FDA To McKesson – You Failed In Opioid Diversion Reporting: “FDA Cites Proof Of Failure To Report In-House Diversion”

McKesson Corp. Failed In Opioid Diversion Reporting: “By Failing To Report In-House Diversion”

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) In a very clear and direct statement, the FDA has issued a formal warning letter to McKesson Corp. where “failure to monitor and report” diversion of prescription opiates including when the diversion took place within McKesson’s in-house control. Examples of opiate deliveries to Rite-Aid pharmacies containing naproxen instead of opiates were delivered in broken-seal containers. Even after Rite-Aid reported the diversions on more than one occasion, there was a failure by McKesson to report the diversion to authorities as required by law, as well as failing to conduct a proper internal investigation.

A December 2018 congressional report on prescription pill dumping squarely placed the blame on U.S. prescription drug distributors and the Drug Enforcement Administration for not doing enough to help mitigate the nation’s opioid addiction and overdose crisis.

The report released by the House Energy and Commerce Committee followed an 18-month investigation and focused on the three largest U.S. wholesale drug companies, McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health and AmerisourceBergen, and regional distributors outlines a pattern of total avoidance at the highest levels where opioid prescription reporting was required by law.

The report cited examples of massive pill shipments to West Virginia, which has a population of 1.8 million and has by far the nation’s highest death rate from prescription drugs. McKesson shipped an average of 9,650 hydrocodone pills per day in 2007 to a now-closed pharmacy in Kermit, which has a population of about 400. The shipments were 36 times above a monthly dosage shipment threshold the company had established that year. Why there was no reporting on the catastrophic numbers remains a matter to be resolved in litigation, because McKesson offers no realistic explanation for their bad conduct in failure to report as required by law.

The report cited  prior federal records that showed drug wholesalers shipped 780 million hydrocodone and oxycodone pills to West Virginia from 2007 to 2012, a period when 1,728 people fatally overdosed on the painkillers. For instance, drug companies collectively poured 20.8 million hydrocodone and oxycodone pills into the small city of Williamson, West Virginia, between 2006 and 2016, according to a set of letters the committee released Tuesday. Williamson’s population was just 3,191 in 2010, according to US Census data.  These numbers are outrageous, and we will get to the bottom of how this destruction was able to be unleashed across West Virginia,” committee Chairman Greg Walden (R-Ore.) and ranking member Frank Pallone Jr. (D-N.J.) said in a joint statement to the Charleston Gazette-Mail.

The nation is currently grappling with an epidemic of opioid addiction and overdose deaths. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that, on average, 115 Americans die each day from opioid overdoses. West Virginia currently has the highest rate of drug overdose deaths in the country. Hardest hit have been the regions of West Virginia, Ohio and Kentucy where for some reason the opioid industry chose to focus their efforts, the how and why of their focus is being addressed in the federal and state courts across the country, with the primary cases being filed in the “Opiate Prescription Multidistrict Litigation MDL 2804” , being heard in the US District Court-Northern District of Ohio, in front of Judge Dan Polster, see Opiate Prescription MDL 2804 Briefcase.

It would now seem that McKesson will have to defend their failed diversion reporting conduct not only in the thousands of lawsuits they are facing, but in the renewed scrutiny that comes along with being outed as on eof the primary causes of the existing opioid crisis in America.

THE FULL FDA WARNING LETTER TO MCKESSON CORPORATION DATED FEBRUARY 7, 2019 IS BELOW

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Via SIGNATURE CONFIRMED DELIVERY
February 7, 2019

John H. Hammergren

Chief Executive Officer

McKesson Corporation

One Post Street

San Francisco, California 94104

 

Dear Mr. Hammergren:

From June 25 to July 3, 2018, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigators conducted an inspection at your corporate headquarters located at One Post Street, San Francisco, California.  FDA investigators also inspected your distribution center facility at 9700 SW Commerce Circle, Wilsonville, Oregon, from June 26 to 29, 2018.

This warning letter summarizes significant violations of the verification requirements found in section 582(c)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) (21 U.S.C. 360eee(c)(4)). These verification requirements are intended to help preserve the security of the supply chain for prescription drug products, thereby protecting patients from exposure to drugs that may be counterfeit, stolen, contaminated, or otherwise harmful.  The verification requirements at issue include those that apply to wholesale distributors when they determine or are notified that a product is suspect or illegitimate.[1]

FDA issued a Form FDA 483 to McKesson Corporation at its San Francisco corporate headquarters on July 3, 2018.  FDA reviewed your firm’s responses, dated July 25, 2018, September 25, 2018, and November 4, 2018.

During FDA’s inspection, FDA investigators observed that your firm failed to have systems in place to enable compliance with the verification requirements of section 582(c)(4) of the FD&C Act. Specific violations include, but may not be limited to, the following:

  1. Your firm failed to respond to illegitimate product notifications as required, which includes identifying all illegitimate product subject to such notifications in your possession or control and quarantining such product (section 582(c)(4)(B)(iii)).

      2. Your firm failed to quarantine and investigate suspect product (section 582(c)(4)(A)(i)).

      3. Your firm failed to keep, for not less than 6 years, records of the investigation of suspect product and the disposition of        illegitimate product (sections 582(c)(4)(A)(iii) and 582(c)(4)(B)(v)).

Failure to comply with any of the requirements under section 582 of the FD&C Act is a prohibited act under section 301(t) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 331(t)).

Example 1: In September and October 2016, McKesson was notified by your pharmacy trading partner, Rite Aid, that three separate Rite Aid pharmacies received illegitimate product, which they reported had been distributed by McKesson. Initially, McKesson was notified by Rite Aid on September 1, 2016, that their pharmacy located in Milford, Michigan, received a bottle labeled as containing 100 tablets of oxycodone hydrochloride (NDC 0406-8530) manufactured by Mallinckrodt. The seal of the bottle was broken, and the bottle contained no oxycodone hydrochloride.  The bottle contained only 15 tablets, which were later determined to be naproxen.  Rite Aid reported to McKesson that it had received this product through a transaction with McKesson.  Mallinckrodt submitted an illegitimate product notification (via Form 3911) to FDA about this oxycodone hydrochloride, noting that “the tablets that were in the bottle were foreign tablets.”

Rite Aid’s pharmacy located in Waterford, Michigan, also received illegitimate product, which they reported had been distributed by McKesson.  The pharmacy received one bottle, also labeled as containing 100 tablets of oxycodone hydrochloride, which had a broken seal and did not contain oxycodone hydrochloride.  The bottle’s contents were also replaced with 15 tablets of naproxen.  Rite Aid reported to McKesson that it had received this product through a transaction with McKesson. On September 15, 2016, Rite Aid alerted McKesson by email about this discovery of product with missing tablets.  Mallinckrodt submitted an illegitimate product notification to FDA (via Form 3911) about the oxycodone hydrochloride, noting that the Rite Aid pharmacy in Waterford “reported that upon opening a bottle of Mallinckrodt Oxycodone 30mg the seal was broken and 100 tablets of Oxycodone 30mg were missing.  Fifteen tablets of generic Aleve ([n]aproxen sodium 220mg tablets) manufactured by Amneal Pharmaceuticals were inside the bottle.”

On October 6, 2016, Rite Aid’s pharmacy located in Warren, Michigan, also received illegitimate product, which they reported had been distributed by McKesson.  The pharmacy had ordered five bottles of oxycodone hydrochloride.  In three of the bottles they received, all the oxycodone hydrochloride had been removed.  These three bottles contained various combinations of naproxen and ciprofloxacin hydrochloride.  Mallinckrodt submitted an illegitimate product notification (via Form 3911) to FDA about these products, noting that “three bottles were missing all 100 tablets of [o]xycodone [h]ydrochloride 30mg tabs and contained foreign tablets.”

Your firm’s investigation of these three incidents of illegitimate product determined that, because of the lack of evidence of tampering with these packages and the proximity of these three Rite Aid pharmacies, it was likely that the oxycodone hydrochloride was replaced with other product while the packages were in the possession or control of McKesson.

These instances illustrate your firm’s failure to have systems in place to enable compliance with the requirements of section 582(c)(4) of the FD&C Act. After receiving illegitimate product notifications from Rite Aid, your firm was required to respond by identifying all illegitimate product subject to such notification that was in its possession or control, including any product that was subsequently received (section 582(c)(4)(B)(iii)). McKesson was then required to quarantine such product within its possession or control from product intended for distribution until such product was dispositioned (section 582(c)(4)(B)(i)(I)), dispose of any illegitimate product within its possession or control (section 582(c)(4)(B)(i)(II)), take reasonable and appropriate steps to assist trading partners to dispose of illegitimate product not in the possession of McKesson (section 582(c)(4)(B)(i)(III)), and notify within 24 hours FDA and all immediate trading partners that may have received such illegitimate product (section 582(c)(4)(B)(ii)). Your firm was also required to keep, for not less than 6 years, records of the disposition of illegitimate product (sections 582(c)(4)(B)(v)).

Although your firm conducted an investigation related to these bottles of oxycodone hydrochloride, your firm was unable to demonstrate that you met key obligations under section 582(c)(4). For example, you did not demonstrate that you identified all illegitimate product subject to the notification, such as by searching for product with the same lot number or NDC, or that you quarantined any such product. Similarly, your firm failed to demonstrate that you notified your immediate trading partners who may have received product with the same lot number or NDC. This is particularly troubling because your firm’s investigation noted that the oxycodone hydrochloride was likely replaced with different product at a McKesson distribution center. Also troubling is that during the FDA inspection of your firm’s San Francisco headquarters, a McKesson representative stated that incidents involving stolen or diverted controlled substances are not treated as Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) verification events within the firm. In fact, DSCSA explicitly defines illegitimate product to include “a product for which credible evidence shows that the product is counterfeit, diverted, or stolen.”[2] Finally, your firm provided no records to demonstrate the disposition of these illegitimate products.

Corrective Actions

FDA has reviewed your firm’s responses to the Form FDA 483 and subsequent correspondence.

  1. Your firm’s response to the Form FDA 483 states that while you investigated “incidents related to potential diversion and theft issues … the incidents were not necessarily related to suspect or illegitimate products.”  This response parallels your representative’s statement to FDA investigators at your San Francisco headquarters that incidents involving stolen or diverted controlled substances are not treated as DSCSA verification events within the firm.  These statements demonstrate a lack of understanding of the definitions of suspect and illegitimate products, and of your firm’s responsibilities when notified of an illegitimate product by a trading partner.  All prescription drug products in finished dosage form for administration to a patient[4]– including those containing controlled substances – are subject to DSCSA verification requirements in section 582(c)(4). Moreover, the statute defines illegitimate product to include “a product for which credible evidence shows that the product is counterfeit, diverted, or stolen.”[5] Under the law, your firm must treat incidents involving suspect and illegitimate products as subject to DSCSA requirements, including products that are controlled substances.
  2. Your firm’s response to the Form FDA 483 cannot be evaluated because it lacks sufficient supporting documentation.  Your response states that McKesson plans to make procedural updates to its standard operating procedures, without describing what these updates are or providing new standard operating procedure documents for review.  FDA does not have enough information to conclude that future investigations of suspect or illegitimate product by McKesson will be conducted in a manner compliant with DSCSA.  Your firm’s response dated November 4, 2018, contains similar information as your previous response; namely regarding updates you have made to various policy documents.  Again, however, your firm provided no supporting documentation for review.
  3. Although your November 4, 2018, response to FDA states that you intend to form a “Product Safety Committee that will be responsible for coordination of all actions related to suspect or illegitimate product,” your firm provided no information about the composition of this committee or the procedures under which the committee will function.  As a result, your response does not demonstrate how the proposed change will improve McKesson’s compliance with DSCSA verification requirements.

 Conclusion

The violations cited in this letter are not intended to be an all-inclusive statement of violations at your facilities. You are responsible for investigating and determining the causes of the violations identified above, and for preventing their recurrence or the occurrence of other violations. It is your responsibility to ensure that your firm complies with all requirements of federal law.

Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in legal action without further notice, including injunction. Unresolved violations in this warning letter may also prevent other federal agencies from awarding contracts.

Within fifteen (15) working days of your receipt of this letter, please notify this office in writing of the specific steps that you have taken to (1) correct the violations identified in this warning letter, and (2) identify and conduct appropriate investigations and follow-up related to other reports of suspect or illegitimate product that you have identified or received. Please include an explanation of each step being taken to prevent the recurrence of violations and include copies of related documentation. In addition, provide the steps your firm has taken to prevent incidents of theft and diversion. If you disagree with the characterization of the violations of the FD&C Act in this warning letter, include your reasoning and any supporting infom,ation for our consideration. If you cannot complete corrective actions within fifteen (15) working days, state the reason for the delay and the time within which you will complete the corrections.
Please send your electronic reply to ORAPHARM4_Responses@FDA.HHS.GOV or mail your reply to:
CDR Steven E. Porter, Jr.
Director, Division of Pharmaceutical Quality Operations IV
U.S. Food & Drug Administration
19701 Fairchild Rd.
Irvine, California 92612-2506
Sincerely,

Alonza Cruse

Director

Office of Pharmaceutical Quality Operations

Office of Regulatory Affairs

 

 

 

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Plaintiff Scores Win in Cook IVC Filter MDL Bellwether Trial

Indiana Jury Awards Tonya Brand $3 million In Damages

By Mark A. York (February 6, 2019)

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) A federal jury awarded plaintiff Tonya Brand $3 million in the most recent Cook MDL 2570 IVC Filter bellwether trial on February 1, 2019 in Indianapolis. See Tonya Brand v. Cook IVC Filter Jury Verdict Form Feb 1, 2019 , where the jury determined that the design of the Cook Celect IVC Filter was defective and returned a verdict of $3 million dollars.

The jury declined to award punitive damages against Cook Medical, Inc. with Ms. Brand’s trial counsel, Misty Farris offering “we are happy with the jury verdict and are encouraged that the Celect IVC Filter was recognized as being defectively designed, as far as punitive damages not being awarded—we respect the jury decision to not award punitives and look forward to the next trial.” See Tonya Brand v Cook Punitive Jury Instructions Feb 5, 2019.

Ms. Farris further added, “We believe this was the right verdict and perhaps the defense may consider this when determining whether or not to begin settlement discussions,” as there are no other bellwether trials scheduled in the Cook MDL 2570 following the Tonya Brand trial. Will this verdict move Cook Medical and its legal team toward the start of settlement negotiations?

