair surgical procedures through the FDA 510(k) process.  The 510k process does not require a manufacturer to prove that a product is safe for its intended use, but merely requires a showing that a device is a “substantive equivalent” to a product or products already approved by the FDA.  In fact, post-approval, the FDA has advised consumers that adverse events as a result of hernia mesh devices are possible.  The FDA did so as a result of receiving a number of complaints about hernia mesh devices in general.(2)

According to the FDA, “[t]he most common adverse events following hernia repair with mesh are pain, infection, hernia recurrence, adhesion, and bowel obstruction. Some other potential adverse events that can occur following hernia repair with mesh are mesh migration and mesh shrinkage (contraction).” (3)

Hernia Mesh Injuries And Complications

Hernia mesh is used to repair both ventral hernias and inguinal hernias. Various injuries and complications can occur depending on what part of the body the mesh is placed. A coated hernia mesh is also more likely to cause injuries such as infection than a non-coated hernia mesh. The follow is a list of the array of complications we observed:

  • Infection, including sepsis. An infected mesh almost always requires removal.
  • Adhesions form to connect the bowel to the hernia mesh. Adhesions frequently form when ventral hernias are repaired with a coated mesh.
  • Bowel Obstruction caused by adhesion formation. Evidenced by a change in bowel habits or the inability to defecate.
  • Abdominal Pain is a sign of possible adhesion formation, a bowel obstruction, infection, or nerve damage.
  • Rashes are commonly observed in association with hernia meshes such as the C-Qur V-Patch and Ventralex ST.
  • Leg, Groin, and Testicular Pain are all common to inguinal hernias repaired with mesh. This pain can be debilitating.
  • Pain with Sex (Dyspareunia) caused from the mesh used to repair an inguinal hernia attaching to the spermatic cord.
  • Testicle Removal may be necessary if the mesh erodes far enough into the spermatic cord.
  • Diarrhea can be an early symptom of the mesh attaching to the bowel.
  • Constipation can be a sign of a bowel obstruction. You should consult a doctor if your constipation persist for several days.
  • Nausea can be an additional sign of adhesions to the bowel and stomach.
  • Seroma is a fluid capsule surrounding the mesh. Seromas can be present with and without infection.
  • Fistula. An abnormal tunnel between two structures. Our attorneys observe many fistulas connecting to the bowel, which are associated with infections.
  • Dental Problems. Medical reviewers have observed a large number of patients who have lost their teeth after a hernia mesh infection.
  • Autoimmune Disorders. An alarming number of our patients have developed autoimmune disorders after being implanted with a pelvic or hernia mesh.
  • Neurological Changes. Several different patients that have been implanted with the same type of mesh have been diagnosed with unexplained neurological changes on a CT scan.
  • Severe Headache. Typically a sign of a larger problem, such as an infection.
  • Fever. Associated with both an autoimmune response to the mesh and infection.
  • Renal Failure has been observed in those implanted with large coated meshes. The coatings are absorbable and put a great deal of strain on the kidneys.
  • Liver Abnormalities have also been documented in those implanted with coated hernia meshes. The liver is also responsible for cleansing the body.
  • Joint Aches and Pain can be caused by increased systemic inflammation due to infection and an autoimmune reaction to the mesh.
  • Abnormal Sweating can be related to an autoimmune response or to an infection.
  • Meshoma is the migration, contracture, or bunching-up of an artificial mesh. Meshomas become hard, tumor-like bodies.

In addition to the Bard MDL 2846, there is other hernia mesh litigation in courts across the country, including the Ethicon Physiomesh MDL 2782, Judge Richard W. Story, US District Court-Northern District of Georgia. For current information on MDL 2782, see the Mass Tort Nexus briefcase Ethicon-MDL-2782-Physiomesh-Hernia-Mesh-Litigation for all up to date docket and case filing information.

There is also the Ethicon Physiomesh New Jersey State Court Multi-county litigation, see Ethicon Physiomesh MCL Designation to Superior Court Atlantic County Notice (New Jersey Supreme Court Aug 15, 2018), for information and to discuss potential referrals in the New Jersey Ethicon Physiomesh litigation contact, Joshua S. Kincannon, at JKincannon@lomurrofirm.com, where Josh is the head of the LoMurro Firm mass tort practice group in Freehold, NJ.

Meet The Hernia Mesh Lead Counsel in November
Kelsey Stokes, lead counsel in the Bard MDL 2846 from the Fleming, Nolen & Jez firm and Joshua Kincannon, lead counsel on the New Jersey Ethicon Physiomesh litigation from the LoMurro Firm will both be speaking at the upcoming Mass Tort Nexus “CLE Immersion Course” November 9 -12, 2018 at The Riverside Hotel in Fort Lauderdale , FL.  
For class attendance information please contact Jenny Levine at 954.520.4494 or Jenny@masstortnexus.com.
For the most up to date information on all MDL dockets and related mass torts visit www.masstortnexus.comand review our mass tort briefcases and professional site MDL briefcases.
To obtain our free newsletters that contain real time mass tort updates, visit www.masstortnexus.com/news and sign up for free access.  

 

 

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