The Brand trial is just one of the more than 5,000 cases filed against Cook Medical, Inc. and its affiliates, where plaintiffs are alleging its blood clot filters were defectively designed. Ms. Brand’s attorneys offered to the jury that she pulled a part of her Cook IVC filter out of her thigh in 2011 after it broke up and deteriorated, while pieces of the device remain lodged in in other areas of her body and are unable to be removed. For additional information on the Cook IVC Filter MDL 2750 docket see Cook-Medical IVC-Filter-MDL-2570-Docket Briefcase, by Mass Tort Nexus.

In addition to Misty Farris, of Dallas-based Fears Nachawati, the trial team consisted of Ben Martin of  the Law Offices of Ben C. Martin; Denman Heard, of the Heard Law Firm; Laura Baughman, with Baron & Budd and Joseph Williams of Indiana-based Riley Williams & Piatt, with a sincere congratulations to the entire team on their trial victory!

The Brand jury verdict came in the third bellwether trial in the Cook IVC MDL 2750, after two previous cases selected for trial resulted in wins for Cook.

Cook promoted its Celect IVC filter which was implanted into Ms. Brand as retrievable, but the filters often tilt and pierce the inferior vena cava, or pieces break off and may travel to the duodenum and aorta as well as other parts of the body, resulting in metal fragments pressing against the spine and other critical areas and organs, making it impossible to remove without major surgery. Many times the filter migration requires multiple attempts at surgical removals which fail due to the location of where the metal IVC filter fragments have migrated to.

What is an IVC Filter?

An inferior vena cava (IVC) filter is a small device surgically inserted into the inferior vena cava, the largest vein in the body. These devices, resembling a cage with spindly legs, are designed to trap blood clots from traveling to the lungs and causing a pulmonary embolism. A pulmonary embolism is a potentially fatal blockage of an artery that carries blood from the heart to the lungs. The idea is that the clots will dissolve naturally once trapped in the filter. Some filters are permanent, but otherwise the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommends removing the filter between the 29th and 54th day after the filter is implanted, unless the threat of pulmonary embolism hasn’t subsided. The FDA concluded this specific time span based on a mathematical model they developed using available medical data. When the agency discovered this, they did issue a safety notice in 2010 and again in 2014 outlining the risks of leaving the devices in for too long.

Plaintiff claims include that Cook knew its Celect IVC filter had perforation problems before it was cleared by the FDA, yet pushed it to the market anyway. There are independent studies that found Celect had a perforation rate of greater than 79 percent, while the Cook-sponsored study the company presented to the FDA prior to Celect’s 510(k) clearance in 2008 showed a zero percent perforation rate.

Over 9000 IVC Filter Claims Filed

Since 1979 when IVC filters were first introduced, hundreds of thousands of IVC filters have been implanted in patients. In August 2010, the FDA issued a safety communication stating IVC filters “are not always removed,” and known long term IVC filter risks include lower limb deep vein thrombosis, filter fracture, filter migration, filter embolization and IVC perforation. There are now over 9,000 IVC filter lawsuits pending against Cook Medical, Johnson & Johnson, C.R. Bard, Cordis Corporation, B. Braun, Rex Medical, and other manufacturers in state and federal courts.

What are the risks of an inferior vena cava filter placement?

  • Infection
  • Excess bleeding
  • Allergic reaction
  • Damage to the blood vessel at the insertion site
  • Blockage of blood flow through the vena cava, which can cause leg swelling
  • A filter that travels to the heart or lungs, causing injury or death
  • A filter that pierces through the inferior vena cava, causing pain or damage to other organs
  • Problem with placement of the filter
  • Continued risk of a blood clot that travels to the lungs

Clinical Research Shows IVC Filter Dangers Were Known

 “Caval Penetration by Inferior Vena Cava Filters”

https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/full/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.115.016468

Zhongzhi JiaAlex WuMathew TamJames SpainJ. Mark McKinneyWeiping Wang    Originally published13 Jul 2015

https://doi.org/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.115.016468 Circulation. 2015;132:944–952

Blood clot filters are implanted in an estimated 250,000 people in the U.S. each year, most without incident. In the last decade, millions of filters have been implanted in Americans and Cook Medical, Inc. is justone of 11 manufacturers that make these devices and are involved in litigation pending in both federal and state court dockets across the country.

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  1. For the most up-to-date information on all MDL dockets and related mass torts visit www.masstortnexus.com and review our mass tort briefcases and professional site MDL briefcases.
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(Disclaimer: Excerpts in this document and media content may have originated in other media publications)

 

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“Simon Nitinol IVC Filters” Now Included In BARD IVC FILTER MDL 2641 Claims

“Simon Nitinol IVC Filters” Included In BARD IVC FILTER MDL 2641 Claims

By Mark A. York (January 29, 2019)

SIMON NITINOL IVC FILTER

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) Recent pleadings in the Bard IVC Filter MDL 2641 reflect Bard’s Simon Nitinol IVC Filters now being included in the types of IVC filters permitted in claims. The Simon IVC filters being allowed in the litigation is based on motions by Bard that were deemed moot and had also included a Bard request for a separate MDL for Simon Nitinol Filters, which was denied. See Bard IVC MDL 2641 Joint Report Re Bard Simon Nitinol Filters part of MDL (Jan 28, 2019) also referenced in the January 2, 2019 JPML order JPML Order Re: Simon Nitinol IVC Filters Included in MDL 2641.

Bard-Davol is attempting to consolidate MDL 2641 IVC Filter litigation cases now that settlement discussions seem to be starting in earnest and having all their filters in this MDL makes good business sense.

Bard’s history includes being known as the company that manufactured IVC filters associated with at least 27 deaths and hundreds of related problems when they replaced the initial IVC device with a modified version, that it knew had similar and potentially fatal flaws soon after it was put on the market.

Company records have shown that New Jersey based C.R. Bard was concerned about reports of failures for its G2 series filters, designed to replace the company’s Recovery filter, within four months of being cleared to sell the G2 by the Food and Drug Administration.

Bard is currently involved in MDL 2641 Bard IVC Filter Litigation in US District Court -Phoenix, Arizona. For further information, see Mass Tort Nexus Briefcase BARD-IVC-Filters-MDL-2641-Product-Liability-Litigation Briefcase.

Bard IVC filter models include:
  • Simon Nitinol IVC Filter
  • Recovery Filter System
  • G2 Vena Cava Filter
  • G2 Express Vena Cava Filter
  • Eclipse Vena Cava Filter
  • Meridian Vena Cava Filter
  • Denali Vena Cava Filter

But instead of recalling the G2 filter, and the virtually identical G2 Express, the medical device manufacturer decided to keep them on the market for five years until 2010, selling more than 160,000 of them.

At least 12 deaths and hundreds of problems are now linked to the G2 series filters, according to Bard and FDA records.

“All of the data that we’ve seen in our own studies, as well as other clinician researchers’, is that this device consistently fractures, consistently causes major complications,” said Dr. William Kuo, a interventional radiologist who runs Stanford Health Care’s IVC Filter Clinic, which specializes in removing failed blood clot filters. “The number of complications, the frequency of severe failures makes it obvious that it was never safe to be implanted.”

The spider-shaped Bard filters, implanted in the largest vein in the body (the inferior vena cava) were designed to stop blood clots from moving to the heart and lungs, where they could be fatal.

                  Two of Bard IVC Filter Products

Blood clot filters are implanted in an estimated 250,000 people in the U.S. each year, most without incident. In the last decade, millions of filters have been implanted in Americans. Bard is one of 11 manufacturers that make these devices.

Bard had hoped to gain a new foothold in the lucrative filter market when it introduced the Recovery filter. But after it received FDA clearance to market the device in 2002, reports of deaths and injuries associated with it moving and breaking steadily climbed.

confidential study commissioned by Bard showed that the Recovery filter had higher rates of relative risk for death, filter fracture and movement than all of its competitors. An outside doctor hired to conduct the study wrote that “further investigation…is urgently warranted.”

But Bard decided not to recall the Recovery from the market. In 2005, after the device had been sold for three years, the company replaced it with the similar G2 series of filters. Internal Bard records and hundreds of reports to the FDA show that the G2 series did not solve the filter’s problems.

confidential memo written in December 2005 by a Bard vice president soon after the G2 was cleared by the FDA shows his concern about “problems with…migration,” “tilting” and “perforation.” He also noted that Bard had another filter on the market that had virtually no complaints. “Why shouldn’t doctors be using that one rather than the G2?” he asked.

Another document written later that includes data through 2010 showed the G2 series filters had more fractures, migrations and reported problems than any of its competitors.

Clinical Research Shows IVC Filter Dangers Were Known

 “Caval Penetration by Inferior Vena Cava Filters”

https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/full/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.115.016468

Zhongzhi Jia, Alex Wu, Mathew Tam, James Spain, J. Mark McKinney, Weiping Wang    Originally published13 Jul 2015

https://doi.org/10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.115.016468Circulation. 2015;132:944–952

 Abstract:

Limited penetration into the caval wall is an important securing mechanism for inferior vena cava (IVC) filters; however, caval penetration can also cause unintentional complications. The aim of this study was to assess the incidence, severity, clinical consequences, and management of filter penetration across a range of commercially available IVC filters.

Methods and Results—

The MEDLINE database was searched for all studies (1970–2014) related to IVC filters. A total of 88 clinical studies and 112 case reports qualified for analysis; these studies included 9002 patients and 15 types of IVC filters. Overall, penetration was reported in 19% of patients (1699 of 9002), and 19% of those penetrations (322 of 1699) showed evidence of organ/structure involvement. Among patients with penetration, 8% were symptomatic, 45% were asymptomatic, and 47% had unknown symptomatology. The most frequently reported symptom was pain (77%, 108 of 140). Major complications were reported in 83 patients (5%). These complications required interventions including surgical removal of the IVC filter (n=63), endovascular stent placement or embolization (n=11), endovascular retrieval of the permanent filter (n=4), and percutaneous nephrostomy or ureteral stent placement (n=3). Complications led to death in 2 patients. A total of 87% of patients (127 of 146) underwent premature filter retrieval or interventions for underlying symptoms or penetration-related complications.

Conclusions—

Caval penetration is a frequent but clinically underrecognized complication of IVC filter placement. Symptomatic patients accounted for nearly 1/10th of all penetrations; most of these cases had organ/structure involvement. Interventions with endovascular retrieval and surgery were required in most of these symptomatic patients.

Introduction

The inferior vena cava (IVC) filter is a device that is implanted in the IVC to prevent lower-extremity deep venous thrombosis from causing life-threatening pulmonary embolism. The IVC filter achieves this by catching the embolizing thrombus between metal struts. Therefore, it is critical that the IVC filter maintains its position once implanted to fulfill this filtration function. Limited penetration of the filter into the caval wall is needed to secure the filter to the caval wall, so penetration is considered pathological only when the limb protrudes >3 mm beyond the caval wall.1 Over the last decade, as more patients with optional filters have returned for filter retrieval, penetration has been increasingly recognized as a frequent finding, particularly with conically shaped filters.2 Although most cases of penetration are asymptomatic and regarded as incidental findings on imaging studies, penetrations may be clinically significant when they involve the adjacent organs or structures. In such cases, filter penetration may require intervention.3

Clinical Perspective

The purposes of this study were to conduct a literature review on the frequency and severity of caval penetration for commercially available IVC filters and to discuss the potential mechanisms, risk factors, treatment, and prevention strategies for filter penetration.

 Search Strategy

Institutional Review Board approval was not required for this literature review. The MEDLINE database was searched (search parameters: PubMed from 1970–2014, English language) for terms describing IVC filters (key words: inferior vena cava, filter, and perforation or penetration). Prospective clinical trials, retrospective studies, case reports, and series with IVC filter placement and subsequent radiographic imaging or surgical follow-up were included in this review for analysis. We excluded studies of IVC filter placements without either imaging or surgical follow-up, review articles, animal studies, laboratory investigations, duplicated case reports or clinical studies, and other unrelated articles such as editorials, guidelines, response letters, commentaries, or special communications.

Data Extraction

Articles that met the inclusion criteria were reviewed. A standardized data extraction database was created by tabulating the following information: first author; year of publication; title; journal; study design (prospective, retrospective, or case report); number and model of IVC filters; number of patients with imaging or surgical follow-up; cases of penetration; imaging findings; clinical symptoms; interventions; and clinical outcomes. Two investigators conducted the literature search independently to verify data accuracy and completeness, with a third reviewer resolving any uncertainties. The formal definition of penetration provided by Society of Interventional Radiology guidelines (the extension of a limb >3 mm beyond the cava wall) was used in this study.1 Major complications of IVC penetration were defined as admission to a hospital for therapy (for outpatient procedures), an unplanned increase in the level of care, prolonged hospitalization, permanent adverse sequelae, or death after filter placement.1 The quality of clinical studies and case reports was assessed with the Grading of Recommendation, Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE), with study and report quality categorized as high, moderate, low, or very low.4

Results

The initial search for “IVC” and “filter” yielded 1511 English reports from January 1, 1970, to December 31, 2014. Of the 1511 reports, a total of 1311 studies were excluded, which included 146 review articles, 1158 studies unrelated to penetration, 1 duplicated clinical study, and 6 duplicated case reports (Figure 1). Ultimately, a total of 88 studies (14 prospective clinical trials and 74 retrospective studies) and 112 case reports were included in this study. The quality of evidence was as follows: high, n=9; moderate, n=44; low, n=34; and very low, n=113. The total number of filter placements qualified for analysis was 9002 (8833 from clinical studies and 169 from case reports; Figure 1). Fifteen types of filters exhibited caval penetration (Table 1); the basic shape of each involved filter is illustrated in Figure 2. Penetration segregated by filter type according to longitudinal studies is shown in Table 2. The incidence of caval penetration was 21% (973 of 4694) for conical filters and 4% (34 of 799) for nonconical filters (P<0.01). The incidence of caval penetration in prospective trials was 9.8% (105 of 1076) and for retrospective studies was 20% (902 of 4417). [end]

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WHAT DID BARD KNOW AND WHEN?

Bard kept the G2 series filters on the market until 2010, the same year that Chris Svedise had a Bard G2 Express implanted in him because he was prone to blood clots. Svedise, 69, a manager at a wholesale fish company in San Francisco, asked his doctor last October to check on the filter. He was alarmed to learn it had moved.

“He said, ‘It is dangerously close to your heart,’” Svedise said.

After two surgeons declined to remove the filter because of its precarious position, Svedise turned to Dr. William Kuo, whose team has developed an advanced technique to remove failed filters and filter pieces.

Dr. William Kuo of Stanford Health Care’s IVC Filter Clinic.

During emergency surgery, Kuo discovered three legs had already broken off of Svedise’s filter and traveled to his lungs. Kuo also said that two partially broken legs completely broke away during the operation. One, he said, could have killed Svedise.

“It floated off right in front of our eyes,” Kuo said. “First into the right atrium and then into the right ventricle. He’s very lucky.”

Kuo estimates that in the last 10 years he has removed 1,000 failed filters. Many of the cases were referred to him by other surgeons who deemed the procedure too complex and dangerous. Kuo said he has removed more Bard filters than any other single type.

The Recovery and G2 series filters should have been pulled from the market, “Whether it’s an ethical reason, a moral obligation, in the interest of public safety and patient safety, absolutely these devices should have been recalled,” he added.

Kuo said that along with device companies, the FDA also needs to take stronger action to protect patients.

“What we’ve learned the hard way is that we can no longer rely on medical device companies to do what’s in the best interest of the patient. And we can no longer rely on the FDA to properly regulate these devices,” he said.

Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, sent a letter to the FDA inquiring about the agency’s oversight of the filter. One of his questions was about the actions the agency takes when new information about the performance of an already cleared medical device becomes known.

“FDA’s only got one responsibility. It’s not the company, it’s John Q. Public — to protect the American public from two standpoints: safety and effectiveness,” Grassley said.

Grassley then issued a statement that the FDA’s response was incomplete and he has more questions as he decides what steps to take next.

Asked about Grassley’s concerns and why Bard’s Recovery and G2 filters were not recalled, the FDA declined to answer. The agency said in a statement that it has “investigated the risks of all of these devices,” not just Bard’s, and “issued safety communications” about “risks associated with IVC filters.”

In 2010 and 2014, the agency recommended in those safety alerts that doctors should consider removing the filters from patients as soon as protection from blood clots is no longer needed.

The Society of Interventional Radiologists, Society for Vascular Surgery, and blood clot filter manufacturers, including Bard, have started a large clinical trial called PRESERVE to examine how safe and effective filters now on the market are. The study, which the FDA helped organize, is expected to enroll 2,100 patients over the course of five years, the most ambitious filter study ever in the U.S.

In the meantime, Kuo worries about the steady stream of patients coming into his clinic whose filters have failed and risk injury or death. ”It’s upsetting to see the patients who have actually suffered from a system that appears to be broken,” he said.

As of January 2, 2019 when the JPML issued the Simon Nitinol related order, there were 85 Simon IVC filter related cases directly filed in to MDL 2641, and how many more of these claims will be filed is unknown, as many Simon Nitinol cases have been historically declined by firms due to not being part of Bard MDL 2641.

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Purdue Pharma’s Historical Bad Conduct Started 50 Years Ago: “Crafted By The Sackler Brothers”

 DOCUMENTS SHOW LONG-TERM DRUG INDUSTRY MANIPULATION BY THE SACKLERS

By Mark A. York (January 16, 2019

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) In 2007, Purdue Frederick Co. (not Purdue Pharma) and three company executives pled guilty to misbranding OxyContin and agreed to pay $634.5 million to resolve a U.S. Department of Justice investigation, in the US District Court of Virginia, see Purdue Criminal Plea Agreement US Department of Justice May 10, 2007. This plea deal “a get-out-of-jail free card” was engineered by none other than former New York City Mayor and political/corporate fixer, Rudy Guiliani, by directly leveraging high level US DOJ contacts and other DC insiders to derail the prosecution of Purdue Pharma, and instead offer up Purdue Fredrick Co. as the guilty party and thereby permitting the multi-billion dollar per year Oxycontin assembly line to continue operations.

The Sackler family has always been protected by the company shield, even though their most profitable selling opioid drug Oxycontin, and its boardroom coordinated marketing campaign was the brainchild and a direct result of the Purdue Pharma company founders, the Sackler brothers and their tried and true business model.

That is now changing, as the State of Massachusetts has filed a lawsuit against Purdue Pharma and the Sackler family as well as various Purdue executives over the prescription painkiller OxyContin. Oxycontin is now recognized as the opioid fuse that ignited America’s opioid crisis, and in a positive move forward, the leading executives and members of the multibillionaire Sackler family, now known to be feuding over the opioid crisis have been named in civil litigation.

The Sacklers named in the lawsuits include Theresa and Beverly, widows of Purdue founders, brothers Mortimer and Raymond Sackler and Ilene, Kathe and Mortimer David Alfons Sackler, three of Mortimer’s children; Jonathan and Richard Sackler, Raymond’s two sons; and David Sackler, Raymond’s grandson. The Sackler family is worth conservatively, an estimated$13 billion according to Forbes, which has been generated from sales of OxyContin.  As is normal procedure by the Sackler family and the company itself, the Sackler family feuding members always decline requests for comment on the catastrophic opioid crisis and avoid discussing any Purdue Pharma links to how the crisis came about.

As Purdue Pharma comes to grips with the fact that they are being designated as the primary litigation targets of states, counties and cities across the country for being the Opiate Big Pharma leader in creating the current opioid crisis in the United States, they may need to determine how they will pay the billions of dollars in jury verdicts and affiliated legal settlements resulting from the lawsuits that now number over 1,200 cases in state and federal courts.

The entire Sackler brothers’ Oxycontin marketing plan followed their previously proven drug marketing test drive of “Valium” – when Hoffman-LaRoche hired the Sacklers to market their new drug “diazepam” commonly known as Valium and its sister drug Librium.

While running the drug advertising company, Arthur Sackler became a publisher, starting a biweekly newspaper, the Medical Tribune, which eventually reached 600,000 physicians. He scoffed at suggestions that there was a conflict of interest between his roles as the head of a pharmaceutical-advertising company and the publisher of a periodical for doctors. Later it emerged that a company he owned, MD Publications, had paid the chief of the antibiotics division of the FDA, Henry Welch, nearly $300,000 in exchange for Welch’s help in promoting certain drugs. Sometimes, when Welch was giving a speech, he inserted a drug’s advertising slogan into his remarks. After the payments were discovered, Welch was forced to resign from the FDA.

When Purdue Pharma started selling its prescription opioid painkiller OxyContin in 1996, Dr. Richard Sackler asked people gathered for the launch party to envision natural disasters like an earthquake, a hurricane, or a blizzard. The debut of OxyContin, said Sackler — a member of the family that started and controls the company and then a company executive — “will be followed by a blizzard of prescriptions that will bury the competition.”

Five years later, as questions were raised about the risk of addiction and overdoses that came with taking OxyContin and opioid medications, Sackler outlined a strategy that critics have long accused the company of unleashing: divert the blame onto others, particularly the people who became addicted to opioids themselves.

“We have to hammer on the abusers in every way possible,” Sackler wrote in an email in February 2001. “They are the culprits and the problem. They are reckless criminals.”

Sackler’s comments at the party and his email are contained in newly public portions of a lawsuit filed by the state of Massachusetts against Purdue that alleges that the company, the Sackler family, and company executives misled prescribers and patients as they aimed to blanket the country with prescriptions for their addictive medications.

“By their misconduct, the Sacklers have hammered Massachusetts families in every way possible,” the state’s complaint says, noting that since 2007, Purdue has sold more than 70 million doses of opioids in Massachusetts for more than $500 million. “And the stigma they used as a weapon made the crisis worse.”

The new filing also reveals how Purdue aggressively pursued tight relationships with Tufts University’s Health Sciences Campus and Massachusetts General Hospital — two of the state’s premier academic medical centers — to expand prescribing by physicians, generate goodwill toward opioid painkillers among medical students and doctors in training, and combat negative reports about opioid addiction.

Since the beginning of May, the attorneys general of Florida, Nevada, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia have also filed lawsuits against the company.

New York City previously filed a $500 million suit, against pharmaceutical companies that make or distribute prescription opioids, the complaint was filed in New York state court, the Superior Court of Manhattan, which is a break from other Opioid lawsuits filed by cities, who filed into federal court, see Mass Tort Nexus Briefcase,  OPIOID-CRISIS: MDL-2804-OPIATE-PRESCRIPTION-LITIGATION. The primary claims state that the opiate drug companies fueled the deadly epidemic now afflicting the most populous U.S. city, joining Chicago, Seattle, Milwaukee and other major cities across the country in holding Big Pharma drug makers accountable for the opioid crisis. The case docket information is: City of New York v Purdue Pharma LP et al, New York State Supreme Court, New York County, No. 450133/2018.

Major US Cities Filing Suit Against Opioid Big Pharma-New York, Seattle, Chicago Join MDL 2804

Gov. Andrew Cuomo said in a statement “The opioid epidemic was manufactured by unscrupulous manufacturers and distributors who developed a $400 billion industry pumping human misery into our communities”.

The suit comes three months after Underwood first announced her intention to sue the pharma giant, joining several other states that have already targeted Purdue for its alleged role in the epidemic that saw more than 3,000 New Yorkers die of opioid overdoses in 2016. Daniel Raymond, deputy director of the Harm Reduction Coalition, said that the cities and states are forced to file suits now, after realizing initially that the opioid overdose rates “were primarily driven by prescription painkillers — they weren’t concentrated in urban areas.”

“But the recent rises in prescription overdoses, which in turn has accelerated a major increase in heroin overdoses, and particularly fentanyl, and the latter seems particularly prevalent in urban drug markets,” said Raymond, whose organization is based in New York City. “That’s certainly true in places like Ohio and Philadelphia, which are seeing a lot of fentanyl-involved overdose deaths. That doesn’t mean the problems have waned in smaller cities and rural areas, which are also seeing fentanyl, but we are seeing increasing vulnerability in major urban centers.”

The only bright spot — and it’s a dim one at that — was that the CDC found decreases in opioid overdoses in states like West Virginia, New Hampshire and Kentucky that have been leading the nation in the category.

“We hope this is a positive sign,” said Schuchat, who credited leadership, particularly in West Virginia, with taking bold steps to combat the crisis. “But we have to be cautious in the areas that have reported decreases.”

Dr. Rahul Gupta, then Director of Public Health for West Virginia has been at the forefront of addressing the opioid crisis in not only West Virginia but across the country, he stated “Sometimes places that have had such high rates have no place to go” but down, he added, with West Virginia being one of the states to address the issues pro-actively in all areas.

The same drug abuse related issues that are in New York and other major metropolitan areas are now at healthcare crisis levels, with the causation now being seen as based on the ongoing marketing abuses by Purdue Pharma and other opiate industry drug makers and distributors.

The new CDC “Vital Signs” report was released a week after Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a “statement of interest” in support of local governments that are suing the big pharmaceutical makers and distributors, accusing them of swamping many states with prescription painkillers and turning millions of Americans into junkies.

The new CDC numbers come from analysis of emergency room data from 16 states, including some hardest hit by the plague — Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia and Wisconsin.

Dozens of states, counties and local governments have independently sued opioid drugmakers in both state and federal courts across the country, (see OPIOID-CRISIS-BRIEFCASE-MDL-2804-OPIATE-PRESCRIPTION-LITIGATION by Mass Tort Nexus) with claims alleging all opiate drug makers, distributors and now the pharmacies engaged in fraudulent marketing to sell the powerful painkillers. They also failed to monitor and report the massive increases in opioid prescriptions flooding the US marketplace. Which has now resulted in fueling the nationwide epidemic, that’s reported to have killed over a quarter million people. The now organized approach steps up those efforts as officials sift evidence and are holding not only the companies, but the executives and owners culpable in the designing the opioid crisis.

Purdue Pharma is facing a legal assault on many fronts, as cities, counties and states have either filed suit or are probing the company for an alleged role in the United States’ opioid and addiction epidemic. The lawsuit filed by Massachusetts’ Attorney General Maura Healey, is the first to bring the company’s current and former execs into the mix, including the billionaire family with sole ownership of Purdue.

The Sackler family name graces some of the nation’s most prestigious bastions of culture and learning — the Sackler Center for Arts Education at the Guggenheim Museum, the Sackler Lefcourt Center for Child Development in Manhattan and the Sackler Institute for Developmental Psychobiology at Columbia University, to name a few.

Now for the first time since the opioid crisis came to the attention of America, the Sackler name is front and center in a lawsuit accusing the family and the company they own and run, Purdue Pharma, of helping to fuel the deadly opioid crisis that has killed thousands of Americans.

Lawsuit filed by the state of Massachusetts against Purdue Pharma

Under an agreement with Mass. General, Purdue has paid the hospital $3 million since 2009 and was allowed to propose “areas where education in the field of pain is needed” and “curriculum which might meet such needs,” the court document shows. Tufts made a Purdue employee an adjunct associate professor in 2011, Purdue-written materials were approved for teaching to Tufts students in 2014, and the company sent staff to Tufts as recently as 2017, the complaint says. Purdue’s New England staff was congratulated for “penetrating this account.”

A Tufts spokesman declined to comment, citing the ongoing legal process. Mass. General did not immediately comment.

In a statement Purdue criticized the Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey’s office, which is spearheading the lawsuit, and said the complaint was “a rush to vilify” Purdue. It noted that its medications were approved by the Food and Drug Administration and regulated by the government, and that the company promoted the medications “to licensed physicians who have the training and responsibility to ensure that medications are properly prescribed.”

“Massachusetts’ amended complaint irresponsibly and counterproductively casts every prescription of OxyContin as dangerous and illegitimate, substituting its lawyers’ sensational allegations for the expert scientific determinations of the [FDA] and completely ignoring the millions of patients who are prescribed Purdue Pharma’s medicines for the management of their severe chronic pain,” the company said.

It also said the state attorney general’s office omitted information about the steps Purdue has taken in the past decade to promote safe and appropriate use of opioid medicines.

“To distract from these omissions of fact and the other numerous deficiencies of its claims, the Attorney General has cherry-picked from among tens of millions of emails and other business documents produced by Purdue,” the company said. “The complaint is littered with biased and inaccurate characterizations of these documents and individual defendants, often highlighting potential courses of action that were ultimately rejected by the company.”

Healey’s office sued Purdue, current and former executives, and members of the Sackler family in June. In December, it filed an amended complaint that was nearly 200 pages longer than the June filing, with more allegations spelled out against the individual defendants. Many of the details were redacted; a portion of them were made public in an updated document filed Tuesday in state court, though much of the complaint is still blacked out.

The state’s suit focuses on Purdue’s actions since 2007, when the company and three current and former executives pled guilty in federal court to fraudulently marketing OxyContin and the company agreed to pay $600 million in fines. The case is separate from litigation being waged by STAT to obtain sealed Purdue documents in Kentucky, including the only known deposition of Richard Sackler, about the company’s marketing practices in earlier years, which have been blamed for igniting the current opioid addiction crisis.

The Massachusetts complaint sketches an image of the Sacklers, as board members, exercising tight control over the company, overseeing the deployment of a phalanx of sales representatives who were pushed to get Purdue medications into more hands, at higher doses, and for longer periods of time. The Sacklers, the complaint states, reaped “billion of dollars,” even as the company blurred the risks of addiction and overdose that came with the drugs.

Richard Sackler, who was named president of the company in 1999 before becoming co-chairman in 2003, is singled out in the complaint as particularly domineering as he demanded greater sales. In 2011, he decided to shadow sales reps for a week “to make sure his orders were followed,” the complaint states.

Russell Gasdia, then the company’s vice president of sales and marketing, who is also a defendant in the Massachusetts lawsuit, went to Purdue’s chief compliance officer to warn that if Sackler directly promoted opioids, it was “a potential compliance risk.”

“LOL,” the compliance officer replied, according to the complaint. Other staff raised concerns, but they ultimately said that “Richard needs to be mum and anonymous” when he went into the field.

After the visits to doctors, Richard Sackler claimed that Purdue’s drugs shouldn’t need a legally mandated warning. He wrote in an email cited in the complaint that the warning “implies a danger of untoward reactions and hazards that simply aren’t there.”

Secret trove reveals bold ‘crusade’ to make OxyContin a blockbuster

The following year, Sackler’s pressure on the staff grew so intense that Gasdia asked the CEO to intervene: “Anything you can do to reduce the direct contacts of Richard into the organization is appreciated,” Gasdia wrote in an email cited by the complaint.

It apparently didn’t work. The next week, Richard Sackler emailed sales managers to say that U.S. sales were “among the worst” in the world.

Sales managers were badgered on nights, weekends, and holidays, according to the filing. The marketing campaigns focused on high-volume doctors, who were visited repeatedly by salespeople, and pushed doctors to prescribe high doses. The demands on sales managers created such a stressful environment that in 2012, they threatened to fire all sales representatives in the Boston area because of lackluster numbers.

The complaint also accuses Purdue of rarely reporting alleged illegal activity, such as improper prescribing and massive Oxycontin order increases to government officials when it learned about it. In one 2009 case, a Purdue sales manager wrote to a company official that Purdue was promoting opioids to an illegal pill mill.

“I feel very certain this is an organized drug ring,” the employee wrote, adding “Shouldn’t the DEA be contacted about this?” Purdue did nothing for two years, according to the complaint.

In addition to relying on its sales force, Purdue cultivated ties with academic hospitals, which both treat patients and train the next generation of prescribers.

In 2002, the company started the Massachusetts General Hospital Purdue Pharma Pain Program after a Purdue employee reported that access to the hospital’s doctors “is great … they come to us with any questions, and allow us to see them when we need to.” The hospital, the staffer added, “has significant influence through most of New England, simply because they are MGH.”

As part of the program, Purdue gained influence over training programs and organized a symposium in the hospital’s famed “Ether Dome” — the site of the first public surgery with anesthetic.

The Sacklers renewed the deal with Mass. General in 2009 and agreed to contribute $3 million to fund the program, the lawsuit says.

Purdue’s funding, however, didn’t stop researchers at Mass. General from raising concerns about its products. The complaint cites a July 2011 email from Purdue’s then-chief medical officer Craig Landau — who is now the CEO and is a defendant in the lawsuit — flagging a study questioning the use of opioid painkillers for chronic pain that was conducted by Mass. General researchers with Purdue funding. Landau wanted to make sure that any Purdue-funded study supported the use of its medicines.

Purdue’s ties to Tufts date back even further, according to the lawsuit. In 1980, three Sacklers donated funding to launch the Sackler School of Graduate Biomedical Sciences. In 1999, the Sacklers gave money to help start the Tufts Masters of Science in Pain Research, Education, and Policy. Through the program, “Purdue got to control research on the treatment of pain coming out of a prominent and respected institution of learning,” the filing states. Purdue employees even taught a Tufts seminar about opioids, and Tufts and its teaching hospital collaborated with Purdue on a publication for patients called, “Taking Control of Your Pain.”

Purdue also allegedly used Tufts’s ties in Maine as reports about addiction emerged in the state. Tufts ran a residency program in the state, the complaint says, and in 2000 “agreed to help Purdue find doctors to attend an event where Purdue could defend its reputation.”

The bulk of the documents cited in the Massachusetts complaint were filed by Purdue in federal court in Ohio as part of a consolidated case involving hundreds of lawsuits filed by states, cities, counties, and tribes against Purdue, other opioid manufacturers, and others in the pharmaceutical industry.

Purdue says it produced 45 million pages of documents for the federal court case — known as a multidistrict litigation. In a motion filed last month and in an emergency hearing before the federal judge in Ohio overseeing the MDL, Purdue argued that the details in Massachusetts’ amended complaint were largely drawn from about 500 Purdue documents it had filed on a confidential basis in the federal court. The company’s lawyers argued the rules of confidentiality established in the federal court should apply to Massachusetts’ filing in state court, while state officials say the issue of what should be made public should be decided in state court.

Among the records Purdue said last month should remain confidential are those involving the company’s board of directors. Making them public, the company argued, would have a “chilling effect” on corporate governance.

The effort to protect the disclosure of board-related documents serves another purpose not cited by the company: It protects the Sackler family, whose members have long constituted the majority of board members.

In its filing last month, Purdue also said one company official, whom it did not name, was concerned for his safety because his home address was listed in the complaint along with “numerous irrelevant, incendiary, and misleading comments about his career at Purdue.”

Purdue’s attorneys contend the Massachusetts amended complaint is a “concerted effort by the Commonwealth to use confidential documents in an attempt to publicly embarrass Purdue and its officers, directors and employees.” They claim the information selected was “cherry-picked” to “bolster a series of inflammatory and misleading allegations against Purdue.”

In September 2017, Landau, by that time Purdue’s CEO, jotted down a note summarizing some of the roots of the opioid crisis. It reads:

“There are:
Too many Rxs being written
Too high a dose
For too long
For conditions that often don’t require them
By doctors who lack the requisite training in how
to use them appropriately.”

The state’s lawsuit concludes: “The opioid epidemic is not a mystery to the people who started it. The defendants knew what they were doing.”

The Sackler family is the 19th richest in the nation, with an estimated fortune of $13 billion, according to Forbes.

The Sacklers involved with Purdue Pharma are the descendants of brothers Mortimer and Raymond Sackler. Their eldest brother, Arthur, died in 1987, well before Purdue began making and selling OxyContin. Arthur also worked in pharmaceuticals and developed a reputation for cleverly marketing new drugs directly to doctors, convincing them to prescribe medications including tranquilizers to their patients.

Arthur was inducted into the Medical Advertising Hall of Fame after his death, but he has also been criticized for originating “most of the questionable practices that propelled the pharmaceutical industry into the scourge it is today,” as Allen Frances, the former chair of psychiatry at Duke University School of Medicine, told the New Yorker last year.

Arthur’s family has made a point of noting that he was not involved in the sale of OxyContin and would prefer him to be remembered for his philanthropy, including funding the Arthur M. Sackler Gallery of Chinese Stone Sculpture at The Metropolitan Museum in Manhattan and the Arthur M. Sackler Museum at Harvard University.

“None of the charitable donations made by Arthur prior to his death, nor that I made on his behalf after his death, were funded by the production, distribution or sale of OxyContin or other revenue from Purdue Pharma,” his widow, Jillian Sackler, said in a February statement. “Period.”

Seven of the Sacklers named in the suit have been on the Purdue board since the 1990s, according to the suit, while David Sackler, the grandson, has served since 2012.

The board met on a weekly — sometimes daily — basis while the company was being investigated by 26 states and the Justice Department from 2001 to 2007, according to the lawsuit. In 2007, the board settled and agreed to pay a $700 million fine after the company’s CEO at the time, Michael Friedman, and two other high-ranking company officials pleaded guilty to misleading doctors and patients about opioids.

KENTUCKY LEGAL FIGHT TO KEEP SACKLER TESTIMONY SEALED

In an example of the past coming back to haunt the present, in 2015 Purdue Pharma agreed to pay $24 million to settle a lawsuit filed by Kentucky, December 22, 2015 Purdue Pharma Settlement With State of Kentucky,  which Purdue thought would end that problem by paying a fine and moving on, which isn’t the case it seems. See Purdue Pharma settles with Kentucky over Oxycontin claim(statnews.com/pharmalot) for information on the claims in Kentucky.

That state court litigation is now subject to an ongoing legal battle in the Kentucky courts where Purdue is fighting to keep the original court records from that settlement sealed, due to the only deposition testimony of one of the Sackler brothers is known to be located. The Purdue court records were unsealed by Pike County Judge Stephen Combs in May 2016, and Purdue immediately appealed with oral arguments taking place June 26, 2017 in front of a three judge panel of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which as of June 20, 2018 has not issued a ruling on releasing the records. The original Kentucky vs. Purdue docket information is case no. 07-CI-01303, Judge Stephen Combs, Pike County Circuit Court of Kentucky.

OxyContin was hailed as a medical marvel when it debuted in 1995. Pitched as balm for people suffering from moderate to severe pain, it reportedly generated more than $35 billion in revenue for Purdue Pharma.

Oxycontin’s chief ingredient is oxycodone, a cousin of heroin, and prosecutors say Purdue played down the dangers of addiction while getting hundreds of thousands of Americans hooked on opioids.

Purdue has argued that OxyContin is approved by the Food and Drug Administration and accounts for just 2 percent of the opioid prescriptions nationwide.

To access the most relevant and real time information on Mass Torts  sign up for:

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For class attendance information please contact Jenny Levine at 954.520.4494 or Jenny@masstortnexus.com.

  1. For the most up-to-date information on all MDL dockets and related mass torts visit www.masstortnexus.com and review our mass tort briefcases and professional site MDL briefcases.
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(Disclaimer: Excerpts in this document and media content may have originated in other media publications)

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How Johnson & Johnson Hid Asbestos In J&J Baby Powder Products For Over 40 Years

“Why Did Johnson & Johnson Hide Asbestos In Baby Powder Products?” 

By Mark A. York  (January 2, 2019)

 

 

 

 

 

 

  (Mass Tort Nexus Media) Johnson & Johnson has hidden the fact that they’ve known its raw talc and finished powders tested positive for quantities of asbestos, with the company’s doctors and lawyers being fully aware of the findings but failed to alert regulators or consumers.  This may currently be due to the Talc based litigation docket that’s quickly becoming a major mass tort, but in looking back over 40 years, it seems that J&J simply chose to ignore the science and hide the data from the public.

Among the recent documents unsealed in court indicates that in May 1974, an official at Johnson & Johnson’s Windsor mine in Vermont recommended “the use of citric acid in the depression of chrysotile asbestos” from talc extracted from the site.

“The use of these systems is strongly urged by this writer to provide protection against what are currently considered to be materials presenting a severe health hazard and are potentially present in all talc ores in use at this time,” the mine’s director of research and development wrote then.

See also “New Evidence of Johnson & Johnson Bad Conduct Moved LA Jury to Award $417 Million Talc Verdict”.

Johnson & Johnson stock — up 6 percent for the year — plunged 11 percent on news of the report, based on memos, internal documents and confidential memos that the maker of Johnson’s Baby Powder had been compelled to share with attorneys for some 11,700 plaintiffs who claim the company’s powder products caused their cancers. The cases include thousands of women with ovarian cancer.

Johnson & Johnson is facing thousands of lawsuits across the country including in a federal multi-district litigation in New Jersey, see Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder MDL 2738 (USDC New Jersey). This litigation is related primarily to the ovarian cancer claims brought by women, who claim that J&J talcum powder products cause ovarian cancer, which combined with the emerging talc mesothelioma lawsuits, would open an entire new area of mass tort litigation for J&J and its affiliates to defend.

Any exposure to asbestos is a health risk, according to the World Health Organization and other medical groups.  ompany documents, along with deposition and trial testimony, show that from at least 1971 to the early 2000s, tests showed small amounts of asbestos could sometimes be found in the company’s raw talc and finished powders, Reuters reported.

At the same time, company executives, mine managers, scientists, doctors and lawyers worried about the problem and how to address it but did not disclose the issue to regulators or the public.

https://www.cbsnews.com/video/johnson-johnson-vows-to-appeal-4-7-billion-talcum-products-verdict/

An examination of the documents also revealed how J&J succeeded in curbing regulators’ plans to curtail asbestos in cosmetic talc products as well as scientist research on talc’s health effects, Reuters stated.

Johnson & Johnson denied reports in a statement to the Associated Press. J&J said “thousands of independent tests by regulators and the world’s leading labs prove our baby powder has never contained asbestos.”

The New Brunswick, New Jersey, company  also has publicly maintained in recent years there is no science to back alleged links between its powder and cancer. J&J has won several recent court cases alleging liability and damages, and is appealing other judgments, including $4.6 billion awarded in July to 22 women who claimed its product caused their ovarian cancer.

J&J dominated the talc powder market for more than a century, with its talc products adding $420 million to the company’s $76.5 billion in sales in 2017. While contributing a relatively small portion to overall revenue, Johnson’s Baby Powder is seen as a major component of J&J’s image as a caring company — a “sacred cow,” as one 2003 internal email cited by Reuters put it.

SCIENCE SAYS TALC IS DANGEROUS

The debate over talc began decades ago. In the early 1970s, scientists discovered talc particles in ovarian tumors. In 1982, Harvard researcher Daniel Cramer reported a link between talcum powder and ovarian cancer. His study was followed by several more finding an increased risk of ovarian cancer among regular users of talcum powder. Cramer, who at one point advised J&J to put a warning on its products, has become a frequent expert witness for women suing the company. J&J ignored and suppressed Mr. Cramer’s attempts to show them the study data then publicly declared this research as flawed, which J&J still continues to this day.

DOES J&J TALCUM POWDER CAUSE CANCER?

Johnson & Johnson has been ordered to pay nearly $1 billion in total damages after just 5 trials, alleging its baby powder is causing ovarian cancer, all jury verdicts have been in state courts in Missouri and California, see J&J Talc Trials St. Louis Missouri.

Talc, a mineral composed of magnesium, silicon, oxygen and hydrogen, is used extensively in cosmetics and personal care products. Women sometimes use talcum powder on their genital areas, sanitary napkins or diaphragms to absorb moisture and odor – contrary to the guidance of most physicians. (Asbestos, linked to lung cancer, was once an impurity in talc, but it has been banned for several decades.)  J&J is notorious for using any means possible to influence scientific data and opinion as well as manipulating research reports and public media commentary by industry experts. The recent California trial showed payments made to previously perceived impartial Science Council members, who were declaring publicly that J&J talcum powder does not pose a cancer risk, the Los Angeles jury did not agree with J&J and other pro-talc defense team members, as over $300 million of the total $417 million judgment was for punitive damages, usually awarded for intentional misconduct, see “New Evidence of Johnson & Johnson Bad Conduct Moved LA Jury to Award $417 Million Talc Verdict”.

His studies and the many others that have found a relationship used a case-control approach. A group of women diagnosed with ovarian cancer and a group without it were asked to recall their past diet and activities, and the results were then compared.

Critics say these kinds of studies have serious drawbacks, particularly “recall bias.” Women may forget what they did or, if diagnosed with cancer, might inadvertently overestimate their use of a suspect substance. People without a serious disease may be less motivated to remember details.

Three other studies – considered cohort studies – did not find any overall link. Unlike the case-control studies, these efforts began with a large group of women who did not have cancer and followed the progress of their health, with participants recording what they were doing in real time. The results of this approach, most scientists say, are stronger because they aren’t subject to the vagaries of memory.

One such study included more than 61,000 women followed for 12 years as part of the National Institutes of Health’s well-respected Women’s Health Initiative.

WILL “MESOTHELIOMA TALC” BE THE NEW MASS TORT?

Two recent verdicts for asbestos contamination demonstrate the risk to cosmetic talc defendants, when a Los Angeles County jury awarded $18M to Philip Depolian against Whittaker, Clark & Daniels finding it 30% responsible for his mesothelioma due to his alleged exposure to various cosmetic talc products used at his father’s barbershops that contained asbestos. The jury apportioned liability against various cosmetic talc defendants that had settled and several other cosmetic talc product defendants that sold products including Old Spice, Clubman, Kings Men and Mennen Shave Talc.

In 2015, another Los Angeles jury awarded Judith Winkel $13M against Colgate-Palmolive for mesothelioma allegedly caused by exposure to talc in its baby powder. The jury rejected Colgate and its experts’ claims that the cosmetic talc at issue was not contaminated by asbestos and that the talc in question were non-fibrous “cleavage fragments” unlikely to be inhaled or embedded in the lungs. Although details of the trial are not readily verified, at least one report indicated that evidence presented at trial showed that the talc contained 20% asbestos fibers.

These cases are particularly important because the defendants were held responsible for cosmetic talc containing asbestos and for having caused mesothelioma and not ovarian cancer as in the earlier J&J talc cases. Further, both juries found that the defendants acted with malice. However, the cases were confidentially settled before the respective punitive damage phases.

Will “Talc Mesothelioma” be the next mass tort against Johnson & Johnson and its affiliates? Mass Tort Nexus will continue to report on this as additional information becomes available.

 

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FDA STATEMENT ON BAYER ESSURE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AFTER BAYER STOPS U.S. SALES

 

 

Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on new steps to strengthen the long-term safety oversight of the Essure device following discontinuation of its U.S. sales

For Immediate Release

December 20, 2018

FDA Statement

When new safety concerns arise for particular devices, we’re committed to taking action to develop post-market information that can help patients and providers make more informed decisions and also support regulatory actions that reduce any potential risks to patients. We’ve taken a series of such steps with respect to Essure, a permanent birth control device. The product has been the focus of several important FDA safety actions. We’re announcing some additional steps today to make sure the FDA continues to evaluate the product’s long-term safety profile past its scheduled discontinuation from the U.S. market following a series of earlier regulatory actions that we took apply significant new requirements on its use. This includes the agency’s decision to take the step of making Essure a restricted device.

In July, citing the declining annual number of implantations, the manufacturer of the device, Bayer, announced that Essure will no longer be sold or distributed in the U.S. after Dec. 31, 2018. At that time, I stressed that, even when Essure is no longer sold, the FDA would remain vigilant in its oversight of the device. This includes requiring that Bayer complete the postmarket surveillance study that we ordered in February 2016. I also affirmed that we’d continue to actively communicate with patients and physicians as new information about the device becomes available or as the FDA takes additional regulatory steps.

Today, I’m providing an update on new steps to revise and strengthen the manufacturer’s postmarket study, to make sure we continue to collect long-term safety information following the discontinuation of the product to better evaluate the safety profile of the device when used in the real world.

As part of the revised protocol for the postmarket surveillance study, the FDA has worked with Bayer to see that the manufacturer implements several approved modifications to the study that we believe will strengthen the evidence collected.

First and foremost, women in the study will be followed for five years, rather than the three years that was initially required. This significant extension follows the FDA’s request that the company go beyond the three-year period provided for by law. This extension will provide us with longer-term information on adverse risks of the device, including issues that may lead women to have the device removed.

Second, we’re requiring additional blood testing of patients enrolled in follow-up visits during the study to learn more about patients’ levels of certain inflammatory markers that can be indicators of increased inflammation. This could help us better evaluate potential immune reactions to the device and whether these findings are associated with symptoms that patients have reported related to Essure.

The FDA is also requiring Bayer to continue to enroll patients who might still opt to receive Essure in advance of its full discontinuation from the U.S. market, and to continue to submit more frequent reports to the FDA on the study’s progress and results. Since FDA’s 2016 decision to order Bayer to conduct the postmarket study and then to add a boxed warning and Patient Decision Checklist to the labeling, sales of Essure declined by 70 percent. Earlier this year, the FDA decided to restrict the sale and distribution of the device to only health care providers and facilities that provide information to patients about the risks and benefits of this device and that give patients the opportunity to sign an acknowledgement of understanding before implantation. In view of this decline in sales and the manufacturer’s decision to discontinue sales and distribution at the end of this year, we recognize that Bayer is having challenges reaching the study’s initial sample size that relied on enrolling patients who were newly implanted with Essure until May 2020. We believe that this new, revised study plan will help provide more long-term information regarding complications that may be experienced by patients who have Essure, despite reduced enrollment.

For the past several years, the FDA has been monitoring the progress of an Essure post-approval study that was mandated to gather long-term data on pregnancies occurring in patients who may have received a transvaginal ultrasound in order to confirm that Essure was properly placed in a woman’s fallopian tubes and could be relied upon to prevent pregnancy. The FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health conducted an  analysis of an ongoing post-approval study data to gain a fuller understanding of device removals over time; they also completed their extensive evaluation into a significant collection of medical device reports submitted in 2017 and the first half of 2018 that mentioned issues involving potential device removal to learn more about why women were choosing to have the device removed, which usually requires a surgical procedure. CDRH also spent the past several months actively evaluating more than 15,000 medical device reports submitted to FDA in 2017 through June 2018 on the Essure device. (The majority of these reports referenced an instance in which the device was removed from a patient, and most came from cases that were made available by plaintiff attorneys as part of litigation against the manufacturer Bayer.) CDRH is providing some important new information about the removals of the Essure device learned from this analysis on our website.

Based on this information, the FDA instructed Bayer to extend the postmarket surveillance study from three years to five years to capture longer term information about device removals. We believe it’s important to continue closely monitoring device removals in the postmarket surveillance study to gain greater knowledge of this issue.

Following Essure’s removal from the market, the FDA is committed to continuing to monitor women who have the device implanted. In addition to the post-market surveillance study, the agency will continue its efforts to monitor Essure’s safety and effectiveness since its approval in 2002 by reviewing the medical literature, clinical trial information, post-approval study data and medical device reports submitted to the agency. This follows previous actions the FDA has taken, including requiring Bayer to add a boxed warning to the labeling of Essure and issue a Patient Decision Checklist to help women considering Essure to be fully informed about potential risks and the sales restriction that FDA placed on the product.

I personally had the opportunity to meet with women who have been adversely affected by Essure to listen and learn about their concerns. Some of the women I spoke with developed significant medical problems that they ascribe to their use of the product. We remain committed to these women and to improving how we monitor the safety of medical devices, including those related to women’s health.

We’re also advancing new ways to solidify our monitoring systems to achieve our new goal to consistently be the first among the world’s regulatory agencies to identify and act upon safety signals related to medical devices.

As we announced when we issued our Medical Device Safety Action Plan in April, we’re working to implement an active surveillance system to help us detect device safety signals faster, including for devices related to women’s health. We’re implementing active surveillance capabilities as part of our National Evaluation System of health Technology, which will leverage a wide range of data systems that could provide real-time information on device safety signals from electronic health information, such as registries and electronic medical records. We’re also continuing our ongoing efforts to strengthen our Coordinated Registry Networks (CRN), which link different real-world data sources to generate clinical evidence about medical devices used by patients.

We’re especially focused on addressing clinical questions for device therapies that address conditions that are unique to women, such as treatment of uterine fibroids, pelvic floor disorders, female sterilization (including the Essure device) and long-acting reversible contraception. To advance these goals, the FDA partnered with the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Urogynecologic Society, the National Library of Medicine and others on this effort, which is known as the Women’s Health Technologies CRN, or WHT-CRN. Once fully implemented, the WHT-CRN can be used to answer crucial questions on medical devices for women’s health to help supplement the evidence we’re gathering from postmarket studies and medical device reports. It could also help us detect safety issues with medical devices faster, enabling us to take actions — like the implementation of special controls — sooner.

We believe women who’ve been using Essure successfully to prevent pregnancy can and should continue to do so. Women who suspect the device may be related to symptoms they are experiencing, such as persistent pain, should talk to their doctor on what steps may be appropriate. Device removal has its own risks. Patients should discuss the benefits and risks of any procedure with their health care providers before deciding on the best option for them. The FDA will continue to collect and review reports of adverse events associated with device removal and is committed to continuing to provide updates on our evaluation of this data as the information is collected and we develop new findings about the device.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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VALSARTAN U.S. SUPPLIERS IN CHINA AND INDIA ON FDA RECALL RADAR: SEE FDA WARNING LETTER TO ZHEJIANG HUAHAI PHARMACEUTICAL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations

Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical 11/29/18

 

 

10903 New Hampshire Avenue
Silver Spring, MD 20993

Via UPS                                                          Warning Letter: 320-19-04

November 29, 2018

Mr. Jun Du

Executive Vice President

Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.

Coastal Industrial Zone, Chuannan No. 1 Branch No. 9 

Donghai Fifth Avenue, Linhai, Taizhou Zhejiang 317016

CHINA

Dear Mr. Du:

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected your drug manufacturing facility, Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., located at Coastal Industrial Zone, Chuannan No. 1 Branch No. 9, Donghai Fifth Avenue, Linhai, Taizhou Zhejiang, from July 23 to August 3, 2018.

 This warning letter summarizes significant deviations from current good manufacturing practice (CGMP) for active pharmaceutical ingredients (API).

Because your methods, facilities, or controls for manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding do not conform to CGMP, your API are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).

We reviewed your August 26, 2018, response in detail and acknowledge receipt of your subsequent correspondence.

During our inspection, our investigators observed specific deviations including, but not limited to, the following.

  1. Failure of your quality unit to ensure that quality-related complaints are investigated and resolved.

Valsartan API

Your firm received a complaint from a customer on June 6, 2018, after an unknown peak was detected during residual solvents testing for valsartan API manufactured at your facility. The unknown peak was identified as the probable human carcinogen N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA). Your investigation (DCE-18001) determined that the presence of NDMA was caused by the convergence of three process-related factors, one factor being the use of the solvent (b)(4)). Your investigation concluded that only one valsartan manufacturing process (referred to as the (b)(4) process in your investigation) was impacted by the presence of NDMA.

However, FDA analyses of samples of your API, and finished drug product manufactured with your API, identified NDMA in multiple batches manufactured with a different process, namely the (b)(4) process, which did not use the solvent (b)(4). These data demonstrate that your investigation was inadequate and failed to resolve the control and presence of NDMA in valsartan API distributed to customers. Your investigation also failed:

  • To include other factors that may have contributed to the presence of NDMA. For example, your investigation lacked a comprehensive evaluation of all raw materials used during manufacturing, including (b)(4).
  • To assess factors that could put your API at risk for NDMA cross-contamination, including batch blending, solvent recovery and re-use, shared production lines, and cleaning procedures.
  • To evaluate the potential for other mutagenic impurities to form in your products.

Our investigators also noted other examples of your firm’s inadequate investigation of unknown peaks observed in chromatograms. For example, valsartan intermediates (b)(4) and (b)(4) failed testing for an unknown impurity (specification ≤ (b)(4)%) with results of (b)(4)% for both batches. Your action plan indicated that the impurity would be identified as part of the investigation; however, you failed to do this. In addition, no root cause was determined for the presence of the unknown impurity. You stated that you reprocessed the batches and released them for further production.

Your response states that NDMA was difficult to detect. However, if you had investigated further, you may have found indicators in your residual solvent chromatograms alerting you to the presence of NDMA. For example, you told our investigators you were aware of a peak that eluted after the (b)(4) peak in valsartan API residual solvent chromatograms where the presence of NDMA was suspected to elute. At the time of testing, you considered this unidentified peak to be noise and investigated no further. Additionally, residual solvent chromatograms for valsartan API validation batches manufactured using your (b)(4) process, with (b)(4) in 2012 ((b)(4), and (b)(4)) show at least one unidentified peak eluting after the (b)(4) peak in the area where the presence of NDMA was suspected to elute.

Your response also states that you were not the only firm to identify NDMA in valsartan API. In your case, FDA analyses of samples identified amounts of NDMA in valsartan API manufactured at your firm that were significantly higher than the NDMA levels in valsartan API manufactured by other firms. FDA has grave concerns about the potential presence of mutagenic impurities in all intermediates and API manufactured at your facility, both because of the data indicating the presence of impurities in API manufactured by multiple processes, and because of the significant inadequacies in your investigation.

In response to this letter:

  • Submit risk assessments for all APIs and intermediates manufactured at your facility for the potential presence of mutagenic impurities.
  • Provide an update on investigations and CAPA plans initiated to address the presence of NDMA and other potential mutagenic impurities in all APIs manufactured at your firm.
  • Provide a thorough, independent assessment of your overall system for investigating deviations, discrepancies, out-of-specification (OOS) results, complaints, and other failures. In addition, provide a retrospective review of all distributed batches within expiry to determine if your firm released batches that did not conform to established specifications or appropriate manufacturing standards.
  • Provide test results for all (b)(4)and intermediates for the presence of NDMA, N-Nitrosodiethylamine (NDEA), and other potentially mutagenic impurities.

(b)(4) API

Your firm received a customer complaint on September 13, 2016, concerning (b)(4) API batches ((b)(4) and (b)(4)) that exceeded the specification for (b)(4) (≤ (b)(4)ppm). (b)(4) has been classified as a probable human carcinogen. Your customer’s test results conflicted with your (b)(4) test results, which showed the two batches meeting the specification upon release. Your complaint investigation (CC-16008) identified no clear laboratory error, and no anomalies were detected during the production of the batches. Your investigation failed to evaluate other (b)(4) API batches to determine if the presence of excess (b)(4) was an adverse trend. For example, (b)(4)batches (b)(4), and (b)(4) were OOS for (b)(4) because of production errors; however, they were not discussed in your complaint investigation.

Your response states that (b)(4) API batches (b)(4) and (b)(4) were returned, reprocessed, and released to customers in non-U.S. markets.

Your response also states that in August 2017 you implemented a new (b)(4) test method that uses a (b)(4) LC-MS/MS method, to replace the (b)(4) LC-MS method that was prone to erroneous OOS results. You failed to verify the reliability of the (b)(4) results for all (b)(4) API batches (including (b)(4) batch (b)(4)) originally released using your (b)(4) LC-MS method, which you indicated was inferior to your updated method.

In response to this letter, provide:

  • A risk assessment for all (b)(4) API batches manufactured within expiry.
  • A revised complaint handling procedure and details of any further controls your facility has implemented to ensure that all complaints are adequately documented and thoroughly investigated.
  • Procedures for accepting and reprocessing returned drugs.
  • Results of (b)(4) testing of all (b)(4)API batches released to the U.S. market using your updated (b)(4) LC-MS/MS (b)(4) test method.
  1. Failure to evaluate the potential effect that changes in the manufacturing process may have on the quality of your API.

In November 2011 you approved a valsartan API process change (PCRC – 11025) that included the use of the solvent (b)(4). Your intention was to improve the manufacturing process, increase product yield, and lower production costs. However, you failed to adequately assess the potential formation of mutagenic impurities when you implemented the new process. Specifically, you did not consider the potential for mutagenic or other toxic impurities to form from (b)(4) degradants, including the primary (b)(4) degradant, (b)(4). According to your ongoing investigation, (b)(4) is required for the probable human carcinogen NDMA to form during the valsartan API manufacturing process. NDMA was identified in valsartan API manufactured at your facility.

You also failed to evaluate the need for additional analytical methods to ensure that unanticipated impurities were appropriately detected and controlled in your valsartan API before you approved the process change. You are responsible for developing and using suitable methods to detect impurities when developing, and making changes to, your manufacturing processes. If new or higher levels of impurities are detected, you should fully evaluate the impurities and take action to ensure the drug is safe for patients.

Your response states that predicting NDMA formation during the valsartan manufacturing process required an extra dimension over current industry practice, and that that your process development study was adequate. We disagree. We remind you that common industry practice may not always be consistent with CGMP requirements and that you are responsible for the quality of drugs you produce.

Your response does not describe sufficient corrective actions to ensure that your firm has adequate change management procedures in place: (1) to thoroughly evaluate your API manufacturing processes, including changes to those processes; and (2) to detect any unsafe impurities, including potentially mutagenic impurities. For FDA’s current thinking on control of potentially mutagenic impurities, see FDA’s guidance document M7(R1) Assessment and Control of DNA Reactive (Mutagenic) Impurities in Pharmaceuticals To Limit Potential Carcinogenic Risk for approaches that FDA considers appropriate for evaluating mutagenic impurities, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM347725.pdf.

In response to this letter, provide:

  • Detailed revised change management procedures describing how your firm will assess and control all impurities, including mutagenic impurities, in API and intermediates manufactured at your facility.
  • Detailed procedures describing how your firm establishes impurity profiles for products manufactured at your firm. These procedures should contain instructions for comparing at appropriate intervals against the impurity profile in the regulatory submission, or for comparing against historical data, to detect changes to the API resulting from modifications in raw materials, equipment operating parameters, or the production process.
  • A retrospective analysis of other API and intermediates manufactured at your firm to determine if they were adequately evaluated for anticipated and unanticipated impurities, including potentially mutagenic impurities.
     

CGMP Consultant Recommended

Based upon the nature of the deviations we identified at your firm, we strongly recommend engaging a consultant qualified to evaluate your operations and assist your firm in meeting CGMP requirements. Your use of a consultant does not relieve your firm’s obligation to comply with CGMP. Your firm’s executive management remains responsible for fully resolving all deficiencies and ensuring ongoing CGMP compliance.

 Quality Systems Guidance

 Your firm’s quality systems are inadequate. For guidance on establishing and following CGMP compliant quality systems, see FDA’s guidances: Q8(R2) Pharmaceutical Development, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm073507.pdfQ9 Quality Risk Management, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm073511.pdf; and Q10 Pharmaceutical Quality System, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm073517.pdf.

 Additional API CGMP guidance

FDA considers the expectations outlined in ICH Q7 in determining whether API are manufactured in conformance with CGMP. See FDA’s guidance document Q7 Good Manufacturing Practice Guidance for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients for guidance regarding CGMP for the manufacture of API, at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/…/Guidances/ucm073497.pdf.

Conclusion

Deviations cited in this letter are not intended as an all-inclusive list. You are responsible for investigating these deviations, for determining the causes, for preventing their recurrence, and for preventing other deviations.

If you are considering an action that is likely to lead to a disruption in the supply of drugs produced at your facility, FDA requests that you contact CDER’s Drug Shortages Staff immediately, at drugshortages@fda.hhs.gov, so that FDA can work with you on the most effective way to bring your operations into compliance with the law. Contacting the Drug Shortages Staff also allows you to meet any obligations you may have to report discontinuances or interruptions in your drug manufacture under 21 U.S.C. 356C(b) and allows FDA to consider, as soon as possible, what actions, if any, may be needed to avoid shortages and protect the health of patients who depend on your products.

FDA placed your firm on Import Alert 66-40 on September 28, 2018.

Until you correct all deviations completely and we confirm your compliance with CGMP, FDA may withhold approval of any new applications or supplements listing your firm as a drug manufacturer.

Failure to correct these deviations may also result in FDA continuing to refuse admission of articles manufactured at Zhejiang Huahai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., located at Coastal Industrial Zone, Chuannan No. 1 Branch No. 9, Donghai Fifth Avenue, Linhai, Taizhou Zhejiang, into the United States under section 801(a)(3) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 381(a)(3). Under the same authority, articles may be subject to refusal of admission, in that the methods and controls used in their manufacture do not appear to conform to CGMP within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).

After you receive this letter, respond to this office in writing within 15 working days. Specify what you have done since our inspection to correct your deviations and to prevent their recurrence. If you cannot complete corrective actions within 15 working days, state your reasons for delay and your schedule for completion.

 Send your electronic reply to CDER-OC-OMQ-Communications@fda.hhs.gov or mail your reply to:

Rory K. Geyer

Compliance Officer

U.S. Food and Drug Administration

White Oak Building 51, Room 4235

10903 New Hampshire Avenue

Silver Spring, MD 20993

USA

Please identify your response with FEI 3003885745.

Sincerely,

/S/

Francis Godwin

Acting Director

Office of Manufacturing Quality

Office of Compliance

Center for Drug Evaluation and Research

 

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The Opioid Epidemic and State Courts – Why some aren’t filing into Opiate MDL 2804

Florida, Texas, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Massachusetts and others have started  their own Opioid Litigation in state courts across the country

By Mark A. York (December 10, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) Opioid abuse has been steadily increasing in the United States, and now state courts are becoming the legal venue of choice for filing lawsuits against the “opioid industry” and there may be a need for partnerships with other organizations to confront this epidemic. Lawsuits have already been filed in federal courts and by 22 U.S. states and Puerto Rico against Opiate Big Pharma. 

For a look at the Federal Opiate Litigation MDL 2804 see “OPIOID-CRISIS-BRIEFCASE -MDL-2804-OPIATE-PRESCRIPTION-LITIGATION” where states, counties, cities, indian tribes as well as unions, hospitals and individuals have filed more than 1000 lawsuits against the opioid industry as a whole.

BILLIONS IN PROFITS

The pharmaceutical industry spent a vast $6.4 billion in “direct-to-consumer” advertisements to hype new drugs in 2016, according tracking firm Kantar Media. That figure has gone up by 62% since 2012, Kantar Media says. This number may seem large at first but compared to the multi-billions in yearly profits just by opioid manufacturers over the last 15 years, the numbers is small.  Corporate earnings have risen every year since the push to increase opioid prescriptions in every way possible, to became an accepted business model in Big Pharma boardrooms across the country.

Opioids were involved in more than 42,000 overdose deaths in 2016, the last year for which data was available, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Kentucky, one of the nation’s hardest-hit states, lost more than 1,400 people to drug overdoses that year.

A NEW INFANT NAS MDL 2872

Kevin Thompson of the Opioid Justice Team, has filed a motion for a new prescription opiate related multidistrict litigation, which was heard in front of the JPML panel on November 28, 2018 in New York City, where the panel was requested to designate MDL No. 2872 (INFANTS BORN OPIOID-DEPENDENT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION) as a new and separate litigation focused on infants born addicted to opiates and suffering from what’s commonly knows as Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS) and numerous other long-term medical issues.

The current Opiate MDL 2804 is not moving litigation related to individuals forward in any way. Thompson’s team is requesting that the infant cases be carved out from the sprawling lawsuit in Cleveland and transferred to a federal judge in West Virginia, one of the hardest hit states where roughly 5 percent of all babies are born dependent on opioids. The overall Infant NAS MDL 2872 docket can be viewed here MDL 2872 Infant NAS Re-infants-born-opioid-dependent-products-liability-litigation docket.

The misuse of opioids starting with the flood of prescription pain medicines, which has cast a wide net to now include heroin, fentanyl, morphine, and other drugs both legal and illegal is a serious national problem. In 2015 one in ten Americans reported using an illicit drug in the past 30 days.[1] Marijuana use and the misuse of prescription pain relievers account for the majority of illicit drug use. Of the 21.5 million Americans 12 or older who had a substance-use disorder in 2014, 1.9 million had a substance-use disorder involving prescription pain relievers, and 586,000 had a substance-use disorder involving heroin.[2]

 

Widespread use of opioids has had a devastating impact on many communities. In 2014, more people died from drug overdoses than in any year on record, with 78 Americans dying every day from an opioid overdose. Drug overdose now surpasses motor-vehicle crashes as the leading cause of injury death in the United States. Most opioid-related overdoses involve prescription painkillers, but a growing number are the result of a powerful combination of heroin and fentanyl, a synthetic opioid often packaged and sold as heroin. Some of the largest concentrations of overdose deaths were in Appalachia and the Southwest, according to county-level estimates by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.[3]

One contributing factor behind the opioid epidemic is the increase in the use of prescription painkillers nationally. From 1991 to 2011, the number of opioid prescriptions dispensed by U.S. pharmacies tripled from 76 million to 219 million.[4] This increase in the use of opioids is unique to America. The United States represents less than 5 percent of the world’s population but consumes roughly 80 percent of the world’s supply of opioid drugs.[5] There is also wide variation from one state to another in opioid-prescribing rates. In 2012 twelve states had more opioid prescriptions than people: Alabama (142.9 per 100 people), Tennessee (142.8), West Virginia (137.6), Kentucky (128.4), Oklahoma (127.8), Mississippi (120.3), Louisiana (118), Arkansas (115.8), Indiana (109.1), Michigan (107), South Carolina (101.8), and Ohio (100.1).[6]

The impact of the opioid epidemic touches every aspect of our public safety and judicial system. Drug-related arrests involving opioids are skyrocketing. In many communities, court dockets and probation caseloads are filled with individuals with opioid-use disorders. Access to treatment, particularly medication-assisted treatment combined with cognitive behavioral interventions, is limited—particularly in rural communities. This epidemic also comes at a price. In 2015 the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services began providing substance-abuse treatment in Ohio’s prisons, spending an estimated $30 million per year on drug treatment in prisons, $4 million on housing for individuals in recovery, and $1 million over two years for naloxone to reverse drug overdoses. The Ohio State Highway Patrol spent over $2 million to expand and improve their crime lab to keep up with substance testing.

In addition to the impact of opioid abuse on the criminal courts, the nation’s family courts and child welfare system are being deeply impacted. A recent report by the Administration for Children and Families shows that after years of decline, the number of children in foster care is rising. Nearly three-quarters of all states reported an increase in the number of children entering foster care from 2014 to 2015. The largest increases occurred in Florida, Indiana, Georgia, Arizona, and Minnesota. From 2012 to 2016, the percentage of removals nationally due to parental substance abuse increased 13 percent to 32.2 percent.

In addition to hundreds of cases consolidated in federal court in Opiate MDL 2804, the defendants face a wave of litigation in state courts as well as civil and criminal investigations by numerous state attorneys general and the federal government. Any settlement would have to protect the defendant companies from future lawsuits over the same issue and that may be difficult to negotiate given all the concurrent litigation in different courts.

The primary federal litigation involving many cities and counties was consolidated by the JPML in December 2017 in a federal court in Cleveland, Ohio, in front of Judge Daniel Polster. The defendants include Purdue, J&J, Teva, Endo, AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health and McKesson. The federal litigation is growing daily see, Opiate Prescription MDL 2804, US District Court of Ohio link.

The time has now arrived for Opioid Big Pharma, in all forms to face the facts that for close to 20 years they have flooded the mainstream commerce of America with massive amounts of opiates with little to no oversight, which whether caused by a catastrophic systemic failure on many levels, or simple greed, the time has now come for the opiate industry to face the music of complex litigation in state and federal court venues across the country.

The judiciary can play a critical role in addressing the opioid epidemic. In August 2016, representatives from the Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia courts convened for the first-ever Regional Judicial Opioid (RJOI) Summit. The judicial summit brought together multidisciplinary delegates from each state to develop a regional action plan and consider regional strategies to combat the opioid epidemic. RJOI member states continue to work both within their home states and regionally to share promising practices, as well as to implement the objectives of the regional action plan. Courts are encouraged to work with partners in similar ways to:

  • Invest in local, state, and regional multidisciplinary, system-level strategic planning to identify policies or practice changes that can improve treatment engagement and reduce the risk of overdose death. Judges are particularly effective at using their convening power to bring together a variety of agencies and community stakeholders. The sequential intercept model is an effective approach to identifying gaps and opportunities for diverting criminal-justice-involved people to treatment. Communities are encouraged to not focus singularly on heroin use but to focus on substance-use disorders in general. A recent CDC study found that nearly all people who used heroin also used at least one other drug; most used at least three other drugs.[7]
  • Implement law-enforcement diversion programs, prosecutor diversion programs, or both to deflect or divert individuals with substance-use disorders from the criminal justice system into treatment at the earliest possible point.
  • Expand court diversion and sentencing options that provide substance-abuse treatment as an alternative to incarceration. Problem-solving courts, such as adult drug courts or veterans treatment courts, are the most notable examples of effective approaches.  
  • Incorporate strategic screening questions designed to identify criminal-justice-involved individuals at high-risk for overdose death into all criminal-justice-agency intake forms. Specifically, research suggests that individuals with a history of non-fatal overdoses, individuals with a history of opioids in combination with benzodiazepines like Xanax (alprazolam) and Soma (Carisoprodol), and individuals with an opioid-use disorder recently released from a confined environment (e.g., residential treatment or incarceration) are at particular risk for overdose death. This population should be prioritized for treatment and overdose-prevention services, such as naloxone access.

On January 24, 2017, the Bureau of Justice Assistance released funding for a “Comprehensive Opioid Abuse Program.” Through this solicitation, courts and their partners may implement overdose outreach projects, technology-assisted treatment programs, and diversion and alternatives to incarceration.

What remains to be seen is where and how the directly affected “individuals” who were prescribed millions of addictive opiates and subsequently became addicted and where thousands more overdosed and died, remains to be seen.

Who will be the advocate to make sure that these individuals as well as their children, families and communities as a whole are placed on the road to recovery. Historically, Big Pharma is not an industry to put the best interests of the paying consumer at the forefront of their agendas.

__________________________________________________________________________________________

[1] Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, “Key Substance Use and Mental Health Indicators in the United States: Results from the 2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health” (HHS Publication No. SMA 16-4984, NSDUH Series H-51), report prepared for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Rockville, Maryland, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.samhsa.gov/data/.

[2] Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, Behavioral Health Trends in the United States: Results from the 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2015).

[3] L. M. Rossen, B. Bastian, M. Warner, D. Khan, and Y. Chong, “Drug Poisoning Mortality: United States, 1999–2014,” National Center for Health Statistics, 2016.

[4] National Institute on Drug Abuse, “Prescription Opioids and Heroin,” Research Report Series, Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, Washington, D.C., 2015. Retrieved from https://d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/rx_and_heroin_rrs_layout_final.pdf.

[5] L. Manchikanti and A. Singh, “Therapeutic Opioids: A Ten-Year Perspective on the Complexities and Complications of Escalating Use, Abuse, and Nonmedical Use of Opioids,” Pain Physician 11, 2nd supp. (2008): S63-S88.

[6] L. J. Paulozzi, K. A. Mack, and J. M. Hockenberry, “Vital Signs: Variation Among States in Prescribing Pain Relievers and Benzodiazepines—United States,” Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, 2014.

[7] National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2011-2013.

 

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The FDA 510(k) System Overhaul -Process For Medical Device Approval: Is this a win for Big Pharma?

 

IS BIG PHARMA LOBBYING DICTATING FEDERAL REGULATORY POLICY IN WASHINGTON D.C. NOW?

By Mark A. York (December 5, 2018)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Official FDA announcement: FDA changes 510(k) program for approval and review of medical devices Nov. 26, 2018

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) On November 26, 2018 the FDA announced an overhaul of the 510(k) system that is meant to prompt manufacturers to base new products on technologies that are 10 years old or less. Almost 20% of the products currently cleared by the system were based on devices older than 10 years. For consumer safety, the FDA is considering whether to publicize the manufacturers and their devices that are based on older products.

The FDA is supposed to protect the interests of the general public and ensure that new devices, as well as existing ones are functioning as designed. More often that is not the case, as the FDA either fails to review medical device failures or simply ignores them.

The FDA has a reporting and tracking database that permits the public to review and see what devices are unsafe or causing adverse events, see FDA Medical Device Adverse Event Report Database.

Now there seems to be an effort by the FDA to pull back on the reporting functions in their official oversight duties. This includes the reporting requirements for problematic medical devices.

But earlier this year, the FDA made a rule change that could curtail that database, which was already considered to be of limited scope by medical researchers and the FDA itself.

For the FDA Medical Device Reporting Program (MDR): FDA.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/ReportaProblem

BIG PHARMA LOBBYING INFLUENCE

Pharmaceutical companies and medical device makers, collectively Big Pharma, spend far more than any other industry to influence politicians. Big Pharma has poured close to $2.5 billion into lobbying and funding members of Congress over the past decade.

Hundreds of millions of dollars flow to lobbyists and politicians on Capitol Hill each year to shape laws and policies that keep drug company profits growing. The pharmaceutical industry, which has about two lobbyists for every member of Congress, spent $152 million on influencing legislation in 2016, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Drug companies also contributed more than $20m directly to political campaigns last year. About 60% went to Republicans. Paul Ryan, the former speaker of the House of Representatives was the single largest beneficiary, with donations from the industry totaling $228,670.

Over the past decade, manufacturers have also paid out at least $1.6 billion to settle charges of regulatory violations, including corruption and fraud, around the world, according to the consortium, which published its report findings on November 26, 2018.

The new FDA rule, which had been sought by medical device manufacturers, opens the door for a decrease in reported information for nearly 9 out of 10 device categories, a recent review found. It could allow manufacturers to submit quarterly summarized reports for similar incidents, rather than individual reports every time malfunctions occur, meaning there will be much less detail about individual cases.

As part of the worldwide scrutiny of medical devices and at times, the  affiliated dangers, a massive investigation known as “The Implant Files” was undertaken by a group of journalists around the world.  Led by editors and reporters from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, it took a year to plan and another year to complete

ICIJ partnered with more than 250 journalists in 36 countries to examine how devices are tested, approved, marketed and monitored. This included an analysis of more than 8 million device-related health records, including death and injury reports and recalls.

The Implant Files review encompassed more than 1.7 million injuries and nearly 83,000 deaths suspected of being linked to medical devices over 10 years, and reported to the U.S. alone.

Like the rest of Big Pharma, the medical device manufacturers have created an intricate web of corporate and political influence including at the Federal Drug Administration, where the FDA is charged with oversight of medical devices.

The new rule is one of several regulatory changes favoring the medical device industry that have been proposed and enacted since the beginning of the Trump administration. They are part of a decades-long campaign to decrease U.S. regulation of the pharmaceutical and medical device industry, which is a massive global business that has existed for years with minimal international scrutiny.

A recent analysis of the 10 largest publicly traded medical device companies in the U.S. found that since the start of the Trump administration, the companies have spent more than $36.5 million on efforts to influence rules and legislation. Some of these companies manufacture a variety of medical products, including pharmaceuticals and lab equipment, but four of the 10 exclusively manufacture devices and lobbying disclosures for all 10 emphasize efforts to influence policy around devices.

BUYING A PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON

The medical device industry was worth $405 billion worldwide in 2017, according to an Accenture market analysis. Despite its size, the medical device industry has only a patchwork of international oversight, even though when things go wrong with a device, the consequences can be serious.

But the single largest medical device market in the world is the U.S., worth an estimated $156 billion in 2017, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. As the medical device market has boomed over the past several decades, the industry has built a sizable presence in Washington, D.C.

Many medical device companies have built sophisticated lobbying arms, often employing their own team of lobbyists in addition to hiring outside firms for specific issues. Several of the largest companies used between 15 and 50 lobbyists in 2017 alone, an analysis by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) found.

There are also two main trade groups for the industry to which device makers contribute membership fees to, both of which pack a hefty lobbying punch on their own. Since the start of 2017, the Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed), the older and larger group, has spent more than $6 million and the Medical Device Manufacturers Association (MDMA) has spent nearly $2.6 million. The groups’ policy goals echo those that individual companies list on their lobbying disclosures, among them: decreasing taxes on devices, increasing insurance coverage and reimbursement and the FDA’s approval process for bringing a device to market.

The medical device lobbying effort is vast, with lobbyists seeking to be heard on Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement codes, device purchasing policies at the Veterans Administration, even cybersecurity and trade issues. Companies regularly lobby Congress and target agencies and offices across the executive branches in D.C., from the FDA to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid and the National Security Council.

Altogether, the industry has spent more than $20 million per year for the past five years lobbying the federal government, according to an analysis of campaign finance and lobbying data from CRP.

With the change in administration in 2017, that spending increased to more than $26 million, $2.2 million more than its highest level in any of the previous four years. Based on disclosures from the first three quarters of the year, medical device lobbying in 2018 is on pace to exceed 2017 levels.

An industry spokesperson noted that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry spends more heavily on lobbying than the device industry. Big Pharma-pharmaceuticals, which was worth more than $453 billion in the U.S. in 2017, spent more than $171 million the same year, more than six times as much as the device industry, according to a Statista market analysis.

The lobbying resources of the device industry far outweigh those of consumer and patient advocates, which are often on the other side of regulatory debates on Capitol Hill.

Very few advocacy groups spend time lobbying on devices, said Dr. Diana Zuckerman, a former HHS official under Obama and president of the National Center for Health Research, a nonprofit advocacy organization based in Washington.

“When we’ve talked to congressional staff about this,” she said, “they say things like, ‘Well, we’re getting calls every day, all day long from various device companies or their lawyers,’ and the nonprofits are basically going to the Hill for visits a few hours a year.”

Zuckerman’s group is one of about a half dozen to lobby on devices over the past few years. Each of the largest spends no more than a few-hundred-thousand dollars annually to lobby on devices and all other consumer issues, according to their federal lobbying disclosures.

Trial lawyer groups, which the device industry spokesperson noted often sue device makers, also spent less than one third of what the device industry did in 2017, a CRP analysis found.

Three companies that spent the most on lobbying in the past five years were  ask about their lobbying efforts. Baxter International and Abbott Laboratories did not comment. Medtronic said, “Despite the company nearly doubling in size, our lobbying-related efforts over the last 10 years have remained relatively stable.”

Previously, Abbott, Medtronic and a half-dozen other international device makers told the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists that they conduct business with the highest ethical standards, adhere to all laws and have rigorous programs to prevent employee misconduct.

In a statement, Mark Leahey, president of MDMA, said, “As millions of Americans benefit daily from the more than 190,000 different medical devices available and in use in the United States, our members continue to work with patient groups and policy makers to advance policies that promote improved access for patients and providers. This dynamic innovation ecosystem remains committed to developing the cures and therapies of tomorrow, while reducing adverse events and learning from ongoing research and each patient’s experience.”

OBAMA – TRUMP COMPARISON

During its eight-year tenure, the Obama administration permitted some deregulation but also instituted the first FDA product ban since the 1980s.

Beginning in 2014, warning letters to industry began to drop steeply and approval of new devices to rise. By 2017, the number of FDA warning letters to device manufacturers about product safety had dropped to nearly 80 percent less than those issued in 2010, while approval numbers for new devices were more than three times as high as at the beginning of the decade. The FDA says the decrease in warning letters is due to a more interactive approach to working with violative companies, and the uptick in approvals is due to an increase in staffing and efficiency.

Under Obama, some FDA regulators responsible for overseeing the device industry pushed for deregulation. Administrators largely kept it in check, said Peter Lurie, an FDA associate commissioner during the Obama administration.

“It was accompanied by very heavy lobbying on Capitol Hill as well,” said Lurie. Priorities included faster device approval times and decreasing taxes.

During Obama’s final year in office, the FDA banned its first device in more than 30 years, a type of surgical glove and proposed a ban on a home shock collar for behavior modification. That ban is still pending.

The industry successfully pushed for changes in a proposed regulation on unique device identifiers, the identification codes for individual devices, similar to automotive vehicle identification numbers, and won the suspension of a tax on medical devices created to help fund the Affordable Care Act.

“Now with the advent of the Trump administration,” said Lurie, “the deregulatory gloves are off and we’re seeing a number of the device industry’s most desired objectives come to fruition.”

President Trump vowed to cut regulations across the government by 75 percent when he came into office.

In 2002, Congress instituted a program in which the device industry pays “user fees” to fund the FDA office that oversees it, amounts which are agreed upon in negotiations between industry and the regulator every five years. In its first year, the fees provided 10 percent of funding for the device center, but by 2018, the fees brought in more than $153 million, providing more than 35 percent of the center’s budget.

“It’s carefully negotiated for weeks and months at a time,” said Jack Mitchell, former director of Special Investigations for the FDA. “And there’s a laundry list of things that the industry gets FDA to agree to and that they’re paying for.”

If the most recent agreement, negotiated in 2017, had not gone through by the deadline, the agency would have legally been required to temporarily layoff at least one third of its device center staff. The final agreement included a decrease in approval time for certain devices.

“We do not believe user fee funding has influenced our decision making,” the FDA said in a statement, noting that other parts of the FDA are also funded by user fees.

The agency also noted that it held meetings with patient stakeholders in addition to industry when negotiating the user fee agreement, saying, “Patients are a critical part of the user fee process.”

The FDA emphasized that it does not always agree with the industry, citing as examples its support of legislation that makers of reusable devices provide instruction on how to prevent bacterial contamination, and including device identifier codes in insurance claims forms.

MAKING FDA APPROVAL EASIER FOR BIG PHARMA

The changes to how adverse events are reported was seen as an overwhelming industry success.

The FDA database in which surgical complications are entered is known as the Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database (MAUDE), which includes more than 750,000 incidents per year. The adverse events range from minor malfunctions to patient deaths linked to products being used around the world.

Despite its size, it’s widely accepted that the database is only a rather limited record of the full scale of medical device complications and adverse events.

The rule went into effect in August. The FDA said in a statement in November that though the reports are valuable, they were never meant to be sole source for determining if a device is causing harm.

“This type of reporting system has notable limitations,” said the FDA, “including the potential submission of incomplete, inaccurate, untimely, unverified, or biased data.”

Patients are able to report adverse events to the database themselves, but few know to do so. Companies are required to report the events, once they are notified., which they don’t always do. The FDA said thirty-three percent (33%)  of all FDA warning letters to device makers were to companies that failed to meet rules for reporting complications with devices.

The more companies that fail to file properly, the less the database accurately reflects what is happening to patients with devices.

Under the rule change, companies could be allowed to submit quarterly summarized reports for similar incidents, rather than individual reports each time malfunctions occur. Previously, qualified manufacturers could submit summarized reports if they filed a request with the agency. Now they can do so without making a request.

“[The database] is the way we’ve learned about some very serious health issues,” said Rita Redberg, a cardiologist at the University of San Francisco who studies adverse events like Hershey’s. “It’s the most widespread and publicly available database for adverse events, which is extremely important for patient safety.”

In a public comment in support of the rule change, AdvaMed called the change a “commonsense approach” that will reduce the volume of reports manufacturers need to submit to the FDA and streamline the information the FDA receives about malfunctions.

“This process will actually make it easier for third parties to assess the malfunction data in [the database],” said Greg Crist, a spokesperson for AdvaMed. “Comparing the old alternative summary reporting program to this new initiative is comparing apples to oranges.”

In response to public comments that critical report information would be lost with the change in reporting, the FDA wrote in the published rule that, “We do not believe there will be an adverse impact on the content of information provided to FDA.”

In a statement, the agency said the new program “streamlines the process for reporting of device malfunctions and allows us to more efficiently detect potential safety issues and identify trends. It also frees up resources to better focus on addressing the highest risks.”

But Redberg, is worried that the new rule change will make searching an already unwieldy database more difficult, decreasing the ability of researchers and the public to search for misfiled reports or see accurate numbers of adverse events.

“It makes things easier for industry, it makes things worse for patients,” she said. “I really think it’s a public health crisis. We have more and more devices in use, and for many of them we really have no idea how safe they are because we don’t have accurate reporting.”

How these changes are affecting medical care in the US, and more importantly the publics right to be informed of adverse events and problems with medical devices, their approval process and who’s lobbying who and for what in the FDA should be open and transparent.  

(Certain images and text excerpts in this article were reprinted from third party media sources)

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Why is the US Solicitor General Supporting Merck in Supreme Court Fosamax Preemption Appeal?

WILL BIG PHARMA LOBBYING EFFORTS BE PAYING DIVIDENDS IN 2019?

By Mark A. York (December 7, 2018)

The Supreme Court’s decision involving Merck’s osteoporosis drug Fosamax could have a ripple effect across Big Pharma and Mass Torts.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MASS TORT NEXUS MEDIA) The U.S. Supreme Court agreed in June to hear Merck & Co.’s appeal in the long running Fosamax liability litigation, (MDL No. 2243, District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano, USDC New Jersey) where plaintiffs are suing Merck & Co over its osteoporosis drug Fosamax, (see Fosamax [Merck] Appeal U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit).

The plaintiffs have requested the U.S. Supreme Court uphold a federal appeals court ruling that allowed their cases to move forward, however acting U.S. Solicitor General Jefferey Wall asked for permission to present oral arguments. It would be a plus for Merck, because Wall has been a major supporter of the Big Pharma position on the issue of preemption, which revolves around the question of whether FDA decisions protect pharma companies from state legal challenges.

How the Court answers this question will no doubt shape the drug and device industry for years to come. Levine provided that a drug manufacturer could not be held liable under a failure-to-warn theory if the FDA had previously considered—and rejected—a proposed amendment to the product’s warning label. But Levine did not clearly define when preemption would apply in these circumstances, and as a result, lower courts have struggled to uniformly apply this rule.  With Albrecht, the Court now has an opportunity to clear up the ambiguities left in Levine’s wake.

On December 3, 2018 the Supreme Court agreed to let the Solicitor General’s office participate in the oral arguments, which probably caused the executive suites at Big Pharma to raise a toast to Jeffrey Wall.

The pre-emption question dates back to the original Fosamax case, which was filed by patients who suffered femoral fractures while taking the osteoporosis drug. Merck added language to the product’s label about the risk in 2011, but more than 500 patients claimed that their injuries occurred before then, and Merck should have warned them sooner.

In January 2019, the full Supreme Court will hear arguments in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, a case arising out of the In Re: Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liability Litigation. Fosamax is a drug used to treat osteoporosis, with a cited adverse evenet bieng that it may inhibit bone repair, which could result in an atypical femoral fracture.

The central claim at issue concerns the Fosamax warning label, which initially did not warn of the risk of an atypical femoral fracture. Plaintiffs contend that the label should have included such a warning, while Merck counters that it tried to add language addressing the risk of a “Low-Energy Femoral Shaft Fracture,” but was prevented from doing so by the FDA, who affirmatively told Merck to “hold off” on adding any such language until the FDA could decide on “atypical fracture language, if it is warranted.”  Ultimately, the FDA rejected Merck’s proposed warning label, stating that the justification for such language was “inadequate.” The FDA reversed course the following year, and Merck then added a risk of atypical femoral fracture to Fosamax’s label.

Based on these facts, Merck moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claims, arguing that such claims were preempted under Wyeth v. Levine because “clear evidence” demonstrated that the FDA would not—and did not—approve of the proposed label change.  The District Court agreed, but the Third Circuit did not, holding instead that: (1) Levine’s reference to “‘clear evidence’ referr[ed] solely to the applicable standard of proof,” which Merck failed to satisfy; and (2) the issue of whether the FDA would have rejected the label change was a fact question for the jury.

Merck said it tried to update the label earlier, but failed because the FDA rejected its proposed wording. Because it was the FDA’s call, pre-emption should apply, Merck claimed and Wall concurred. Now, the Supreme Court will offer 10 minutes for the U.S. to make its case.

“The government has a significant interest in the proper resolution of the case, which concerns the manner in which the scope and effect of an FDA labeling decision is determined in private tort litigation,” asserted Wall in his MOTION OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE FOR LEAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN ORAL ARGUMENTS.

At least three court members (Thomas, Gorsuch, and Roberts) appear likely to support preemption under this set of facts, and it would not be unreasonable for Kagan, Ginsburg, and/or Breyer to hold similarly, given that the latter two were both part of the Levine majority, which stated that preemption would apply if there existed “clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change[.]” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 571 (2009). The odds of a five-justice majority favoring preemption could be buttressed if Kavanaugh is confirmed. Regardless, all one can truly hope for is that the Court avoids a plurality decision, since such an outcome would leave the Third Circuit’s opinion intact and muddy the waters further.

SCOTUS Docket: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht

17-290 3d Cir.  Hearing Date January 7, 2019

Issue: Whether a state-law failure-to-warn claim is pre-empted when the Food and Drug Administration rejected the drug manufacturer’s proposal to warn about the risk after being provided with the relevant scientific data, or whether such a case must go to a jury for conjecture as to why the FDA rejected the proposed warning. CVSG: 05/22/2018.

Date Proceedings and Orders (key to color coding)
Jun 23 2017 Application (16A1264) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from July 23, 2017 to August 22, 2017, submitted to Justice Alito.
Jun 27 2017 Application (16A1264) granted by Justice Alito extending the time to file until August 22, 2017.
Aug 22 2017 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due September 25, 2017)
Aug 31 2017 Waiver of right of respondents Affronti, Joanne, et al. to respond filed.
Sep 11 2017 Blanket Consent filed by Petitioner, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. on 09/12/2017
Sep 19 2017 Waiver of right of respondents Esther Parker & Pamela Paralikis to respond filed.
Sep 20 2017 Blanket Consent filed by Respondents, Albrecht, Doris, et al. on 09/21/2017
Sep 21 2017 Order extending time to file response to petition to and including October 25, 2017, for all respondents.
Sep 22 2017 Because Justice Alito now realizes that he should have recused himself from consideration of this application, the order of June 27, 2017, is vacated. Pursuant to Rule 22.2, the application (16A1264) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from July 23, 2017 to August 22, 2017, has been submitted to Justice Sotomayor.
Sep 22 2017 Application (16A1264) granted by Justice Sotomayor extending the time to file until August 22, 2017. (Justice Alito is recused)
Sep 25 2017 Brief amicus curiae of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America filed.
Sep 25 2017 Brief amici curiae of Product Liability Adisory Council, Inc., et al. filed.
Oct 25 2017 Brief of respondents Doris Albrecht, et al. in opposition filed.
Nov 08 2017 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/1/2017.
Nov 08 2017 Reply of petitioner Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. filed. (Distributed)
Dec 04 2017 The Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
May 22 2018 Brief amicus curiae of United States filed (to be corrected and reprinted).
May 22 2018 Brief amicus curiae of United States filed (Corrected brief received 5/29/18).
Jun 05 2018 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/21/2018.
Jun 05 2018 Supplemental brief of respondents Doris Albrecht, et al. filed. (Distributed)
Jun 07 2018 Supplemental brief of petitioner Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. filed. (Distributed)
Jun 27 2018 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/27/2018.
Jun 28 2018 Petition GRANTED. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
Jul 27 2018 Motion for an extension of time to file the opening briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner’s brief on the merits is extended to and including September 13, 2018. The time to file respondents’ brief on the merits is extended to and including November 14, 2018.
Jul 27 2018 Motion for an extension of time to file the opening briefs on the merits filed.
Sep 12 2018 Blanket Consent filed by Respondents, Doris Albrecht, et al..
Sep 13 2018 Brief of petitioner Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. filed.
Sep 13 2018 Joint appendix (2 volumes) filed. (Statement of costs filed)
Sep 17 2018 Blanket Consent filed by Petitioner, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp..
Sep 20 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Washington Legal Foundation filed.
Sep 20 2018 Brief amici curiae of Product Liability Adisory Council, Inc., et al. filed.
Sep 20 2018 Brief amici curiae of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, et al. filed.
Sep 20 2018 Brief amicus curiae of United States filed.
Oct 12 2018 Motion of the Acting Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument filed.
Oct 26 2018 Justice Alito is no longer recused in this case.
Nov 14 2018 Brief of respondents Doris Albrecht, et al. filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amicus curiae of Public Citizen filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amici curiae of Commonwealth of Virginia, et al. filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amici curiae of Joseph Lane, M.D., and Vincent Vigorita, M.D. filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amici curiae of MedShadow Foundation, et al. filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amicus curiae of The Cato Institute filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amici curiae of Tort Law Professors John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amici curiae of Public Law Scholars filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amici curiae of Jerome P. Kassirer, M.D., et al. filed.
Nov 21 2018 Brief amicus curiae of American Association for Justice filed.
Nov 28 2018 SET FOR ARGUMENT ON Monday, January 7, 2019
Nov 30 2018 CIRCULATED

The SCOTUS ability to resolve the preemption question could have a ripple effect on the entire pharma industry. The issue generated heated debate a few years back, when a liability case raised questions about whether generics makers can be held responsible for patients’ injuries, given that they must use label language the FDA approved for branded versions of the drugs.

In a close 5-4 decision, the justices ruled that generics makers could not be held liable in those cases.

Initially, it looked as if Merck would prevail in its preemption argument, too, as the  defense had won two bellwether lawsuits filed over alleged Fosamax injuries. Then, in 2014, a federal judge tossed out 5,000 lawsuits from patients who claimed their fractures were caused by Fosamax, followed by a federal appeals court reviving those cases by over-ruling that dismissal.

Lawyers representing the patients in this case have argued that Merck’s preemption argument is faulty because it’s largely based on an internal memo recounting a phone conversation one of its employees had with the FDA.

“Respondents are aware of no other preemption case in which the manufacturer relied on hearsay accounts of informal FDA communications,” the lawyers said in a recent brief.

Merck developed Fosamax to strengthen bones and reduce the risk of fractures from osteoporosis. However, numerous studies have linked the medication to an elevated risk of abnormal femur fractures. Furthermore, plaintiffs in the litigation argue that Merck had an intrinsic obligation to its consumers to provide stronger warnings that users could experience femur fractures from little or no trauma while taking the medication. This includes falling from standing height or less.

Merck introduced Fosamax in 1995, and the company didn’t add a thigh bone fracture risk warning label to the drug until 2011. Plaintiffs claim Merck knew about the risk for years but concealed it to maximize sales and profits.

Fosamax was a blockbuster drug with annual sales of over $3 billion, until the company  lost its exclusive patent rights in 2008, even then the brand name drug still brought in $284 million in sales in 2016.

Both Merck and the Solicitor General contend that if the FDA believed there was scientific reasoning to support a labeling change, the agency would have added the warning, because federal laws require it to do so.

As SCOTUS gets set to hear the case, many individuals and organizations have filed briefs in support, urging the justices to uphold the lower court ruling that would allow those thousands of Fosamax suits to go forward. Consumer watchdog group Public Citizen, for example, filed a brief earlier this month suggesting that Merck’s pre-emption argument is invalid because federal statutes do not support the idea that “the FDA’s rejection of a particular proposed warning constitutes a determination ‘that no new labeling language is warranted.’”

Besides, Public Citizen argued (PDF), SCOTUS should preserve patients’ rights to pursue drug liability claims in state courts, and by siding with Merck, the judges might make it much harder for those suits to be filed.

“Allowing patients to pursue tort claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers for injuries caused by inadequate warnings is important as both an incentive for manufacturers to be vigilant about product safety and a means to provide remedies to patients,” Public Citizen wrote. “For this reason, the case has important implications that go well beyond the interests of the parties.”

How Big Pharma’s cadre of lobbyists and congressional insiders appears to be paying major dividends as we approach 2019 remaons to be seen, but considering the wide-open lack of federal oversight for pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers by the current administration, it would appear that Big Pharma investments in the FDA and related oversight agencies is apying off very well.

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